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Introduction
Traditionally economic theory is based on very narrow presumptions about hu-
man behavior. It is essentially assumed that people only care about their own
monetary payoﬀ, or, in other words, that people are selﬁsh. However, in the last
20 years experimental research has accumulated overwhelming evidence that is at
odds with this classical model of human behavior. It has been shown that people
very often care about the distributional consequences of their actions as well as
underlying motives and intentions. As a consequence the model of human be-
havior has been substantially widened. Models of distributional concerns as well
as belief-dependent models of reciprocity, guilt aversion, regret and shame have
been conceptualized. Against the background of the experimental ﬁndings and
the associated new models of human behavior, the question arises whether the
broadening of the behavioral presumptions impacts the conclusions drawn on the
basis of our classical model. This question is the central point of my dissertation.
More precisely, I study in four diﬀerent papers the impact of these broader models
of human behavior on decision making and human interactions.
In the ﬁrst paper, ’Investments into education - Doing as the parents did’ (with
Georg Kirchsteiger), we study the impact of indirect reciprocity on the eﬃciency
of private investments into human capital. The starting point of this project is
empirical evidence suggesting that parents act indirectly reciprocal toward their
children. Indirect reciprocity in this context means that parents that have received
a lot (little) from their parents tend to give also a lot (little) to their children. More
speciﬁcally, the paper focuses on parental investments into the education of their
children, i.e. parents that have received a lot of education ﬁnanced for by their
parents do the same for their children and vice versa. This indirectly reciprocal
behavior implies an intergenerational chain transmitting the attitude towards the
formation of human capital from one generation to the next. In this paper we
incorporate this ’chain’ into an overlapping generations model with endogenous
human capital formation and show that in absence of any state intervention such
an economy might be characterized by multiple steady states. Interestingly, tem-
porary public investments into human capital formation can move the economy
from a steady state with low human capital levels to one with higher human capital
levels. Nevertheless, even the best steady state that can be reached by temporary
public investments is suboptimal when human capital is privately provided in the
long run. This ineﬃciency can only be overcome by a permanent public subsidy
for education. The analysis, hence, presents another good reason for government
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intervention to support optimal private investments into the education of children.
The second project, ’Procedural Concerns and Reciprocity’, concentrates on
another issue concerning the model of human behavior in economic theory. ’Proce-
dural concern’ is a well established concept in psychology. Sparked by experimen-
tal evidence, economists have only lately started to ask the question why people
often behave very diﬀerently in outcome-wise identical situations depending on the
ways, i.e. procedures, which have led to them. In this second project I present a
framework which allows to account for procedural concerns in economic analyzes.
More speciﬁcally, building on Martin Dufwenberg and Georg Kirchsteiger (2004)’s
’theory of sequential reciprocity’, I show how procedural concerns can be concep-
tualized assuming that agents are (also) motivated by belief-dependent reciprocal
preferences. Already during my work on ’Procedural Concerns and Reciprocity’ I
came to the conviction that it actually represents only one step in a bigger theory.
Reciprocity is only one type of motive through which procedural concerns can be
rationalized.
In my job market paper, ’Procedural Concerns in Psychological Games’, I
generalize this idea to show that in the presence of all kinds of belief-dependent
utilities (guilt, reciprocity, regret etc) procedural concerns arise. Hence, building
on my second project, I generalize in this third project the results regarding proce-
dural concerns to all kinds of belief-dependent motivations and demonstrate how
the interaction of agents with belief-dependent psychological payoﬀs is inﬂuenced
by procedural choices. More speciﬁcally, I use Martin Dufwenberg and Pierpaolo
Battigalli (2007)’s framework of ’dynamic psychological games’ and show that pro-
cedural concerns cannot only be conceptualised assuming reciprocal preferences,
but inherently arise in the interaction of agents with all kinds of belief-dependent
motivations. One of the main contributions, in my view, is the way that I de-
ﬁne procedures and formalize ’procedural games’ in which agents do not choose
actions and strategies, as traditionally assumed in game theory, but procedures.
I show that outcomes and procedures are inherently connected but nevertheless
play distinct roles in the interaction of agents with belief-dependent utilities. In
the context of the procedural games I clearly separate procedural choices from
outcomes which allows to isolate the impact that procedural choices have on the
strategic interaction of agents.
Lastly, in the paper ’How (too much) self esteem facilitates contracts with
subjective evaluations’ (with Markus Walzl) we analyze the impact of aggres-
sive reactions to ego-threatening feedback on principal-agent relationships. More
speciﬁcally, we show how peoples’ desire to protect their self-esteem can explain
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the existence of contractual relationships in environments with unobservable eﬀort
and subjective measures of performance. We concentrate on situations in which
performance can only be measured subjectively as these constitute exactly the
settings in which disagreements about eﬀort and performance arise. This project
is closely related to the recent works on self-esteem by Jean Tirole and Roland
Be´nabou (2002) and contracts with subjective performance signals by Bentley
MacLeod (2003).
All in all, as said in the beginning, all papers analyze the implications of a
broader model of human behavior in economic theory. It can be concluded that
allowing for more complex human behavior in economic analyzes greatly impacts
and alters conclusions that have been drawn on the basis of classical presumptions.
References
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Georg Kirchsteiger†and Alexander Sebald ‡
Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that parents with higher levels of education
generally attach a higher importance to the education of their children.
This implies an intergenerational chain transmitting the attitude towards
the formation of human capital from one generation to the next. We in-
corporate this intergenerational chain into an OLG-model with endogenous
human capital formation. In absence of any state intervention such an
economy might be characterized by multiple steady states with low or high
human capital levels. There are also steady states where the population
is permanently divided into diﬀerent groups with diﬀering human capital
and welfare levels. Depending on the parameters of the model, a temporary
or permanent public investment into human capital formation is needed to
overcome steady states with low human capital and welfare levels. Further-
more, even the best steady state is suboptimal when the human capital is
privately provided. This ineﬃciency can be removed by a permanent public
subsidy for education.
Keywords: Human Capital Formation, Education Subsidy, Indirect Reci-
procity.
JEL Classification: H23, H52, I2.
1 Introduction
In modern economies human capital is one of the most important determinants
of economic progress and welfare. In contrast to the investment into physical
capital the formation of human capital is to a large extent not ﬁnanced by its
owner. Rather, parents and the state cover most of the expenditures on educa-
tion. The parental engagement has traditionally been explained by credit market
∗ We are grateful to Monika Bu¨tler and to seminar participants at the Universities of Essex,
Constance and Maastricht, and at ECARES/ULB for helpful comments.
† ECARES, Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles, Avenue F D Roosevelt 50, CP114 1050 Brussels,
Belgium, CEPR, and CESifo. Kirchsteiger is also member of ECORE, the recently created
association between CORE and ECARES. E-mail: gkirchst@ulb.ac.be
‡ Department of Economics, Maastricht University, PO Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The
Netherlands, and ECARES, Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles. E-mail: a.sebald@algec.unimaas.nl
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Investments into education -
Doing as the parents did∗
imperfections, parental altruism (see e.g. [4] and [5]) and/or an exchange between
education expenditures for the children and old-age support for the parents (see
e.g. [7] and [6]).
Parental altruism is traditionally assumed to be exogenously given in economic
theory, neglecting its source and evolutionary development. Among biologists and
social-psychologists, on the other hand, there exists by now a large consensus
that preferences, norms and cultural attitudes are endogenous with respect to our
socio-economic system (see also [3], [8], [11], [16] and [19]). It is argued that two
main channels exist through which preferences are transmitted across generations.
Preferences are passed on genetically and/or through a process of socialization
whereby e.g. children adopt parental preferences by means of imitation.
One area where the transmition of preferences through socialisation / imitation
has been found particularly important is ’the attitude to education’. According
to the socio-psychological literature parents have a pervasive inﬂuence in shaping
young people’s attitudes to education (see e.g. [24], [9] and [10]). More precisely,
parents with higher levels of education transmit a more positive attitude towards
education to their children (see e.g. [24]).1
This intergenerational transmission of attitudes can be viewed as an example
of indirect reciprocity, which has been found to be particularly important within
family relations (see e.g.[1], [2] and [20]). In contrast to direct reciprocity (see
e.g. [13], [26]), we speak of indirect reciprocity when a person does not directly
reciprocate to the behavior of another person, but rather reciprocates indirectly
to a third party (see e.g. [1], [22], [23] and [15]). In the context of education ﬁ-
nancing this means people do not directly reciprocate for the education they have
received from their own parents, but rather repay it by ﬁnancing the education
of their children. Hence, the more education parents have received themselves,
the more they are willing to ﬁnance the education of their children. In this way
investments into human capital do not only aﬀect the immediate recipient, i.e. the
next generation, but also future generations.
The intergenerational transmition of attitudes is in line with the empirical fact
that for given family income, higher educated parents tend to spend more on the
education of their children than parents with lower education (see [21]). Tradi-
tionally this has been explained by the so called ’home environment externality’
[17], which states that not only private and public investments into education,
but also innate abilities and the ’family environment’ determine human capital
formation. This strand of literature (see e.g. [5], [14], [17] and [18]) assumes that
children’s ability to acquire human capital depends on parental levels of educa-
tion. Higher levels of parental education are assumed to increase the marginal
product of investments into the human capital of children. Hence, the higher the
level of education of the parents, the more eﬀective investments in human capital
become. If parents care about their children, this ’home environment externality’
can explain the eﬀect of parents’ human capital on the education expenditures.
If such a ’home environment externality’ exists and parents only care about the
1A similar intergenerational attitude transmission mechanism has been analysed in the con-
text of arts education (see [12])
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educational level of their oﬀsprings, Eckstein and Zilcha [14] also show that pri-
vate investments into human capital are suboptimal. In their analysis the source
of suboptimality is twofold. First, parents do not take into account the impact
of their investment into the education of their children on their children’s wages.
Second, they do not take into account their impact on the relative eﬀectiveness of
their children’s investments into the education of their grandchildren.
In contrast to the ’home environment externality’, the intergenerational trans-
mission of attitudes implies that parents directly aﬀect children’s preferences,
rather than their production of human capital. Parents’ preference for the human
capital of their children depends on their own human capital, which was ﬁnanced
for by the grandparents. Our paper investigates the impact of this intergenera-
tional chain on welfare and the optimal education policy. Using an OLG model we
show that multiple steady states might exist. There always exists an illiterateness
steady state, which is characterized by low incomes and no investments into formal
education. Depending on the parameters of the model, a temporary or permanent
public funding of education could be necessary to overcome this ’bad’ steady state
and to get the economy into a ’good’ steady state with investments into formal
education and higher welfare. Depending on the initial conditions there also exist
steady states where the population is permanently split into a group with large
human capital endowment and high welfare and a group with low human capi-
tal and welfare level. Again a temporary or permanent subsidy is necessary to
overcome such a situation. Furthermore, even the best steady state is suboptimal,
since the model investigated exhibits an externality. It is shown how a permanent,
tax ﬁnanced subsidy on human capital acquisition can internalize this ineﬃciency.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the model, fol-
lowed by a characterization of the economy with private investments into human
capital. In section 4 we analyze the welfare properties of this economy. Finally,
we draw conclusions. All the proofs are delegated to the appendix.
2 The model
We assume a competitive economy, in which the output in period t, Yt, does not
only depend on physical capital used in t, Kt, and on labour Lt, but also on human
capital, Ht. The economy is endowed with a Cobb-Douglas production technology.
The normalized production function is given by
yt = k
α
t h
1−α
t (1)
where α ∈ (0, 1) and yt = YtLt , kt = KtLt , ht = HtLt . yt denotes the output per worker
in period t , and kt and ht are respectively physical and human capital per worker
in t.
Every worker supplies inelastically one unit of labour, and for simplicity the
number of workers is constant over time, i.e. Lt = L for all t. Markets are assumed
to be perfectly competitive, so that factors earn their marginal product:
rt = f
′
k(kt, ht) = α
(
ht
kt
)1−α
(2)
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wt = f(kt, ht)− ktf ′k(kt, ht) = (1− α)kαt h1−αt (3)
with rt being the interest rate and wt the wage.
The capital stock depreciates fully in one period, so that the savings in period
t− 1 equal the capital stock in period t.
Human capital is produced by formal education, i.e. by schooling. We assume
however, that even without any formal education everyone acquires some mini-
mum human capital. We normalize human capital such that the minimum human
capital is one. Human capital production is given by
ht+1 = (et)
β +1 (4)
with β ∈ (0, 1). et ≥ 0 denotes the private expenditures into the formal education
of a child born in t. Of course, the resulting human capital becomes productive
in period t + 1.
At each point in time three overlapping generations are alive in the economy.
Generation Period
t− 1 t t + 1
(1) Education
(2) Work
(3) Retirement
Take a representative individual born at the beginning of period t− 1. In this
period he belongs to the youngest generation 1 which gets educated. The amount
of his education is decided upon by his parent. In the next period t, the individual
belongs to the working (parent) generation 2. In this period he works and has
one child2. He divides his income between consumption in period t, savings for
consumption in t+ 1 and spending for the education of his child. In period t + 1,
the individual belongs to the retired generation 3 and consumes his savings. At
the end of this period, the individual dies.
Only the working generation has to make a decision. Individuals working in
time t are assumed to maximize their utility function given by
U(c2,t, c3,t+1, ht+1) = ln c2,t + γ ln c3,t+1 + ϕ(ht) lnht+1, (5)
where c2,t denotes the immediate consumption of an individual working in period
t. c3,t+1 is the consumption in the next period t + 1 when the individual belongs
to the retired generation 3. Since we assume full depreciation of the capital stock
in one period, the savings in period t are the capital stock in period t + 1, and
the old generation only consumes the interest on their savings. Therefore, c3,t+1 =
kt+1rt+1. ht+1 is the human capital of the child, which becomes eﬀective in period
t+1. γ and ϕ measure the individual’s attitude towards future old-age consumption
and towards the human capital of the child, respectively.
2For simplicity we assume that each adult has only one child, and each child has only one
parent.
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As explained in the introduction, there exists a lot of evidence that the impor-
tance parents attach to the education of their children is determined by indirect
reciprocity. More precisely, the education a parent has received in his own child-
hood shapes his willingness to invest into the human capital of his own child. In
order to capture this, we introduce an attitude function:
ϕ : [1,∞)→ 0+,
with ϕ(ht) denoting the attitude of a parent with a human capital of ht.
3 We
assume that ϕ(ht) is continuous and diﬀerentiable. If the parent has not received
any formal education himself, he is not willing to ﬁnance any formal education
of his child. Furthermore, his attitude towards his child’s education is positively
correlated with his own human capital ht, which was ﬁnanced for by his own
parent. These considerations lead to
ϕ(1) = 0
and
ϕ′(ht) > 0.
In the next section we characterize the economy with pure private investments
into human capital.
3 Private investments into human capital
Agents working in period t have to decide how much of their wage income wt they
want to spend on instantaneous consumption and on the education of their child.
Furthermore, they save in order to ﬁnance consumption when they are retired.
Recall that due to full depreciation of the capital stock, c3,t+1 = kt+1rt+1. Recall
also that et = (ht+1 − 1)
1
β .
The maximization problem of a representative agent working in t can be written
as:
max
c2,t,kt+1,ht+1
U(c2,t, kt+1, ht+1) = ln c2,t + γ ln kt+1rt+1 + ϕ(ht) lnht+1
s.t. wt = c2,t + kt+1 + (ht+1 − 1)
1
β
ht+1 ≥ 1
c2,t, kt+1 ≥ 0
Denote by k˜t+1, h˜t+1 the utility maximizing choice of the agent working in
period t, when the human capital for the next generation is provided privately.
The sequence of utility maximizing choices is denoted by {k˜t, h˜t}∞t=2, and k1 and
h1 denote the initial endowments with physical and human capital. The solution
is characterized by the following lemma.
3Recall that even without formal education each individual is endowed with a minimum
human capital normalized to 1. Hence, ϕ is deﬁned for human capital levels not below 1.
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Lemma 1 If k˜t > 0 it holds that:
i) The solution (k˜t+1, h˜t+1) fulﬁlls the ﬁrst order conditions
∂U
∂ht+1
=
ϕ(h˜t)
h˜t+1
−
1
β
(
h˜t+1 − 1
) 1
β
−1
w˜t − k˜t+1 −
(
h˜t+1 − 1
) 1
β
= 0 (6)
and
∂U
∂kt+1
=
γ
k˜t+1
− 1
w˜t − k˜t+1 −
(
h˜t+1 − 1
) 1
β
= 0 (7)
ii) k˜t+1 > 0.
iii) If h˜t = 1, then h˜t+1 = 1.
iv) If h˜t > 1, then h˜t+1 > 1.
Proof: see Appendix.
If k1 = 0, no production, no consumption, and no formal education is possible
in any future period. Since this case is not interesting, we restrict the analysis
from now on to k1 > 0.
We show next that there exists no unlimited expansionary path.
Proposition 2 There exists a triple hm, km, wm such that for any initial condi-
tions k˜1 and h˜1 there exists a t
m such that:
h˜t < h
m whenever t > tm
k˜t < k
m whenever t > tm
w˜t < w
m whenever t > tm
Proof: See Appendix
Next, we turn to the analysis of the existence and of the stability properties
of steady states. We ﬁrst analyze the benchmark case where the attitude towards
the children’s education does not depend on parents’ education. Then we analyze
the steady states for endogenous education attitudes.
3.1 Exogenous education attitude
As a benchmark we ﬁrst analyze the situation where the attitude towards educa-
tion is not determined by the attitude function ϕ(ht), but exogenously determined
at level ϕ > 0. In this case, there exists a unique interior steady state with h∗ > 1.
Proposition 3 If the attitude towards education is exogenously ﬁxed at level ϕ >
0, there exists a unique steady state with formal education, i.e. with h∗ > 1.
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Proof: See Appendix
Simulations suggest that the steady state is globally stable. See for exam-
ple Figure 1 in which we graphically report simulation results for an exogenous
education attitude ϕ = 4 and parameter values α = 0.3, β = 0.7, γ = 0.5.4
[Figure 1 here]
Each line constitutes the optimal path of human and physical depending on
the initial conditions h1 and k1. As one can easily see, for all initial conditions
of physical and human capital the system converges towards h∗ = 1.18542, and
physical capital k∗ = 0.10281.5 In other words, from any initial values of human
and physical capital the system converges towards the steady state.
Repeating the same simulation exercise for diﬀerent values of the attitude
parameter ϕ and other parameter values α, β, γ leads to diﬀerent steady states
(h∗, k∗) with h∗ > 1. In Table 1 we report the steady states h∗ and k∗ for α =
0.3, β = 0.7, γ = 0.5 with varying levels of the exogenous education attitude
parameter ϕ. Not surprisingly the steady state level of human capital increases in
the exogenous education attitude ϕ.
Exog. Attitude: ϕ Human Capital: h∗ Physical Capital: k∗
1. 0.1 1.00007 0.1250
2. 0.5 1.0033 0.1253
3. 2 1.0707 0.1229
4. 4 1.1854 0.1028
Table 1: Steady state levels h∗ and k∗ for α=0.3, β=0.7, γ=0.5 and varying degrees of ϕ
Also for these parameter values we conducted simulations showing convergence
to the steady state. In all the simulations with an exogenous attitude towards the
education of the children the system converges towards the unique interior steady
state. Hence simulations suggest that the steady state with agents investing into
the formal education of their children is globally stable. As we will see in the next
subsection, this result is in sharp contrast to the model with endogenous education
attitudes.
3.2 Endogenous education attitude
Going back to our model with endogenous education attitude, note that ϕ(1) = 0.
This implies that conditions (6) and (7) are always fulﬁlled by:
4Further simulations with diﬀerent initial conditions and diﬀerent parameters were conducted
showing the robustness of the results. These simulations are available from the authors upon
request.
5Plugging in the attitude parameter ϕ = 4, the parameter values α = 0.3, β = 0.7, γ = 0.5,
h∗and k∗ into condition (24) in Appendix 3 conﬁrms that h∗ = 1.18542 and k∗ = 0.10281
constitutes the steady state.
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h∗ = 1
k∗ =
(
γ(1− α)
1 + γ
) 1
1−α
In this steady state, no formal education takes place, and human capital is at
its lowest possible level. This steady state, which we denote as illiterateness steady
state, characterizes a situation where the economy is trapped in a vicious chain
in which formal education is neglected: Since parents have no formal education,
they are not willing to ﬁnance the formal education of their children, and hence
the children are not interested in the education of the grandchildren, and so on.
Whether this illiterateness trap poses a severe problem depends crucially on
the stability properties of this steady state and on the existence of other steady
states. The same holds for the question whether temporary or permanent state
intervention is necessary to avoid this steady state. The stability properties of
the illiterateness steady state as well as the existence and the properties of other
steady states depend on the form of the attitude function, ϕ(ht). To illustrate the
diﬀerent possible outcomes, we use for the rest of this section a simple attitude
function, namely
ϕ (ht) =
1
δ
(ht − 1) . (8)
Using this attitude function, we get the following
Proposition 4 In addition to the illiterteness steady state, the system exhibits
the following steady states:
i) If β < 1
2
, there exists exactly one interior steady state with formal education.
ii) If β > 1
2
, the following holds: Except for non-generic values of the param-
eters of the model, there exist either two or no interior steady states with formal
education.
Proof: See Appendix
Simulations show that for β < 1
2
the interior steady state is globally stable,
and hence the illiterateness steady state is unstable. In Figure 2 we represent
simulation results for α = 0.3, β = 0.4, γ = 0.5 and δ = 0.04 for varying initial
conditions of human and physical capital.
[Figure 2 here]
Again, each line constitutes the optimal path of human and physical capital
depending on the initial conditions h1 and k1. As in Figure 1 one can easily
see that also with the endogenous formation of attitudes and β < 1
2
the system
converges globally to the interior steady state, h∗ = 1.558 and k∗ = 0.0581.6 This
6Further simulations with diﬀerent initial conditions and diﬀerent parameters were conducted
showing the robustness of the results. These simulations are available from the authors upon
request.
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Figure 2: Endogenous education attitude with β < 12
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suggests that for β < 1
2
the interior steady state with h∗ > 1 is globally stable,
and the illiterateness steady state is unstable. In this case a slight perturbation is
enough to overcome the illiterateness trap.
For β > 1
2
the illiterateness steady state is globally stable when no interior
steady state exists. In Figure 3 we report the simulation results for α = 0.3,
β = 0.7, γ = 0.5 and δ = 0.1.
[Figure 3 here]
With these parameters, no interior steady state exists, and the simulation
suggests that the illiterateness steady state with h∗ = 1 and k∗ = 0.125057 is
globally stable. So in this case a permanent public intervention is necessary to
overcome the illiterateness trap.
If two interior steady states exists, one of them and the illiterateness steady
state are locally stable. In Figure 4 we report simulation results for α = 0.3,
β = 0.7, γ = 0.5, δ = 0.04 and diﬀerent initial conditions.
[Figure 4 here]
One can easily see that depending on the initial level of human and physical
capital the system either converges towards the illiterateness steady state h∗ = 1
and k∗ = 0.125057 with w∗ = 0.377171 or to the stable interior steady state
h∗ = 1.26750 and k∗ = 0.076934 with w∗ = 0.382824. In this case a temporary
public intervention is enough to make the transition from the ’bad’ to the ’good’
steady state. Note that the lack of disutility of labor implies that the wage is a
measure of the welfare of the agents. Hence, agents are indeed worse oﬀ in the
illiterateness steady state than in the other one.
Proposition 4 refers to economies with a homogeneous population - each mem-
ber of the ﬁrst generation is endowed with the same human and physical capital,
and hence all their oﬀsprings are. So the possible multiplicity of stable steady
states refers to whole economies: Depending on the initial conditions, otherwise
identical societies might end up at diﬀerent steady states (and connected welfare
levels). One might wonder whether our model can produce a similar result within
an economy: If the initial endowment with human capital is diﬀerent for otherwise
identical members of the ﬁrst generation, will their descendants end up at diﬀerent
education levels and utility levels? In order to answer this question, we investigate
an economy with a heterogeneous population.
3.3 Heterogeneous population
In this section we consider an economy with agents that are identical but for their
initial endowment of human capital. So there are two diﬀerent types of agents, U
and O, with initial endowment of human capital of hO1 and h
U
t . Since the initial
human capital endowment of the two groups diﬀer, the human capital of their
oﬀsprings might be diﬀerent, too, leading diﬀerent savings and physical capital
levels.
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Denote by s the share of the O types in the population. The average per capita
production function of the economy is given by
yt =
(
skOt + (1− s)
(
kUt
))α (
shOt + (1− s)
(
hUt
))1−α
.
From this we can derive the eﬀective wage rate per unit of human capital that
agents earn:
∂yt
∂ (shOt + (1− s)hUt )
= (1− α)
(
skOt + (1− s) kUt
shOt + (1− s) hUt
)α
Factor markets are competitive and agents receive the same eﬀective wage rate
and interest rate. They diﬀer, however, in the wage that they earn as they diﬀer
in the amount of human capital. Wages are given by
wOt = h
O
t (1− α)
(
skOt + (1− s) kUt
shOt + (1− s)hUt
)α
wUt = h
U
t (1− α)
(
skOt + (1− s) kUt
shOt + (1− s) hUt
)α
Assuming for both types of agents the attitude function (8), the ﬁrst order
conditions for utility maximization are derived by inserting (8) and the wage of
the respective type of agent into the FOCs as stated in Lemma 1:
∂UO
∂hOt+1
=
1
δ
(
h˜Ot − 1
)
h˜Ot+1
−
1
β
(
h˜Ot+1 − 1
) 1
β
−1
w˜Ot − k˜Ot+1 −
(
h˜Ot+1 − 1
) 1
β
= 0
∂UO
∂kOt+1
=
γ
k˜Ot+1
− 1
w˜Ot − k˜Ot+1 −
(
h˜Ot+1 − 1
) 1
β
= 0
∂UU
∂hUt+1
=
1
δ
(
h˜Ut − 1
)
h˜Ut+1
−
1
β
(
h˜Ut+1 − 1
) 1
β
−1
w˜Ut − k˜Ut+1 −
(
h˜Ut+1 − 1
) 1
β
= 0
∂UU
∂kUt+1
=
γ
k˜Ut+1
− 1
w˜Ut − k˜Ut+1 −
(
h˜Ut+1 − 1
) 1
β
= 0
Whenever k˜Ot = k˜
U
t and h˜
O
t = h˜
U
t it is easy that these FOCs are equivalent to
the one for the homogenous population as stated in Lemma 1. Hence, any steady
state of the model with a homogenous population constitutes also a steady state of
the heterogenous population model. But for an initially heterogenous population,
there may exist in addition steady states where the population remains split in
two groups even in the long run. Take for example the model with the following
parameter values: s = 0.5, α = 0.3, β = 0.7, γ = 0.5, and δ = 0.04. With these
parameters, one of the steady states is given by hO∗ = 1.35307, kO∗ = 0.07008,
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hU∗ = 1, kU∗ = 0.10747, leading to wages of wO∗ = 0.43624 and wU∗ = 0.32241.
In this steady state the O-types and their oﬀspring have higher human capital,
higher wages, and consequently a higher utility level than the U-types.
Consider the simulations results in Table 2.
[Table 2 here]
In Table 2 we report the results of 26 simulations for diﬀerent initial conditions
of human capital, hO1 and h
U
1 and the same parameter values: s = 0.5, α = 0.3,
β = 0.7, γ = 0.5, and δ = 0.04. For each simulation we give the initial value
(Initial Cond.) and the values for hO∗, kO∗, hU∗, kU∗ as well as wO∗ and wU∗
that the system converges to (Sim. Results). The simulation results are sorted,
ﬁrst, by the initial level human capital of type-U and, second, by the absolute
diﬀerence between the initial values of human capital of type-O and U. One can
easily see that depending on the initial conditions the system will either converge
towards an egalitarian steady state in which both types have the same human and
physical capital (e.g. simulations 10, 11, 13 etc) or to an unegalitarian in which,
as mentioned above, type-O converges towards hO∗ = 1.35307, kO∗ = 0.07008, and
type-U converges towards hU∗ = 1, kU∗ = 0.10747 (e.g. simulations 1, 2, 3 and 4
etc). Furthermore, the lower the initial level of human capital of type-U and the
higher the diﬀerence between the initial levels of human capital of type-U and O
the more likely it is that diﬀerences remain even in the long run.
So depending on the initial conditions and on the parameter values of the
model, it is possible that even in the long run the diﬀerences remain, irrespective
of the fact that factor markets are perfectly competitive and that all agents face
the same interest and wage rate. Illiterateness gets inherited from generation
to generation, preventing convergence of the two population groups. Comparing
the steady state wage of type-O, wO∗ = 0.43624, in the heterogenous case and
the steady state wage, w∗ = 0.382824, in the homogenous case one can see that
wO∗ > w∗. The reason for this is twofold. First, the average level of human capital
in the homogenous situation is higher implying a lower wage per eﬀciency unit.
Secondly, type-O agents have a higher level of human capital in the heterogenous
steady state compared to the homogenous situation leading to an additional eﬀect
on the wage, wO∗. Consequently, O-types are better oﬀ in the heterogeneous
steady state than in the homogeneous. This suggests that people with higher
human capital might resist a special subsidy to overcome the illiterateness trap of
the underdogs.
4 The optimal education subsidy
In this section we analyze the eﬃciency properties of all steady states of the model,
and the possibilities to overcome ineﬃciencies. For tractability reasons, we restrict
attention to the homogenous population case. We compare the private investments
into human and physical capital with the investments a social planner would make
if endowed with the same initial capital levels. It turns out that this analysis can
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Table 2: Simulations results for a population of heterogeneous agents with diﬀerent initial
values of human capital and s = 0.5, α = 0.3, β = 0.7, γ = 0.5, δ = 0.04.
Type O Type U 
Human  
Capital 
Physical  
Capital Wage
Human 
Capital
Physical 
 Capital Wage
Initial Cond. 1.53881 1.0 1.00252 1.00212 1.0 0.652871
Sim. Results 1.35307 0.07008 0.43624 1.00 0.10747 0.32241
Initial Cond. 1.52511 1.0 0.83371 1.02751 1.0 0.668492
Sim. Results 1.35307 0.07008 0.43624 1.00 0.10747 0.32241
Initial Cond. 2.2 1.0 1.32474 1.03208 1.0 0.626633
Sim. Results 1.35307 0.07008 0.43624 1.0 0.10747 0.32241
Initial Cond. 2.49127 1.0 1.23573 1.03504 1.0 0.611184
Sim. Results 1.35307 0.07008 0.43624 1.0 0.10747 0.32241
Initial Cond. 1.5 1.0 0.97278 1.05 1.0 0.972785
Sim. Results 1.35307 0.07008 0.43624 1.0 0.10747 0.32241
Initial Cond. 2.25407 1.0 1.14192 1.05556 1.0 0.635276
Sim. Results 1.35307 0.07008 0.43624 1.0 0.10747 0.32241
Initial Cond. 1.68072 1.0 1.06966 1.06626 1.0 0.678607
Sim. Results 1.35307 0.07008 0.43624 1.0 0.10747 0.32241
Initial Cond. 1.97 1.0 1.21502 1.08 1.0 0.666108
Sim. Results 1.35307 0.07008 0.43624 1.0 0.10747 0.32241
Initial Cond. 2 1.0 1.22991 1.08 1.0 0.664159
Sim. Results 1.35307 0.07008 0.43624 1.0 0.10747 0.32241
Initial Cond. 1.5 1.0 0.97278 1.08 1.0 0.9727810
Sim. Results 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282
Initial Cond. 1.90000 1.0 1.18004 1.08 1.0 0.6707611
Sim. Results 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282
Initial Cond. 2.5 1.0 1.22152 1.08728 1.0 0.6411612
Sim. Results 1.35307 0.07008 0.43624 1.0 0.10747 0.32241
Initial Cond. 1.96000 1.0 1.21004 1.1 1.0 0.6667613
Sim. Results 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282
Initial Cond. 1.55252 1.0 0.84595 1.12882 1.0 0.7236514
Sim. Results 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282
Initial Cond. 1.89667 1.0 0.99499 1.15546 1.0 0.7124915
Sim. Results 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282
Initial Cond. 1.5 1.0 0.95960 1.20 1.0 0.7676816
Sim. Results 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282
Initial Cond. 2.43514 1.0 1.21378 1.22295 1.0 0.7142317
Sim. Results 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282
Initial Cond. 1.60495 1.0 1.00936 1.25309 1.0 0.7880818
Sim. Results 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282
Initial Cond. 1.62129 1.0 0.87640 1.27515 1.0 0.7987519
Sim. Results 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282
Initial Cond. 1.90798 1.0 0.99975 1.30503 1.0 0.7924220
Sim. Results 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282
Initial Cond. 1.85826 1.0 1.13101 1.32959 1.0 0.8092321
Sim. Results 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282
Initial Cond. 2.33302 1.0 1.36085 1.34022 1.0 0.7817522
Sim. Results 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282
Initial Cond. 2.35603 1.0 1.37115 1.34520 1.0 0.7828723
Sim. Results 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282
Initial Cond. 2.26506 1.0 1.14633 1.36798 1.0 0.8005824
Sim. Results 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282
Initial Cond. 1.73720 1.0 1.06268 1.39741 1.0 0.8548225
Sim. Results 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282
Initial Cond. 1.59003 1.0 0.86260 1.49330 1.0 0.9180126
Sim. Results 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282 1.26750 0.07693 0.38282
Note, simulation results are sorted, ﬁrst, by the initial level human capital of type-U and,
second, by the absolute diﬀerence between the initial values of human capital of type-O and U.
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be carried out for a general attitude function with the properties as speciﬁed in
section 2.
The social planner chooses the investment in human and physical capital such
that he maximizes the weighted sum of utilities of all generations, subject to the
resource constraint of the economy.
max
c2,t,c3,t+1,ht+1
W =
∞∑
t=1
ωt [ln c2,t + γ ln c3,t+1 + ϕ(ht) lnht+1]
s.t. kαt h
1−α
t = kt+1 + (ht+1 − 1)
1
β + c2,t + c3,t and
ht ≥ 1,
kt ≥ 0
with ωt being larger than zero for all t. Denote by k̂t+1 and ĥt+1 the optimal choice
of the social planner. The sequence of optimal choices is denoted by {k̂t, ĥt}∞t=2,
and k1 > 0 and h1 ≥ 1 denote the initial endowments with physical and human
capital.
Deﬁning
ξt =
(1− α)k̂αt+1ĥ−αt+1
k̂αt+1ĥ
1−α
t+1 − k̂t+2 −
(
ĥt+2 − 1
) 1
β − k̂t+1r̂t+1
,
the socially optimal solution is characterized by the following lemma:
Lemma 5 If k̂t > 0 it holds that:
i) The solution of the social planners problem fulﬁlls the ﬁrst order conditions
∂W
∂ht+1
= ωt
⎛
⎜⎝ϕ(ĥt)
ĥt+1
−
1
β
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
−1
k̂αt ĥ
1−α
t − k̂t+1 −
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β − k̂tr̂t
⎞
⎟⎠
+ ωt+1
(
ξt + ϕ
′(ĥt+1) ln ĥt+2
)
(9)
= 0
and
∂W
∂kt+1
= ωt
⎛
⎜⎝ γ
k̂t+1
− 1
k̂αt ĥ
1−α
t − k̂t+1 −
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β − k̂tr̂t
⎞
⎟⎠ = 0 (10)
ii) k̂t+1 > 0, ĥt+1 > 1, and ĉ2,t > 0.
Proof: see Appendix.
Comparing Lemma 1 with Lemma 5, one realizes that condition (7) of the
private solution coincides with condition (10) of the optimal solution, but condi-
tion (9) diﬀers from (6) by the term ωt+1
(
ξt + ϕ
′(ĥt+1) ln ĥt+2
)
. Since ĉ2,t+1 =
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k̂αt+1ĥ
1−α
t+1 −k̂t+2−
(
ĥt+2 − 1
) 1
β−k̂t+1r̂t+1 > 0, ξt > 0 for all t. Similarly, ϕ′(ĥt+1) ln ĥt+2 >
0. So as long as the social planner cares at least a bit about the future generation,
i.e. as long as ωt+1 > 0, the sequence of private decisions, {k˜t, h˜t}∞t=2, diﬀers from
the sequence of socially optimal choices, {k̂t, ĥt}∞t=2 - the private solution is not
optimal. This result is not surprising, since parents do not care about the welfare
of their children, but only about their human capital. This leads to an externality
captured by the variable ξt. Even if the attitude towards children’s education
were independent of the own education, an externality would be present. The en-
dogenous attitude towards education implies a second type of externality, which
leads to the emergence of ϕ′(ĥt+1) ln ĥt+2 in (9). Both of these externalities are
neglected when human capital is privately provided, leading to an underprovision
of human capital. Recall that this ineﬃciency occurs even in the better, interior
steady states.
Can this ineﬃciency be overcome by public expenditures on human capital
formation? Think of a situation where the public ﬁnances schools and universities.
Even if schools and universities are fully ﬁnanced by the state, parents still have
to take care of the children’s costs of living, the costs of supplementary education,
the costs of teaching material and other things indirectly connected to the human
capital formation of children. Hence, parts of the education expenditures are
always paid by parents. Furthermore, in such a system of mixed ﬁnancing a
better education of the children requires higher expenditures of parents as well as
of the state. Finally, the education level of the children is largely inﬂuenced by
the parent’s willingness to cover the children’s costs of living, even in a system
where the state ﬁnances schools and universities. To model such a situation where
human capital formation is partly privately, partly publicly ﬁnanced, assume that
in each period t private education expenditures are subsidized by the state at a
rate st. To ﬁnance this subsidy, wage income is taxed at a rate τt. The balanced
budget condition for the state for period t is given by:
st (ht+1 − 1)
1
β = τtwt. (11)
We assume that an individual agent takes the tax rate and the subsidy scheme
as given when he maximizes his utility. This implies that he does not take into
account the balanced budget condition of the state. This assumption seems plau-
sible for a large economy with many agents. With this simpliﬁcation, the decision
problem of a representative agent working in period t can be written as:
max
c2,t,c3,t+1,ht+1
U(c2,t, c3,t+1, ht+1) = ln c2,t + γ ln c3,t+1 + ϕ(ht) lnht+1
s.t. (1− τt)wt = c2,t + c3,t+1
rt+1
+ (1− st) (ht+1 − 1)
1
β and
ht+1 ≥ 1,
c2,t ≥ 0,
c3,t+1 ≥ 0.
Denote by kt+1 and ht+1 the utility maximizing choice of the agent working in
period t, when the human capital formation is subsidized. The sequence of utility
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maximizing choices is denoted by {kt, ht}∞t=2, and k1 > 0 and h1 ≥ 1 denote the
initial endowments of the economy with physical and human capital. Using the
budget constraint to insert for c2,t the ﬁrst order conditions are:
∂U
∂ht+1
=
ϕ(ht)
ht+1
− (1− st)
1
β
(
ht+1 − 1
) 1
β
−1
(1− τt)wt − kt+1 − (1− st)
(
ht+1 − 1
) 1
β
= 0 (12)
∂U
∂kt+1
=
γ
kt+1
− 1
(1− τt)wt − kt+1 − (1− st)
(
ht+1 − 1
) 1
β
= 0. (13)
Applying the same reasoning as in the proof of lemma 1 it is easy to see that
the ﬁrst order conditions characterize the solution.
Is it possible to ﬁnd a sequence of subsidy schemes {st, τt}∞t=1 such that the
sequence of socially optimal choices is induced? For given initial endowment with
physical and human capital such a sequence would have to induce a sequence
of individual choices {kt+1, ht+1}∞t=1 such hat kt+1 = k̂t+1 and ht+1 = ĥt+1 for all
periods. Furthermore, the sequence of schemes would have to respect the balanced
budget condition (11) in all periods.
The following proposition shows that there exists indeed a sequence of subsidy
schemes that induces an optimal outcome.
Proposition 6 For k̂t > 0 it holds that:
i) The sequence of subsidy schemes {st, τt}∞t=1 deﬁned by
st =
β
(γ + 1)
(
ŵt −
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
)
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
−1
ωt+1
ωt
(
ξt + ϕ
′(ĥt+1) ln ĥt+2
)
(14)
and
τt = st
(ĥt+1 − 1)
1
β
ŵt
(15)
induces a sequence of choices {kt+1, ht+1}∞t=1 such that kt+1 = k̂t+1 and ht+1 = ĥt+1
in all t.
ii) {st, τt}∞t=1 respects the balanced budget condition in all periods.
iii) For all t, 0 < st < 1.
Proof: see Appendix
The above proposition shows that an appropriate subsidy scheme can ensure
eﬃciency. The optimal subsidy rate is always strictly larger than zero, so a per-
manent subsidy is necessary to achieve eﬃciency. The optimal rate in period t,
however, depends on the optimal values of human and physical capital in periods
t, t+1, and t+2. Since nothing guarantees that these optimal human and physical
capital values are constant over time, st might vary over time accordingly.
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5 Conclusions
We have shown that the private allocation of resources leads to ineﬃcient human
capital formation. If parent’s attitude towards education of the children depends
on their own education, the economy might get trapped in an illiterateness steady
state where a low education level of the parents leads to negligence of the children’s
education, reproducing the low education level in the next generation. To over-
come such a steady state, temporary or permanent state intervention is necessary,
depending on the stabilty properties of the illiterateness steady state. Because
of the intergenerational transmission of education attitudes the population of an
economy might also be split in the long run into diﬀerent education groups, even if
the agents are identical in all respects but for their initial endowment with human
capital.
When the economy is not trapped in such an illiterateness steady state, the
purely private ﬁnancing of the education system also leads to ineﬃciencies. These
ineﬃciencies can be overcome by a permanent public support for the education
of children. This conclusion requires some qualiﬁcations. First, a similar result
would occur if the parents’ attitude toward the education of their children were
independent of their own education. Second, if the economy is not in a steady
state, the eﬃcient tax and subsidy rates might change from period to period. For
political reasons as well as for lack of information, it may be diﬃcult to make
these necessary adjustments. Third, the optimal subsidy rate depends on the
weight the social planner puts on the diﬀerent generations. Hence, there is room
for intergenerational conﬂicts. Finally, our model is based on the assumption
that labor supply is ﬁxed. Hence, the taxation of wage income does not create
any excess burden on the labor market. If labor supply is elastic and if a non-
distortive tax is not available, a trade-oﬀ exists between the ineﬃciency created by
the tax system and the ineﬃciency due to the externalities in the human capital
formation.
Notwithstanding these qualiﬁcations, it can be concluded that the broadening
of the model of human behavior to allow for more complex intergenerational re-
lations leads to ineﬃciencies that have been neglected so far. The analysis thus
gives further support for government intervention to support an optimal invest-
ment into the education of our children in order to achieve a maximum amount of
welfare.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Note ﬁrst that h˜t+1 and k˜t+1 have to be ﬁnite for all ﬁnite values of (k˜t, h˜t). The
utility function is strictly quasiconcave, implying a unique solution, which might be
either interior (in which case the ﬁrst order conditions hold) or at the lower bounds.
By (3) w˜t > 0 whenever k˜t > 0. Furthermore, w˜t − k˜t+1 = c˜2,t +
(
h˜t+1 − 1
) 1
β ≥
c˜2,t > 0 due to the INADA condition of the utility function with respect to the
consumption levels. This implies that ∂U
∂kt+1
= ∞ at kt+1 = 0. This requires that
the condition (7) as well as ii) must hold.
As for the solution for the human capital, note ﬁrst that for h˜t = 1,
∂U
∂ht+1
= 0
at ht+1 = 1. This gives iii) and that condition (6) holds in this case.
If h˜t > 1,
∂U
∂ht+1
= ∞ at ht+1 = 1, implying h˜t+1 > 1. This gives iv) and that
condition (6) holds also for h˜t > 1, which completes the proof. 
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6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We ﬁrst introduce the following dynamic system, denoted as upper bound economy
and by superscript b, which will be useful for the proof:
hbt+1 = (1− α)β(kbt )αβ(hbt)(1−α)β + 1 (16)
kbt+1 = (1− α)(kbt )α(hbt)(1−α) (17)
The proof now proceeds in three steps. In the ﬁrst step, we will show that for
the same initial conditions for human and physical capital the path of the upper
bound economy provides an upper bound for the path of the economy we analyze.
In the second step, we will show that the upper bound economy exhibits a globally
stable steady state, to which the system converges from any initial conditions. In
the third step we will use this steady state to ﬁnalize the proof.
Step 1: If the indirect reciprocity economy and the upper bound economy start
at the same initial conditions kb1 = k˜1 > 0 and h
b
1 = h˜1 , it holds that:
kbt ≥ k˜t for all t > 1
hbt ≥ h˜t for all t > 1.
The proof is made by induction. For the same initial conditions kb1 = k˜1 and
hb1 = h˜1, the deﬁnition of the upper bound economy, (3), and (4) give
kb2 = (1− α)(kb1)α(hb1)(1−α) = (1− α)(k˜1)α(h˜1)(1−α) = w˜1 ≥ k˜2
and
hb2 = (1− α)β(kb1)αβ(hb1)(1−α)β + 1
= (1− α)β(k˜1)αβ(h˜bt)(1−α)β + 1
= (w˜1)
β + 1 ≥ (e˜1)β + 1 = h˜2.
So kb2 ≥ k˜2 and hb2 ≥ h˜2. It is obvious that hbt+1 and kbt+1 are monotonically
increasing in hbt and k
b
t . This implies that k
b
t+1 ≥ k˜t+1 and hbt+1 ≥ h˜t+1 whenever
kbt ≥ k˜t and hbt ≥ h˜t, which completes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2: For any initial condition kb1 > 0
7 the upper bound economy converges
to a unique stable state kb∗, hb∗ with kb∗ > 0 and hb∗ > 1.
To show this, note ﬁrst that kb1 > 0 implies that k
b
t > 0 and h
b
t > 1 for all
t > 1. From the deﬁnition of the upper bound economy we get
hbt+1 =
(
kbt+1
)β
+ 1,
implying that
hbt =
(
kbt
)β
+ 1.
7Recall that we restrict our analysis to the nontrivial case of k˜1 > 0, which of course implies
that kb1 > 0.
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Hence, equation of motion of the upper bound economy is characterized by:
kbt+1 = (1− α) (kbt )α
((
kbt
)β
+ 1
)(1−α)
. (18)
Diﬀerentiating we get
∂kbt+1
∂kbt
=
[
(1− α) (kbt )(α−1)
(
(kbt )
β + 1
)(−α)] [
(α (1− β) + β) (kbt )β + α1
]
> 0
and
∂2kbt+1
∂kbt∂k
b
t
=
[
− (1− α)2 (kbt )α−2
(
(kbt )
β + 1
)(−1−α)]
[
α (1− β) + β (1− β) (kbt )2β + (1− β) (2α + β) (kbt )β + α
]
< 0
since
− (1− α)2 (kbt )α−2
(
(kbt )
β + 1
)(−1−α)
< 0
α (1− β) + β (1− β) (kbt )2β > 0
(1− β) (2α + β) (kbt )β > 0
α > 0.
Hence, the equation of motion (18) is strictly monotone and concave in kt.
This and the fact that the system has a steady state at kb = 0 implies that there
is at most one other steady state with kb > 0.
To investigate the possibility of steady states with kb∗ > 0, we set kbt = k
b
t+1 =
kb∗ in (18) and get:
kb∗ = (1− α) (kb∗)α[(kb∗)β + 1](1−α),
implying:
(kb∗)
1
(1−α) = (1− α) (kb∗) α(1−α) [(kb∗)β + 1].
Dividing by (kb∗)
1
(1−α) leads to
1 = (1− α) (kb∗)(−1)[(kb∗)β + 1]
1 = (1− α) [(kb∗)(β−1) + (kb∗)(−1)]. (19)
The right hand side of equation (19) is continuos and strictly monotonically
decreasing in kb∗. Furthermore,
lim
kb∗→0
(1− α) [(kb∗)(β−1) + (kb∗)(−1)] = ∞
lim
kb∗→∞
(1− α) [(kb∗)(β−1) + (kb∗)(−1)] = 0.
Hence, there exists a unique kb∗ > 0 fulﬁlling (19) characterizing the second
steady state of the upper bound economy. The steady state value of h is given by
hb∗ = (kb∗)β + 1 > 1
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Recall that the equation of motion (19) is strictly monotone and concave.
Hence, kbt+1 > k
b
t whenever in k
b
t < k
b∗ and kbt+1 < k
b
t whenever in k
b
t > k
b∗. There-
fore, the upper bound economy converges to the steady state kb∗, hb∗ whenever
kb1 > 0.
Step 3: For any initial conditions k˜1 ≥ 0 and h˜1 ≥ 0 there exists a tm such
that:
h˜t < h
b∗ + 1 whenever t > tm
k˜t < k
b∗ + 1 whenever t > tm
w˜t < (1− α)(kb∗ + 1)α(hb∗ + 1)1−α whenever t > tm
Step 3) follows immediately from Step 1), Step 2), and the wage equation 3).

6.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Education attitude is exogenously given at ϕ. Taking this into account and in-
serting 3 and 2 into 6 and 7 gives
(1− α) k˜αt h˜1−αt =
⎛
⎝((1 + γ)
βϕ
)
h˜t+1(
h˜t+1 − 1
) + 1
⎞
⎠(h˜t+1 − 1) 1β (20)
(1− α) k˜αt h˜1−αt =
⎛
⎝(1 + γ)
γ
+
βϕ
γ
(
h˜t+1 − 1
)
h˜t+1
⎞
⎠ k˜t+1. (21)
Substituting 21 into 20 for kt and rearranging terms gives
(1− α)
(
γ
βϕ
)α
=
1
h˜t
(
h˜t − 1
)( 1β−1)α
(
(1 + γ)
βϕ
)
h˜t+1
(
h˜t+1 − 1
) 1
β
−1
(22)
+
1
h˜t
(
h˜t − 1
)( 1β−1)α
(
h˜t+1 − 1
) 1
β
. (23)
Since we investigate the steady state, we ignore the indices. Rearranging terms
one gets
(1− α)
(
γ
βϕ
)α
=
(
(1 + γ)
βϕ
)
(h∗ − 1)( 1β−1)(1−α) + 1
h∗
(h∗ − 1) 1β−( 1β−1)α . (24)
Obviously, the left hand side of 24 is positive. For the right hand side, notice
that 1
β
−
(
1
β
− 1
)
α > 1 and
(
1
β
− 1
)
(1− α) > 0. This implies that the right
hand side is strictly increasing in h∗, that it is zero for h∗ = 1, and that it goes
to inﬁnity for h∗ going to inﬁnity. Hence there exists exactly one value h∗ that
fulﬁlls 24, and this value is strictly larger than 1. 
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6.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Inserting the attitude function, 3 and 2 into 6 and 7 gives
(1− α) k˜αt h˜1−αt =
⎛
⎝
⎛
⎝ (1 + γ)
β 1
δ
(
h˜t − 1
)
⎞
⎠ h˜t+1(
h˜t+1 − 1
) + 1
⎞
⎠(h˜t+1 − 1) 1β (25)
(1− α) k˜αt h˜1−αt =
⎛
⎝(1 + γ)
γ
+
β 1
δ
(
h˜t − 1
)
γ
(
h˜t+1 − 1
)
h˜t+1
⎞
⎠ k˜t+1. (26)
Substituting 25 into 26 for kt, ignoring the indices, and rearranging terms leads
to the following condition for an interior steady state:
(1− α)
(
δγ
β
)α
=
(
δ (1 + γ)
β
)
(h∗ − 1)( 1β−2)(1−α) + 1
h∗
(h∗ − 1) 1β−( 1β−2)α . (27)
Deﬁne
lhs : = (1− α)
(
δγ
β
)α
rhs(h∗) : =
(
δ (1 + γ)
β
)
(h∗ − 1)( 1β−2)(1−α) + 1
h∗
(h∗ − 1) 1β−( 1β−2)α
a(h∗) : =
(
δ (1 + γ)
β
)
(h∗ − 1)( 1β−2)(1−α)
b(h∗) : =
1
h∗
(h∗ − 1) 1β−( 1β−2)α
Proof of i) lhs strictly positive. If β < 1
2
,
(
1
β
− 2
)
(1− α) > 0 and 1
β
−(
1
β
− 2
)
α > 2. This implies that ∂a
∂h∗ > 0 and
∂b
∂h∗ > 0 - rhs is strictly increasing
in h∗. Furthermore, rhs(h∗ = 1) = 0, and limh∗→∞ a(h∗) = ∞. Therefore there
exists exactly one h∗ > 1 such that lhs = rhs(h∗).
Proof of ii) Again, lhs strictly positive. If 1
2
< β < 1,
(
1
β
− 2
)
(1− α) < 0
and 1 < 1
β
−
(
1
β
− 2
)
α. This implies that limh∗→1 a(h∗) =∞, limh∗→∞ a(h∗) = 0,
limh∗→∞ b(h∗) =∞ and b(h∗ = 1) = 0. This gives limh∗→1 rhs(h∗) = limh∗→∞ rhs(h∗) =
∞ and ﬁnite values of rhs for all other values of h∗.
Next we show that rhs(h∗) has a unique local extremum in the interior. Be-
cause of limh∗→1 rhs(h∗) = limh∗→∞ rhs(h∗) = ∞, a unique interior local ex-
tremum must be a unique local minimum of rhs(h∗). Uniqueness of the local
minimum implies that ∂rhs(h
∗)
∂h∗ < 0 for all values of h
∗ below this minimum and
∂rhs(h∗)
∂h∗ > 0 for all values of h
∗ above this minimum. In the interior, any local
extremum is characterized by the condition
∂rhs(h∗)
∂h∗
= 0
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leading to
(h∗ − 1)
h∗
−
(
1
β
− 2
)
(1− α)
(
δ (1 + γ)
β
)
h∗
(h∗ − 1)2 (28)
=
1
β
−
(
1
β
− 2
)
α.
For the left hand side of equation 28, we have
lim
h→1
(
(h∗ − 1)
h∗
+ z
h∗
(h∗ − 1)2
)
=∞,
with z = −
(
1
β
− 2
)
(1− α)
(
δ(1+γ)
β
)
> 0, and
lim
h→∞
(
(h∗ − 1)
h∗
+ z
h∗
(h∗ − 1)2
)
= 1.
This implies that there is at least one local extremum in the interior. To check
uniqueness, we will show (h
∗−1)
h∗ + z
h∗
(h∗−1)2 is strictly decreasing in in h
∗ for the
relevant values of h∗. The ﬁrst derivative of the left hand side is given by
∂
(
(h∗−1)
h∗ + z
h∗
(h∗−1)2
)
∂h∗
=
−zh∗2 (h∗ + 1) + (h∗ − 1)3
h∗2 (h∗ − 1)3 (29)
To see that this derivative is strictly negative for the relevant values of h∗,
note ﬁrst that 1
β
−
(
1
β
− 2
)
α > 1. All solutions to equation 28 must satisfy the
condition
(h∗ − 1)
h∗
+ z
h∗
(h∗ − 1)2 > 1
which is equivalent to
zh∗2 > h∗ (h∗ − 1)2 − (h∗ − 1)3 .
Inserting into 29 implies that
∂
(
(h∗−1)
h∗ + z
h∗
(h∗−1)2
)
∂h∗
<
− (h∗ (h∗ − 1)2 − (h∗ − 1)3) (h∗ + 1) + (h∗ − 1)3
h∗2 (h∗ − 1)3
=
−2
h∗2 (h∗ − 1) < 0
So the left hand side of 28 is strictly decreasing in the relevant area, and hence
equation 28 has a unique solution. This implies that rhs(h∗) has a unique local
minimum in the interior whenever β > 1
2
, and that ∂rhs(h
∗)
∂h∗ < 0 for all values of
h∗ below this minimum and ∂rhs(h
∗)
∂h∗ > 0 for all values of h
∗ above this minimum.
Furthermore, recall that limh∗→1 rhs(h∗) = limh∗→∞ rhs(h∗) = ∞. So for generic
parameter values there are two possibilities: Either there exist two diﬀerent h∗
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such that lhs = rhs(h∗). In this case there are two interior steady states. On
the other hand, it is possible that lhs < rhs(h∗) for all h∗ > 1 which implies that
there is no interior steady state.
By example we show that both possibilities are indeed feasible. Take ﬁrst the
case α = 0.3, β = 0.7, γ = 0.5, δ = 0.01 and then the case. α = 0.3, β = 0.7,
γ = 0.5, δ = 0.04. In the ﬁrst case condition 27 can be written as:
0 = (1− 0.3)
(
(0.1) (0.5)
0.7
)0.3
−
(
(0.1) (1 + 0.5)
0.7
)
(h∗ − 1)( 10.7−2)(1−0.3)
− 1
h∗
(h∗ − 1) 10.7−( 10.7−2)0.3 = F (h∗) .
and in the second case it can be written as:
0 = (1− 0.3)
(
(0.04) (0.5)
0.7
)0.3
−
(
(0.04) (1 + 0.5)
0.7
)
(h∗ − 1)( 10.7−2)(1−0.3)
− 1
h∗
(h∗ − 1) 10.7−( 10.7−2)0.3 = G (h∗) .
When trying to solve F (h∗) = 0 for h∗ one ﬁnds no solution, whereas solving
G (h∗) = 0 gives exactly two solutions: h∗1 = 1.09496 and h
∗
2 = 1.2675.
These results are illustrated by Figure 5.
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
h
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.1
F+h/,G+h/
G  0.04
G  0.1
Figure 5: Endogenous education attitude with β = 0.7, δ = 0.1 and δ = 0.04
As one can easily see in the ﬁrst case there is no h∗ such that F (h∗) = 0,
whereas in the second case there are two h∗ such that G (h∗) = 0: h∗1 = 1.09496
and h∗2 = 1.2675.
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6.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Note ﬁrst that ĥt+1 and k̂t+1 have to be ﬁnite for all ﬁnite values of (k̂t, ĥt). The
solution might be either interior (in which case the ﬁrst order conditions hold) or
at the lower bounds. Since k̂t > 0, production takes place in period t. Combining
this fact with the INADA condition of the individual utility functions implies that
k̂αt ĥ
1−α
t − k̂t+1 −
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β − k̂tr̂t = c2,t > 0. Therefore, ∂W∂kt+1 = ∞ at kt+1 = 0.
Hence, k̂t+1 > 0, and condition (10) holds.
As for the solution for the human capital, note again that since k̂t > 0, produc-
tion takes place in period t. Again, combining this fact with the Inada condition
of the individual utility functions implies that k̂αt+1ĥ
1−α
t+1 − k̂t+2 −
(
ĥt+2 − 1
) 1
β −
k̂t+1rt+1 = c2,t+1 > 0. Hence
∂W
∂ht+1
=∞ at ht+1 = 1, implying ĥt+1 > 1. This gives
condition (9), which completes the proof. 
6.6 Proof of Proposition 6
i) By combining (12), (13) and the balanced budget condition of the government
(11) one gets:
ϕ(ht)
ht+1
− (1− st)(γ + 1)
β
(
ht+1 − 1
) 1
β
−1(
wt −
(
ht+1 − 1
) 1
β
) = 0. (30)
Furthermore combining (9) and (10) gives:
ϕ(ĥt)
ĥt+1
− (γ + 1)
β
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
−1
ŵt −
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
+
ωt+1
ωt
(
ξt + ϕ
′(ĥt+1) ln ĥt+2
)
= 0. (31)
In order to establish the optimal subsidy rate which ensures that ht+1 = ĥt+1
we set (30) equal to (31), furthermore set ht+1 = ĥt+1 and solve for st.
ϕ(ĥt)
ĥt+1
− (1− st)(γ + 1)
β
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
−1
ŵt −
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
=
ϕ(ĥt)
ĥt+1
− (γ + 1)
β
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
−1
ŵt −
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
+
ωt+1
ωt
(
ξt + ϕ
′(ĥt+1) ln ĥt+2
)
.
45
This can be written as:
ϕ(ĥt)
ĥt+1
− (γ + 1)
β
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
−1
ŵt −
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
+ st
(γ + 1)
β
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
−1
ŵt −
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
=
ϕ(ĥt)
ĥt+1
− (γ + 1)
β
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
−1
ŵt −
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
+
ωt+1
ωt
(
ξt + ϕ
′(ĥt+1) ln ĥt+2
)
.
From which it follows:
st
(γ + 1)
β
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
−1
ŵt −
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
=
ωt+1
ωt
(
ξt + ϕ
′(ĥt+1) ln ĥt+2
)
.
Solving for st gives:
st =
β
(γ + 1)
ŵt −
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
−1
ωt+1
ωt
(
ξt + ϕ
′(ĥt+1) ln ĥt+2
)
.
ii) It is obvious that (15) implies that the balanced budget condition is fulﬁlled
whenever ht+1 = ĥt+1.
iii) Since ξt > 0, ϕ
′(ĥt+1) > 0, ĥt+2 > 1, and ŵt−
(
ĥt+1 − 1
) 1
β
= c2,t+kt+1 > 0,
the optimal subsidy rate st > 0.
On the other hand, if st = 1 the price parents have to pay for the human
capital of the children would be zero. Therefore, demand for education would be
inﬁnite, which is of course not feasible. Hence, the optimal subsidy rate must
fulﬁll 0 < st < 1. 
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Abstract
Diﬀerent to other scientiﬁc disciplines traditional economic theory has re-
mained remarkably silent about procedural aspects of strategic interactions.
Much to the contrast, among psychologists there is by now a broad consen-
sus that not only expected outcomes shape human behavior, but also proce-
dures that are used to take decisions. It is argued that procedural concerns
are especially pervasive in the resolution of conﬂicts. In our paper we show
that procedural concerns are in fact an inherent feature of the interaction
of reciprocal agents. More precisely, using Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004)’s theory of sequential reciprocity we demonstrate that procedural
choices determine the responsibility that people have for outcomes. The
responsibility for outcomes in turn inﬂuences peoples’ evaluations of inten-
tions and, hence, subsequent reactions. Two applications are discussed to
highlight the impact and importance of procedural concerns in strategic
interactions.
Keywords: Psychological Games, Procedural Concerns, Reciprocity
JEL Classification: D01, C70
Introduction
Imagine a group of three friends. One of them has a free ticket for the local concert
of their favorite music band. Unfortunately, however, he cannot go himself, as he
has an exam the following day. As his friends love the band as much as he does,
he would like to give the ticket to one of them instead. He is indiﬀerent as to
whom of the two to give it. He knows, however, that if one of them feels unkindly
treated, he will get into a quarrel. It is easy to see that this situation bears much
resemblance to the ‘So long, Sucker’ game analyzed e.g. by Nalebuﬀ and Shubik
∗I am very grateful to Martin Dufwenberg, Georg Kirchsteiger, Pierpaolo Battigalli, Estelle
Cantillon, Paolo Casini and the seminar participants at ECARES/ULB and Maastricht Univer-
sity for helpful comments.
†Department of Economics, Maastricht University, PO Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The
Netherlands, and ECARES, Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles. Sebald is also member of ECORE, the
recently created association between CORE and ECARES. E-mail: a.sebald@algec.unimaas.nl
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(1988). A player (A), i.e. the ticket holder, is driven to choose an unlucky player,
i.e. the friend that does not receive the ticket, out of two players (B) and (C).
Subsequently the unlucky player is allowed to choose an action which is either
kind, i.e. not quarreling, or unkind, i.e. quarreling, towards player (A). As in the
‘So long, Sucker ’ game, it seems also here, at ﬁrst sight, that the ticket holder is
trapped: By choosing who gets the ticket he inevitably has to be unkind to one of
his friends, creating the risk of trouble. At a second glance, however, when asked
how this conﬂict could be resolved, one is intuitively driven to suggest that he
should ﬂip a coin to take the decision as in this way he avoids being unkind to
either of them.
This example and our intuition of how to resolve the conﬂict eﬀectively high-
light two essential aspects of any human interaction. First, very often there are
numerous ways in which decisions can be taken. On the one hand, the friend hold-
ing the ticket could decide to take the decision himself as to whom to give it, but,
on the other hand, he could also let chance decide by ﬂipping a coin. Secondly,
one can easily see that decisions are inherently associated with procedures which
characterize the way in which they are taken. The ticket holder, in our example,
ﬁrst has to decide how he wants to take the decision before he can eﬀectively take
it.
Among psychologists there is by now a broad consensus that not only expected
outcomes shape human behavior, but also procedures that are used to take deci-
sions [e.g. Thibaut and Walker (1975), Lind and Tyler (1988), Collie et al. (2002),
Anderson and Otto (2003) and Blader and Tyler (2003)]. It is argued that pro-
cedural concerns are especially pervasive in the resolution of conﬂicts. Prominent
examples of conﬂict resolutions are to be found in the areas of workplace relations
and the public acceptability of policies and laws. First, psychologists have found
evidence that behavioral reactions to promotion decisions, bonus allocations, dis-
missals etc. strongly depend on the perceived fairness of selection procedures [e.g.
Lemons and Jones (2001), Konovsky (2000), Bies and Tyler (1993), Lind at al.
(2000) and Roberts and Markel (2001)]. Second, it has been shown that public
compliance with policies and laws strongly depends on the perceived fairness of
their enforcement procedures [e.g. Tyler (1990), Wenzel (2002), Murphy (2004),
De Cremer and van Knippenberg (2003) and Tyler (2003)].
Psychologists explain the impact of procedures on human interactions with the
help of attribution theory [e.g. Heider (1958), Kelley (1967), Kelley (1973), Ross
and Fletcher (1985)]. Attribution theory rests on the assumption that people need
to infer causes and assign responsibilities for why outcomes occur. It is argued that
especially when outcomes are unfavorable and perceptions of intention are strong,
there is a tendency to assign responsibility for outcomes to people. The assignment
of responsibility and blame in turn has been shown to aﬀect the occurrence and
intensity of anger and aggression [Blount (1995)]. In other words, people care
about others’ intentions and reciprocate kind with kind and unkind with unkind
behavior. As procedures explicitly inﬂuence the control that people have over
ﬁnal outcomes, they obviously also inﬂuence the evaluation of responsibilities and
intentions. To exemplify, imagine a workplace situation in which a principal wants
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to promote one out of two agents. If he chooses to take the decision on who is
to be promoted intransperantly behind closed doors, agents are driven to attach
a high degree of responsibility for the outcome to the principal. His choice is
interpreted as intentional, which fosters perceptions of favoritism. If, by contrast,
the principal uses a transparent procedure which credibly shows that the decision
is based on an unbiased criterion, i.e. a criterion which ‘a priori’ ensures that both
agents have the same chance to be promoted, the principal is not blamed for the
ﬁnal outcome.
In line with attribution theory Blount (1995) experimentally showed that the
responder behavior in ultimatum games is very sensitive to the way, i.e. procedure,
in which a proposal is made. In her experiments proposals in the ultimatum game
were either made by a proposer actively having a stake in the ﬁnal outcome of the
game, by a neutral third party not having any monetary stake in the ﬁnal outcome
or by chance. She observed that the same proposal triggered signiﬁcantly lower
rejection rates in case a neutral third party or chance had chosen the proposal
compared to situations in which the proposal was made by a stakeholder. Accord-
ing to attribution theory lower rejection rates in case of neutrality of the proposer
or explicit randomizations hint at the fact that responders attach a lower degree
of responsibility and intentionality for outcomes to other stakeholders as they do
not have any inﬂuence over proposals. In other words, the responders’ willingness
to punish other stakeholders seems to decrease the lower the others’ inﬂuence over
the ﬁnal division of the pie.
Notwithstanding this experimental evidence and the fact that e.g. workplace
relations play an eminent role in the economic literature, economists have remained
remarkably silent so far about the impact of procedures on human behavior in
strategic interactions. Only three recent economic papers have started to address
the issue of procedural choices in strategic interactions [Bolton et al. (2005),
Trautmann (2006), Krawczyk (2007)]. In contrast to attribution theory, however,
they all extend models of distributional concerns to account for the impact of
procedural choices on strategic behavior. Bolton et al. (2005) only present a
sketch of a possible model based on the model of inequity aversion by Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000). Trautmann, on the other hand, manipulates Fehr and
Schmidt (1999)’s model of inequality aversion suggesting that agents’ utilities
depend on ‘expected outcome diﬀerences’ ‘ex ante’ as well as ‘ex post’ to any
outcome realization. In the context of our introductory example this means that
even after the ﬂipping of a coin the ticket holder ’s utility depends on the ‘ex ante’
expected outcome diﬀerence. The expected outcome diﬀerential for his friends is
lowest when ﬂipping a coin. Hence, an inequality avers ticket holder would prefer
ﬂipping a coin to any other procedure because it ensures a zero expected outcome
diﬀerential. Although Trautmann’s functional form is able to accommodate the
experimental ﬁnding that rejection rates in random ultimatum games are lower
than in the standard ultimatum games, it can only be applied to single decision
situations. It cannot be applied to more complicated strategic interactions as the
calculation of expected payoﬀs needs expectations about the other player’s play.
In contrast, our paper follows the psychologists’ view. As a main result, us-
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ing psychological game theory we show that procedural concerns are an inherent
feature of the interaction of reciprocal agents. We ﬁrst formally deﬁne the con-
cepts of procedural game and procedure and, secondly, use the ‘theory of sequen-
tial reciprocity’ by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) to highlight the impact
of procedural choices on the interaction of reciprocal agents. As will be shown,
procedural choices determine the attribution of responsibilities and the evalua-
tion of intentions. Responsibilities and intentions, in turn, determine the degree
of any subsequent reciprocation. In brief, procedures are associated with explicit
probability distributions deﬁned over pure actions. In our concert-ticket example
the two pure actions of friend (A) obviously are: i) giving the ticket to friend
(B) and ii) giving the ticket to friend (C). The ﬂipping of a coin assigns the
probability 1
2
to both of them. The more skewed this probability distribution is
towards a certain pure action, the stronger the impression that the decision maker
is intentionally aiming at this outcome. At the extreme this means, if friend (A)
takes the decision directly, i.e. without explicitly randomizing, to give the ticket
to friend (B), the unlucky friend (C) assigns full responsibility and intentionality
to the decision of friend (A). In this situation player (C)’s kindness perceptions
are obviously shaped by the fact that player (A) has directly chosen player (B)
without giving him any ‘credible’ chance to also get the ticket.
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)’s class of sequential games does not al-
low for diﬀerent procedural choices. More precisely, it only allows for one type
of procedures : procedures that imply full responsibility and intentionality. To the
contrary of this, in our class of procedural games we allow for diﬀerent procedural
choices which then allows to analyze the impact of procedural choices on strategic
interactions. To exemplify, when player (A) in our introductory example decides
to take his decision by ﬂipping a coin instead of taking the decision himself both
his pure actions, i) and ii), are ‘ex ante’ equally probable. The outcome is pure
chance and, hence, no responsibility and intentionality is associated with it. As a
consequence, reciprocal agents react diﬀerently to the same outcomes, i.e. choice
of pure actions, depending on the procedure which has led to them.
To highlight this impact of procedural choices on the strategic interactions of
reciprocal agents we analyze two applications in the ﬁnal section of this paper.
More precisely, we allow for diﬀerent procedures in the ‘So long, Sucker’ game
analyzed by Nalebuﬀ and Shubik (1988) as well as Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) and the Sequential Prisoners Dilemma also analysed by Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004). Comparing our results to their equilibrium predictions shows
that the interaction of reciprocal agents is very sensitive to the availability of
diﬀerent procedures.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In the next section we formally
deﬁne procedures and characterize a procedural game in which agents choose for
procedures rather than actions and strategies. In the second section we point at
the impact of procedures on the behavior of reciprocal agents. More precisely, we
formally deﬁne reciprocity in the context of our procedural game and in this way
explain the impact of procedural choices on the strategic interaction of reciprocal
agents. We furthermore show that the concept of sequential reciprocity equilibria
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(SRE) deﬁned by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) can also be applied to
our class of procedural games in which agents choose for procedural strategies.
Finally, as said above, two applications are discussed to highlight the impact and
importance of procedural concerns in strategic interactions.
Procedures
In this section we proceed in two steps. First, we intuitively sketch our argument
with the help of two examples. In a second step we i) formally deﬁne the concept
of procedures and ii) fully characterize our class of procedural games in which
agents do not choose actions and strategies, as usually assumed in game theory,
but procedures. This class of multi-stage games in which agents choose procedures
is thenceforth used in the subsequent sections to analyze the impact of procedural
choices on the strategic interaction of reciprocal agents.
As a starting point consider games Γ1 and Γ2 in Figure 1 and 2:
[Figure 1 and 2 here]
The sole diﬀerence between games Γ1 and Γ2 is that in Γ2 player 1 can choose
(M) on top of his pure actions (L) and (R). Player 1’s pure action (M), however,
is nothing else than choosing an explicit randomization device, (0), assigning prob-
abilities α2 and (1− α2) to his pure actions (L) and (R) respectively. ‘Flipping
a coin’ or ‘throwing a dice’ constitute explicit randomization devices, for exam-
ple. ‘Flipping a coin’ assigns the probability 1
2
to both pure actions (L) and (R).
‘Throwing a dice’, on the other hand, leads to α2 =
5
6
and (1− α2) = 16 , if, for
example, (L) is chosen, whenever numbers 1 to 5 come up, and (R) is chosen, if
6 appears. Obviously, ‘ﬂipping a coin’ and ‘throwing a dice’ are but two credible
ways in which a decision can be taken. In reality one usually disposes of many dif-
ferent ways. Nevertheless the two examples suﬃce to show how diﬀerent ways, or
in our words explicit randomization devices, are associated with diﬀering explicit
probability distributions with which an action is indirectly chosen by chance.
But not only choices like (M) can be characterized as choices for explicit ran-
domization devices. Taking the thought about the credible ways and the diﬀering
explicit probability distributions to the extreme shows that also pure actions like
(L) and (R) can equally be deﬁned as choices for explicit randomization mech-
anisms. Imagine, for example, that player 1 in Γ1 and Γ2 chooses for his pure
actions (L). This is equivalent to saying that player 1 chooses for chance to take
the decision between (L) and (R) assigning probability 1 to his pure action (L).
Hence, although (L) represents a pure action, it can nevertheless be reinterpreted
in a way in which the decision is indirectly taken by chance randomizing with a
degenerated probability distribution over the set {(L) , (R)}.
This shows that in our two examples, Γ1 and Γ2, any choice for a pure actions,
i.e. (L) and (R), and any choice for an explicit randomization mechanism, i.e.
(M), can likewise be reinterpreted as a choice for an explicit randomization device
through which the actual decision is subsequently taken by chance. Consider, for
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example, game Γ3 in Figure 3, which is a restatement of game Γ2 in the spirit of
this intuition:
[Figure 3 here]
As one can see, in Γ3 we reformulate all strategic choices of game Γ2 into
choices for explicit randomization mechanisms, i.e. chance or player 0, through
which decisions are subsequently taken. In game Γ2 player 1 can decide between
(L), (M) and (R), and player 2 can decide between (l) and (r), (l′) and (r′), (l′′)
and (r′′) or (l′′′) and (r′′′) depending on player 1’s choice. Equivalently, in game
Γ3 player 1, for example, has to decide between the explicit randomization devices
ω (h01), ω
′ (h01) and ω
′′ (h01) in the initial history h
0
1. First, by choosing ω (h
0
1) he can
decide to let chance take the decision between (L) and (R) assigning probability
1 to (L). Second, by choosing ω′ (h01) he can decide to let chance take the decision
between (L) and (R) assigning probability α2 to (L) and (1− α2) to (R). Finally,
by choosing ω′′ (h01) he can decide to let chance take the decision between (L)
and (R) assigning probability 1 to (R). In all these three cases player 1 only
determines how chance subsequently takes the decision, rather then taking the
decision himself. Hence, notwithstanding the formal equivalence between games
Γ2 and Γ3, an interpretive diﬀerence exists. Choosing for an explicit randomization
mechanism implies that players do not take decisions themselves. They merely
determine how decisions are taken by chance. In other words, players decide about
the procedures which are used to take decisions. The example in Figure 3, thus,
uncovers that strategic decision making is not only about choosing actions but
also about how actions are chosen. For this reason we call game Γ3 a procedural
game.
This brings us to a more formal deﬁnition of our class of procedural games.
Formally, let the set of players be N = {0, 1, ..., N} where 0 denotes the uninter-
ested player chance. Denote as H, with the empty sequence ∅ ∈ H, the ﬁnite
set of histories, h, and X the ﬁnite set of decision nodes x, such that hx is the
sequence of decisions on the path to the decision node x. The player function, C,
assigns to each nonterminal history hx ∈ H a member i ∈ N who moves after that
history hx. Therefore, let hxi be the history h on the path to the decision node
x which is controlled by player i ∈ N and Hi the set of all histories after which
player i has to move throughout the game. At each history, hxi , after which player
i ∈ N\ {0} has to move, he disposes of a nonempty ﬁnite set of pure actions A (hxi )
and a ﬁnite set of explicit randomization devices, Ω (hxi ), through which he can
choose an action from A (hxi ). As already suggested in example Γ3 players in our
procedural games do not choose actions a ∈ A (hxi ) directly, but choose explicit
randomization mechanisms, denoted ω (hxi ) ∈ Ω (hxi ), through which a decision is
indirectly taken by chance. The choice for a speciﬁc explicit randomization de-
vice, ω (hxi ), in history h
x
i by player i ∈ N\ {0} leads to a speciﬁc decision node
v ∈ X deﬁned by hv0 in which chance takes the actual decision using the explicit
probability distribution ρ (ω (hxi )) associated with ω (h
x
i ) deﬁned on A (hv0), with
A (hv0) = A (hxi ). Hence, the choice for a pure action a (e.g. (L) in Γ2), for exam-
ple, translates in our procedural game into a choice for an explicit randomization
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mechanisms, ω (hxi ), that is associated with a degenerated probability distribution
ρ (ω (hxi )) which assigns probability 1 to the pure action a in the set of possible ac-
tions A (hv0) = A (hxi ). The choice for an explicit randomization (e.g. (M) in Γ2),
on the other hand, is a choice for an explicit randomization mechanism, ω′ (hxi ),
that is associated with a non-degenerated probability distribution ρ (ω′ (hxi )) de-
ﬁned on A (hv0) = A (hxi ). As said before, the set of player i’s degenerated as well
as non-degenerated explicit randomization mechanisms in any history hxi is Ω (h
x
i ).
The associated set of explicit probability distributions is furthermore denoted as
P (hxi ), where P (hxi ) = {ρ (ω (hxi )) | ω (hxi ) ∈ Ω (hxi )}. It can easily be seen that
the minimum number of explicit randomization mechanisms that a player can de-
cide between in any history hxi in our procedural game equals the number of pure
actions that he has in the traditional extensive form representation.
As said before, by choosing for randomization devices players do not take
decisions directly but only determine how chance subsequently takes them. Intu-
itively, as players only decide on how the decisions are subsequently taken, they
only decide on the procedure, which is used to take a decision.
This brings us to a formal deﬁnition of procedures :
Definition 1 A procedure, ω (hxi ) ∈ Ω (hxi ), for player i ∈ N\ {0} in history
hxi ∈ Hi is a tuple:
〈ρ (ω (hxi )) ,A (hv0)〉 ,
where:
1. ρ (ω (hxi )) is the explicit probability distribution associated with ω (h
x
i ) deﬁned
on A (hv0)
2. A (hv0) = A (hxi ), and
3. hv0 directly succeeds h
x
i .
In example Γ3 procedures are used to choose for pure actions. We do not
exclude, however, the possibility of procedures that choose between procedures and
procedures that choose between procedures that choose between procedures etc.
Procedures, ω (hxi ) ∈ Ω (hxi ), rather have to be understood as reduced procedures.
At any history hxi the explicit probability distribution associated with a reduced
procedure, ρ (ω (hxi )) ∈ P (hxi ), basically subsumes the probability distributions
of procedures of all levels into one explicit distribution deﬁned on A (hxi ). It is
assumed that all players learn the outcome of a reduced procedure directly after
its realization.
We denote a collection of procedures for any player i ∈ N\ {0} that speciﬁes
a procedure for each history after which player i moves a procedural strategy, ωi.
A behavioral procedural strategy, mi ∈ Mi, of player i, on the other hand, has to
be understood as an implicit randomization at each history hxi ∈ Hi over the set
of possible procedures Ω (hxi ). Note, procedural strategies, ωi ∈ Ωi, and behavioral
procedural strategies, mi ∈ Mi, in our class of procedural games are respectively
the analogue to pure strategies and mixed strategies in the traditional extensive
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form representation. We assume throughout that players choose for behavioral
procedural strategies.
Given a behavioral procedural strategy, mi, for each player i ∈ N\ {0} and
the commonly known system of probability distributions, P = ∪i∈N\{0}Pi, where
Pi = ∪hxi ∈HiP (hxi ), we can compute a probability distribution over endnodes, z ∈Z. By assigning payoﬀs to endnodes, we can derive an expected payoﬀ function,
πi : Z → , for every player i ∈ N\ {0} which depends on what behavioral
procedural proﬁle, m in M, where M = ×N\{0}Mi, is played. In what follows
we assume that payoﬀs are material payoﬀs like money or any other measurable
quantity of some good.
Summarizing, a procedural game is a tuple:
Γ =
〈
N ,M,P, (πi : Z → )N\{0}
〉
. (1)
This concludes the deﬁnition of procedures and the characterization of the class
of procedural games which is the basis of our subsequent analysis. Starting from
two simple examples, i.e. Γ1 and Γ2, we have formalized the idea that players
choose for procedures rather than actions. In the remainder of the paper we use
this class of procedural games in order to isolate the impact of procedures on
strategic behavior. More precisely, the following section uses this characterization
of procedural games to analyze the impact of procedural choices on the interaction
of reciprocal agents.
Procedural choices and reciprocity
It is easy to see that if agents are only interested in their own expected material
payoﬀ, they would always behave the same in histories representing starting points
of identical subgames. Looking again at game Γ3 in Figure 3, for example, this
means that players would react the same in histories h42 or h
5
2. However, experi-
mental evidence contradicts this. For example, in ultimatum games rejection rates
for the same proposal signiﬁcantly decrease if proposals are made by a random
draw [Blount (1995) and Bolton et al. (2005)]. In other words responders’ behav-
iors in ultimatum games signiﬁcantly depend on how a certain proposal has come
about. Psychologists have termed this dependence procedural fairness or proce-
dural concerns and explain the observed behavior with the help of attribution
theory. According to attribution theory agents behave reciprocally and evaluate
the (un)kindness of themselves and others taking into consideration their as well
as the others’ possible inﬂuence on (expected) outcomes. The less inﬂuence people
have over outcomes at the time of their decision the less they are held responsible
for it. Therefore, in order to demonstrate how procedural concerns can theoreti-
cally be reconciled with economic theory, we broaden the behavioral presumption
in this section by assuming that agents are reciprocal. This means we formally de-
ﬁne reciprocity in the context of our procedural game and show how it can explain
the aforementioned evidence on procedural concerns.
Generally speaking, reciprocity means that agents do not only care about their
own material payoﬀ but also about the intentions of others [e.g. Rabin (1993),
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Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006)]. They act
kindly or unkindly depending on whether others are kind or unkind to them. Be-
fore we can more formally characterize the motivation of reciprocal agents and
precisely deﬁne kindness and perceived kindness, however, it is necessary to high-
light four theoretical peculiarities: kindness and perceived kindness of any player
towards/from any other player i) cannot be measured directly, ii) might change
after diﬀerent histories of a game, iii) should be unaﬀected by ineﬃcient procedural
strategies and iv) realizations of the moves of chance.
i) Kindness and perceived kindness cannot be measured directly as they depend
on each player’s procedural strategies, beliefs about the others’ procedural strategies
and beliefs about the others’ beliefs. Therefore, to model kindness we assume that
every player holds a belief over the behavioral procedural strategies as well as a
belief over the other players’ beliefs. In the spirit of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) we model beliefs as behavioral procedural strategies, mi ∈Mi, ∀i ∈ N\ {0}.
However, in order to avoid confusion we introduce a separate notation for beliefs.
Let Bij = Mj, ∀i, j ∈ N\ {0} be the set of possible beliefs of player i about the
behavioral procedural strategy of player j (i.e. ﬁrst-order belief). Furthermore let
Cijq = Bjq = Mq, ∀i, j, q ∈ N\ {0} be the set of possible beliefs of player i about
the belief of player j about the behavioral procedural strategy of player q 	= j (i.e.
second-order belief). Obviously, players do not have beliefs about the moves of
the player chance. They do know, however, the explicit probability distributions
associated with them. Therefore, let (a)hx denote the collection of all passed
realizations of moves of chance on the path up to history hx.
ii) Players are assumed to have initial ﬁrst- and second-order beliefs about the
other players. As the game unravels these beliefs might change, however. In order
to capture this it is important to keep track of how each player’s behavior, beliefs,
kindness and kindness perceptions diﬀer across histories. We do this by updating
behavioral procedural strategies as well as ﬁrst- and second-order beliefs at each
history that players control. In the spirit of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)
we therefore formally deﬁne an (updated) behavioral procedural strategy as:
Definition 2 Let mi ∈ Mi and hxi ∈ Hi, let mi (hxi ) ∈ Mi be the (updated)
behavioral procedural strategy that prescribes the same procedural choices as mi
except for the procedural choices of player i on the path to hxi which are made with
probability 1.
In correspondence with the collection of passed realizations of the moves of
chance, (a)hxi
, the collection of passed procedural choices of player i on the path to
hxi is denoted (ωi)hxi
. Hence, the updated behavioral procedural strategy mi (h
x
i ) is
identical to (ωi)hxi
on the path to history hxi and identical to the initial behavioral
procedural strategy, mi, in all other histories. To exemplify consider again game Γ3
in Figure 3. Let player 2’s initial behavioral procedural strategy m2 be an implicit
randomization over his set of pure procedures at each history that he controls.
Player 2 moves after history h52, which means that the implicit randomization
prescribed by his initial behavioral procedural strategy over his pure procedural
choices, ω (h52) and ω
′ (h52), leads to some realization. Following this his updated
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behavioral procedural strategy becomes such that the implicit randomization at
h52 is substituted by its realization, but all other procedural choices at histories
not reached remain the same. The updating of beliefs is assumed to work in
an analogous fashion. Let, for example, player 2’s initial belief about player 1’s
behavioral procedural strategy be b21 = (ω (h
0
1)). If later on he ﬁnds himself in
history h52 in game Γ3, his updated belief about player 1’s behavioral procedural
strategy becomes b21 (h
5
2) = (ω
′ (h01)), where b21 (h
5
2) is player 2’s updated ﬁrst-
order belief in history h52 about player 1’s behavioral procedural strategy. This
shows that, parallel to the deﬁnition of mi (h
x
i ), the updated ﬁrst order belief
bij (h
x
i ) is identical to the passed procedural choices of player j on the path to h
x
i ,
(ωj)hxi
, and identical to the initial belief, bij , in all other histories.
A remark on mixed strategies and procedures. The concept of psychological
games was ﬁrst introduced by Geanakoplos et al. (1989). In their seminal work
Geanakoplos et al. (1989) only allow for initial beliefs to enter utility functions.
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and more recently Battigalli and Dufwen-
berg (2007) have shown, however, that in modeling, for example, reciprocity in
a sequential setting unreasonable conclusions might be drawn if utility functions
only depend on initial beliefs.1 They show that it is necessary to keep track of
how beliefs change as play unravels. Two areas in which the updating of beliefs
needs some further explanation are mixed strategies and beliefs in mixed strate-
gies. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) allow for mixed strategies and also allow
players to hold beliefs in mixed strategies. Mixed strategies in their setting should
be interpreted in terms of frequencies with which pure choices are made in a ‘pop-
ulation’. This interpretation then explains why players that possibly hold mixed
beliefs about the action of some other player update their beliefs (as soon as they
learn his choice) as if he had chosen his actions with probability 1, i.e intention-
ally. Procedures, in comparison to that, might assign probabilities to pure actions
in equivalence to mixed strategies. As they are observable, however, players do
not update their beliefs after learning their outcome. If a player, for example,
uses the ﬂip of a coin to take a decision, this is observed by other players. This
observability and the fact that probabilities connected to procedures are common
knowledge implies that procedural choices represent perfect signals about inten-
tions. Consequently, player’s beliefs are updated taking into account the degree
with which speciﬁc outcomes are intentionally aimed at. Therefore, in contrast
to Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), in our setting players update their beliefs
according to the observed procedural choices that players make.
iii) For the same reason as in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) we restrict
our attention to the set of eﬃcient procedural strategies, Ei. The set of eﬃcient
procedural strategies, Ei, is deﬁned as:
1For a more detailed discussion of this issue refer to Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) and
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).
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Ei = {mi ∈Mi | there exists no m′i ∈Mi such that for all hxi ∈ Hi,
(mj)j =i ∈ Πj =iMj,q ∈ N\ {0} it holds that
πq
(
m′i (h
x
i ) , (mj (h
x
i ))j =i
)
≥ πq
(
mi (h
x
i ) , (mj (h
x
i ))j =i
)
with strict inequality for some
(
h, (mj (h
x
i ))j =i , q
)}
.
Strategic choices are ineﬃcient if there exists at least one other choice which
conditional on any history of play and subsequent choices by the others provides
no lower material payoﬀ for any player, and a higher expected material payoﬀ for
some player for some history of play and subsequent choices by the others. In
other words any behavioral procedural strategy is ineﬃcient if it involves ‘waste-
ful play’ following some history, hxi ∈ Hi. As also pointed out by Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2004), it is unreasonable to let kindness and perceived kindness
be inﬂuenced by strategies or, in our context, procedural strategies that imply
‘wasteful play’. More precisely, the fact that ‘wasteful play’ is possible should be
irrelevant for drawing conclusions regarding the kindness of the others’ ‘eﬃcient’
choices.2
iv) As said above, kindness and perceived kindness should also be unaﬀected
by the realizations of the move of chance. Intuitively this captures the idea that
people are not held responsible for situations over which they had no control. Or,
to put it positively, people are held responsible for situations in as much as they
were/are able to inﬂuence them. To give an example, if the ticket holder in our
introductory situation chose to ﬂip a coin to allocate the concert ticket to one of
his friends, the friends’s kindness perceptions of the ticket holder ’s choice would
depend on his procedural choice even after the realization of the move of chance.
He would not be held responsible for the realization itself as he was not able to
inﬂuence it after he had taken the decision to ﬂip a coin. Similarly, ‘ex ante’ the
ticket holder ’s kindness perception of his own choice is also based only on what
he is able to inﬂuence, i.e. he does not hold himself responsible for the realization
of the ﬂip of the coin but only for his procedural choice. To capture this idea we
deﬁne the decision context of a person i in any history hxi . In every history h
x
i
the decision context comprises, ﬁrst, all passed procedural choices on the path to
history hxi , (ω)hxi
, with (ω)hxi
=
{
(ωi)hxi
, ..., (ωN)hxi
}
. Remember, the knowledge of
all passed procedural choices on the path to history hxi is included in the updated
procedural strategies mi (h
x
i ) and the updated ﬁrst order beliefs bij (h
x
i ). Second,
the decision context includes the realizations of the moves of chance on the path
up to history hxi , (a)hxi
, and, third, the remaining explicit probability distributions,
(P)¬hxi , where ¬h
x
i indicates all histories beside the histories on the path up to h
x
i .
Hence, formally speaking:
2For a more detailed discussion of this issue refer to Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).
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Definition 3 The decision context in any history hxi is a tuple:〈
(ω)hxi
, (a)hxi
, (P)¬hxi
〉
.
This means it is the collection of i) all passed procedural choices of all players on
the path to hxi , (ω)hxi
, ii) all passed realizations of the moves of chance on the path
up to hxi , (a)hxi
, and iii) the unreached explicit probability distributions, (P)¬hxi .
Intuitively speaking the decision context can be understood as the ‘informa-
tional background’ which players use to evaluate their own kindness towards others
and, hence, to take their decisions. It is also the ‘informational background’ which
is used by other players in later stages to evaluate the kindness of passed choices
by others. More precisely, the decision context helps to decide in how far others
were consciously aiming at a certain decision, i.e. pure action, or whether it was
by chance that it was chosen.
We can now capture the idea that players strive to be kind if treated kindly
and are unkind if treated unkindly by assuming that every player i ∈ N\ {0}
chooses a behavioral procedural strategy, mi, that maximizes his utility deﬁned as:
Ui = πi +
∑
j =i
Yij · (κij · λiji) , (2)
where i, j ∈ N\ {0}, κij is the believed kindness of player i to player j and λiji is
player i’s belief about the kindness of player j towards himself.
More precisely, player i’s utility is the sum of N terms. The ﬁrst term πi
represents player i’s self interest. It is his expected material payoﬀ in any history
hxi after which he moves. It obviously depends on his own behavioral procedu-
ral strategy, mi (h
x
i ), his belief about the others’ behavioral procedural strategies,
bij (h
x
i ) , ∀j 	= i, all past outcomes/realizations of procedures (a)hxi until history
hxi , and, ﬁnally, on the explicit probability distributions in all histories that have
not been reached yet during the course of the game, (P)¬hx . Hence:
πi = πi
(
mi (h
x
i ) , (bij (h
x
i ))j =i , (a)hxi , (P)¬hx
)
.
It can easily be seen that, as we allow for explicit randomizations in our class
of procedural games our deﬁnition of expected material payoﬀs diﬀers from the
deﬁnition by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). It takes the player i’s decision
context in history hxi into account.
The following N − 1 terms, ∑j =i Yij · (κij · λiji), in equation (2), on the other
hand, represent player i’s reciprocity payoﬀ with respect to each other player j 	= i.
The factor Yij is a non-negative reciprocity parameter which describes player i’s
sensitivity to the (un)kindness of player j. The higher Yij the more sensitive
to reciprocity player i is. Finally the factors κij and λiji capture respectively
the kindness of player i to any other player j and player i’s perceived kindness of
player j towards him. Intuitively, kindness κij is positive or negative depending on
whether i is kind or unkind to j and perceived kindness λiji is positive (negative) if
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player i beliefs player j to be kind (unkind) to him. Notice, reciprocity is captured
by the factorial speciﬁcation of the kindness parameters, κij and λiji. It drives
players to match perceived kindness (positive λiji) with kindness (positive κij) and
perceived unkindness (negative λiji) with unkindness (negative κij).
This brings us to the formal deﬁnition of kindness, κij:
Definition 4 The kindness of player i to another player j 	= i at any history
hxi ∈ H is given by the function κij : Mi × Πj =iBij →  deﬁned as:
κij = πj
(
mi (h
x
i ) , (bij (h
x
i ))j =i , (a)hxi , (P)¬hx
)
− πeij
(
(bij (h
x
i ))j =i , (a)hxi , (P)¬hx
)
.
The kindness of player i towards player j in history hxi is deﬁned as the diﬀer-
ence between the expected material payoﬀ of player j , πj , that player i intends to
give j and the average expected material payoﬀ, πeij
(
(bij (h
x
i ))j =i , (a)hxi , (P)¬hx
)
,
deﬁned as:
πeij
(
(bij (h
x
i ))j =i , (a)hxi , (P)¬hx
)
=
1
2
[
max
{
πj
(
mi (h
x
i ) , (bij (h
x
i ))j =i , (a)hxi , (P)¬hx
)
| mi (hxi ) ∈Mi
}
+min
{
πj
(
mi (h
x
i ) , (bij (h
x
i ))j =i , (a)hxi , (P)¬hx
)
| mi (hxi ) ∈ Ei
}]
.
Think of πeij as a norm for i describing the ‘equitable’ payoﬀ for player j when
i’s beliefs about the other players’ behavior are summarized by (bij (h
x
i ))j =i, the
past realization on the path to hxi are (a)hxi
and the unreached explicit probability
distributions are given by (P)¬hx . Thus, when πeij = πj then player i’s kindness
towards player j is zero. Intuitively the above deﬁnition means that player i is
kinder the more he expects to give player j relative to the average that he could
give him given his beliefs about the other players play. To exemplify consider, for
example, history h52 of game Γ3. The behavioral procedural strategy of player 2,
m2 (h
5
2), as well as his ﬁrst-order belief over the proﬁle of player 1, b21 (h
5
2), and
the past realized move of nature, (a)h52
= {(L)}, deﬁne history h52. Furthermore,
player 2’s behavioral procedural strategy together with his ﬁrst-order belief and
the remaining probability distributions, (P)¬hx , on the other hand, deﬁne what
player 2 is willing to give to player 1 in expected terms as well as what he could
give him. Assume, for example, that player 2’s behavioral procedural strategy in
h52 is m2 (h
5
2) = (ω (h
4
2) , ω (h
5
2) , ω (h
6
2) , ω (h
7
2)). It can easily be seen that player 2
intends to give player 1 π1 (h
5
2) = 1800, i.e. according to m2 (h
5
2) he will choose
ω (h52) after his history h
5
2. On the other hand, the average of the maximum and
minimum which he could give to player 1 is πe21 (h
5
2) =
1
2
(1800) + 1
2
(0) = 900.
Hence, player 2’s kindness towards player 1 in h52 is:
κ21
(
h52
)
= π1
(
h52
)− πe21 (h52) = 1800− 900
= 900.
The above deﬁnition of kindness is a necessary adaptation from Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2004) in the context of our procedural game. It includes the
decision context on which players base their decisions.
65
The deﬁnition of perceived kindness, λiji, also requires a change though. As
said above, in the evaluation of intentions agents take into account in how far
others were/are actually responsible for the unraveled play. Hence, it would be
unreasonable to assume that player 2 in game Γ3 perceived the kindness of player
1 in histories h52 and h
6
2 diﬀerently. It is simply by chance that either of the two
histories are reached. In order to capture this we assume that players always
evaluate the other players’ kindness on the basis of the decision context in which
the others have taken their last procedural choice. Remember, a decision context
characterizes the ‘informational base’ on which a decision is taken. As players
know all past procedural choices as well as the realizations of moves of chance
along the path up to hxi , they obviously not only know their own current decision
context, but they can also deduce all past decision contexts which were the basis of
the other players’ last procedural choices. Denote the history in which any player
j 	= i has made his last procedural choice along the path up to hxi as hxi
(
hlj
)
.
When player i evaluates the kindness of player j’s procedural choice in history hxi ,
he, hence, uses player j’s decision context in hxi
(
hlj
)
:〈
(ω)hxi (hlj)
, (a)hxi (hlj)
, (P)¬hxi (hlj)
〉
,
where (ω)hxi (hlj)
deﬁnes all past procedural choices on the path to hxi up to history
hlj , (a)hxi (hlj)
deﬁnes all past realizations of moves of chance on the path to history
hxi up to history h
l
j and (P)¬hxi (hlj) indicates all remaining explicit randomizations
in hlj. Evaluating player j’s kindness only on the basis of the decision context in
which he has made his last procedural choice on the path up to history hxi ensures
that player j is held solely responsible for the decisions that he has explicitly taken
himself. To exemplify, in both histories h52 and h
6
2 player 2 evaluates player 1’s
kindness on the basis of player 1’s decision context at the history, h01:〈
(ω)h52(h01)
, (a)h52(h01)
, (P)¬h52(h01)
〉
=
〈
(ω)h62(h01)
, (a)h62(h01)
, (P)¬h62(h01)
〉
,
in which player 1 had to take his last procedural decision, i.e. hlj = h
0
1. In other
words, in histories h52 and h
6
2 player 2 does not take the realization of the move
of chance after history h20 into account when evaluating the kindness of player 1.
The realization of the move of chance after h20 is by chance and hence not the
responsibility of player 1.
Given this let perceived kindness be deﬁned as:
Definition 5 Player i’s beliefs about how kind player j 	= i is to i at history
hxi ∈ H is given by the function λiji : Bij × Πi=jCiji →  deﬁned as:
λiji = πi
(
bij (h
x
i ) , (cijq (h
x
i ))q =j , (a)hxi (hlj) , (P)¬hxi (hlj)
)
−πeji
(
(ciji (h
x
i ))i=j , (a)hxi (hlj) , (P)¬hxi (hlj)
)
,
where hxi
(
hlj
)
is the last history after which player j has moved on the path to hxi .
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As one can see, similar to the deﬁnition of kindness also perceived kindness
is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between what player i beliefs to receive in expected
material payoﬀ relative to the average that he could have gotten. To exemplify,
assume now again that players ﬁnd themselves in history h52 of game Γ3. We
have seen above that, given player 2’s updated behavioral procedural strategy, his
ﬁrst-order belief and the past realizations of the moves of chance up to history h52,
player 2’s kindness towards player 1 is 900 in h52. In addition to player 2’s updated
ﬁrst-order belief b21 (h
5
2) = (ω
′ (h01)), let now player 2’s updated second order belief
be c212 (h
5
2) = (ω (h
4
2) , ω (h
5
2) , ω (h
6
2) , ω (h
7
2)). The kindness that player 2 perceives
from player 1 is then given by:
λ212
(
h52
)
= π2
(
b21
(
h52
)
, c212
(
h52
)
, (a)h52(h01)
, (P)¬h52(h01)
)
−πe12
(
c212
(
h52
)
, (a)h52(h01)
, (P)¬h52(h01)
)
=
(
1
2
(1800) +
1
2
(200)
)
− 1
2
((1800) + (200))
= 0.
This means, player 2 has the impression in history h52 that player 1 intends
to give him π2 (h
5
2) = 1000. As 1000 is also the ‘equitable’ payoﬀ that player 1
could have given to him, player 2 judges player 1’s kindness to be 0. Now consider
history h42, on the other hand, which is the starting point of an identical subgame.
Player 2’s perceived kindness of player 1’s behavioral procedural strategy given his
updated beliefs, b21 (h
4
2) = (ω1 (h
0
1)) and c212 (h
4
2) = (ω (h
4
2) , ω (h
5
2) , ω (h
6
2) , ω (h
7
2))
is:
λ212
(
h42
)
= π2
(
b21
(
h42
)
, c212
(
h42
)
, (a)h42(h01)
, (P)¬h42(h01)
)
−πe12
(
c212
(
h42
)
, (a)h42(h01)
, (P)¬h42(h01)
)
= (200)− 1
2
((1800) + (200))
= −800.
Hence, although h42 and h
5
2 are starting points of identical subgames, players
perceives the situations totally diﬀerent, i.e. perceived kindness of 0 in h52 vs.
perceived kindness of −800 in h42. It follows that as both histories are perceived
diﬀerently, optimal reactions in one history might not be optimal in the other
even though the subsequent situation seems to be the same. This exempliﬁes that
reciprocal agents do care about the way a certain situation has come about or, in
other words, reciprocity inherently leads to procedural concerns.
This completes the description of the reciprocal preferences in the context of
our procedural game. Putting together the procedural game, Γ, as deﬁned in (1)
and the vector of utilities, (Ui)i∈N\{0}, as deﬁned in (2) we get a tuple
Γp =
〈
Γ, (Ui)i∈N\{0}
〉
. (3)
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We refer to Γp as a procedural game with reciprocity preferences. Note, as the ‘psy-
chological game with reciprocity preferences’ deﬁned by Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger (2004) Γp is not a ‘traditional game’. In line with Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger (2004), utility functions, Ui, are deﬁned on richer domains including sub-
jective beliefs. Diﬀerent to them, however, and also diﬀerent to ‘traditional games’
agents in our setting choose for procedures, as deﬁned in Deﬁnition (1), rather than
actions and strategies.
As a solution concept for our class of procedural games with reciprocity prefer-
ences we propose the sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE) deﬁned by Dufwen-
berg and Kirchsteiger (2004). This means, each player in each history chooses
his optimal procedure given his beliefs. The players’ initial ﬁrst and second order
beliefs are required to be correct, and following each history of play the beliefs are
updated as explained above.
Let Mi (hxi , m) be the non-empty set of behavioral procedural strategies that
prescribe, for each player i ∈ N\ {0}, the same choices as the strategy mi (hxi )
for all histories other than hxi . Given this, the sequential reciprocity equilibrium
(SRE) in the context of our procedural game with reciprocity preferences is deﬁned
as:
Definition 6 The proﬁle m∗ = (m∗i )i∈N\{0} is a sequential reciprocity equilibrium
(SRE) if for all i ∈ N\ {0} and for each history hxi ∈ H it holds that
1. m∗i (h
x
i ) ∈
argmaxmi∈Mi(hxi ,m) Ui
(
mi (h
x
i ) ,
(
bij (h
x
i ) , (cijq (h
x
i ))q =j
)
j =i
, (a)hxi
, (P)¬hxi
)
,
2. bij = m
∗
j for all j 	= i,
3. cijq = m
∗
q for all j 	= i, q 	= j.
Condition 1 assures that a SRE is a strategy proﬁle such that at history hxi
player i makes choices which maximize his utility given his beliefs and given that he
follows his equilibrium strategy at other histories. At the initial stage, conditions
(2) and (3) guarantee that the initial beliefs are correct. At any subsequent history,
condition (1) requires that beliefs assign probability one to the sequence of choices
that deﬁne that history, but are otherwise as the initial beliefs.
Concluding, in this section we have formally deﬁned the motivation of recipro-
cal agents in the context of our procedural game and have given a glimpse of the
impact of procedural choices on the strategic interaction of reciprocal agents. In
the following section we will more fully analyze the impact of procedural choices
by applying the concept of the sequential reciprocity equilibrium to two examples.
Applications
The ﬁrst application is the ‘Sequential Prisoners Dilemma’ also analyzed by
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). The second is the ‘So Long, Sucker’ game in
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the spirit of Nalebuﬀ and Shubik (1988) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).
Note, a full description of the strategic interaction and all possible equilibria that
might arise in these two situations is beyond the scope of this paper. We, therefore,
limit the analysis to the characterization of only one equilibrium to demonstrate
the impact and importance of procedural concerns. Results and intuitions are
presented in this section, mathematical proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Example 1: Sequential Prisoners Dilemma
Consider the Sequential Prisoners Dilemma in Figure 4: 1
[Figure 4 here]
As can easily be seen, game Γ4 is an adaptation of the sequential prisoners
dilemma analyzed by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). The diﬀerence is that
in Γ4 player 1 cannot only choose to cooperate (c) and defect (d), but can also
explicitly randomize by choosing procedure (r). One sequential reciprocity equi-
librium is:
Result 7 If player 1’s and 2’s sensitivity to reciprocity, Y1 and Y2, is such that
0 < Y1 <
1
2
and
Y2 >
1
4α2 − 3
and player 1’s procedure r (h01) is associated with an explicit probability distribution
such that 1 > α2 >
3
4
, then the SRE is given by player 1 choosing r (h01) in history
h01 and player 2 choosing c (h
4
2) , c (h
5
2) , c (h
6
2) and d (h
7
2) in histories h
4
2, h
5
2, h
6
2 and
h72 respectively.
3
Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition is the following. If α2 is such that 1 > α2 >
3
4
, player 2 perceives
player 1’s procedural choice as kind. If, in addition, his sensitivity to reciprocity
Y2 is high enough, i.e. Y2 >
1
4α2−3 , then he reciprocates player 1’s kindness by
choosing (c) in history h62. At the same time player 2 punishes player 1 in equi-
librium at history h72 which is the starting point of a payoﬀ equivalent subgame.
The diﬀerence between histories h62 and h
7
2 is that the explicit probability α2 is
such that player 2 perceives player 1’s choice of (r) as kind. He does not attribute
enough responsibility for the outcome, i.e. history h62, to player 1 to make it worth
while to punish him. Furthermore, since Y1 is relatively small, player 1 is mainly
interested by money and his expected monetary payoﬀ is highest by playing (r)
given that player 2 does not play (d) following player 1’s choice of (r).
3For simplicity we denote the sensitivity of reciprocity as Yi in example 1. In example 2 we
stick to Yij as deﬁned in equation (2) to avoid confusion.
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Figure 4: Game Γ4
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Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), on the other hand, showed in the context
of their setting that if player 2’s sensitivity to reciprocity is strong enough, he
cooperates if player 1 cooperates and defects if player 1 defects. Furthermore, they
showed that if player 1’s sensitivity to reciprocity is low and player 2’s sensitivity
is high, cooperation is player 1’s equilibrium behavior for both monetary and
reciprocity reasons.
Comparing the results shows that their equilibrium predictions are very sen-
sitive to the availability of other procedures to take the same decision. As player
1 can also use procedure (r) to take his decision cooperation is no longer his op-
timal action given that player 2 is very sensitive to reciprocity. He chooses (r)
because this makes player 2 to cooperate even in history h62 which is identical to
the subgame starting in h72. Hence, procedural choices inﬂuence the kindness and
perceived kindness of players and therefore inﬂuence the interaction of reciprocal
agents.
Example 2: The ‘So Long, Sucker’ Game
In the following we will apply the concept of the sequential reciprocity equilibrium
to the example, Γ5, in Figure 5.
1 Example Γ5 is an adaptation of the ‘So Long,
Sucker’ game also analyzed by Nalebuﬀ and Shubik (1988) and Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004). With ε = 0, Γ5 is a strategic situation in which player 1
has to decide on whom of two other players to give a zero payoﬀ. Following his
decision, the player who was unfavorably treated is called upon to decide whether
player 1 should get 3 or whether both the others should equally get a payoﬀ of 1.
Intuitively it looks as if player 1 is ‘a priori’ worst oﬀ, as whoever he chooses will
feel badly treated, and hence take revenge on player 1 by giving him the lowest
possible monetary payoﬀ.
[Figure 5 here]
However, if all players are solely motivated by purely selﬁsh monetary concerns,
this outcome is not guaranteed, as players 2 and 3 are indiﬀerent between all their
choices given that ε = 0. In order to allow for the possibility of revenge, Nalebuﬀ
and Shubik (1988) depart from the usual selﬁshness assumption, and assume that
the players have lexicographically ordered objectives. This means that each player
primarily maximizes his monetary payoﬀ, but in case some choices yield exactly
the same monetary payoﬀ ties are broken so as to allow a player to take revenge.
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), on the other hand, show that if agents behave
reciprocally this outcome is also guaranteed for ε ≥ 0. More precisely, they show
that for any ε ≥ 0 there exist sensitivities to reciprocity Y21 > 0 and Y31 > 0 for
which taking revenge on player 1 is the best alternative for player 2 and 3. As said
above, if players 2 and 3 are willing to take revenge even if it is costly, it seems
that player 1 is trapped, as whatever he does, his action is perceived unkind by
the player who has to take the subsequent decision.
As in the Sequential Prisoners Dilemma also in this application these results
crucially depend on the fact that players 2 and 3 attribute full intentionality to
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player 1. In other words, Nalebuﬀ and Shubik (1988)’s and Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004)’s result is contingent on the unavailability of other procedures
for player 1 to resolve the conﬂict between him and the other players. Consider
game Γ6 in Figure 6:
[Figure 6 here]
As can easily be seen, the only diﬀerence between games Γ5 and Γ6 lies in
the fact that in the latter player 1 cannot only take his decision directly but can
also e.g. ﬂip a coin, i.e. choose ω′1 (h
0
1), to take it. Hence, he has an additional
procedure which he can use to take his decision. It can be shown that with the help
of this procedure player 1 can avoid the conﬂict with the others. More precisely:
Result 8 If player 1, 2 and 3 have a sensitivity to reciprocity of
Y12 = Y13 ≥ 0,
Y21 ≥ ε
ε + 1
and
Y31 ≥ ε
ε + 1
,
then the only equilibrium is given by players 2 and 3 playing(
ω′2
(
h42
)
, ω2
(
h52
))
and (
ω′3
(
h63
)
, ω2
(
h73
))
respectively and player 1 choosing ω′1 (h
0
1).
Proof: see Appendix.
This means, if players 2 and 3 are enough sensitive to reciprocity, they will
punish player 1, if he chooses one of them directly, and will be kind to him, if
he chooses to take the decision by e.g. ‘ﬂipping a coin’. Knowing this, player
1 will choose to ﬂip a coin, given that his sensitivity to reciprocity is equal for
players 2 and 3, as this gives him a higher monetary as well as reciprocity payoﬀ.
In other words, by choosing e.g. to ﬂip a coin, player 1 can get out of his ‘trap’.
Players 2 and 3 respectively perceive player 1’s procedural strategy ω1 (h
0
1) , ω
′′
1 (h
0
1)
as unkind and ω′1 (h
0
1) as kind. If player 1 chooses e.g. to ﬂip a coin, they do not
attribute the outcome of the randomization to player 1, as he is only responsible
for choosing the procedure but not for the outcome itself. Player 1, on the other
hand, chooses ω′1 (h
0
1) for monetary as well as reciprocity reasons.
This highlights ones more how procedural choices inﬂuence the strategic inter-
action of reciprocal agents.
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Conclusion
As we have seen, any decision in human interactions is inherently associated with
a procedure which characterizes the way in which the decision is taken. This
means it is impossible to take a decision without deciding on how to take it. It is
widely accepted in other scientiﬁc disciplines and it has been shown experimentally
that people react diﬀerently to identical outcomes depending on the procedures
which have led to them. Hence, people are concerned about the way in which
decisions are taken. Nevertheless economic theory has so far neglected the impact
of procedural choices on human interaction. It has ignored procedural concerns as
traditional economic theory is based on consequentialist preferences. However, if
preferences are solely outcome oriented, it can hardly be explained why people
should react diﬀerently to ‘outcomewise’ identical situations which only diﬀer in
the procedures which have led to them.
Only in recent years theories of reciprocity have contested the consequential-
ist view in economic theory by assuming that agents also receive a psychological
payoﬀ which, broadly speaking, depends on the agents’ perceived intentions of
others. As said before, when people behave reciprocally they evaluate the inten-
tions of others and reciprocate kind with kind and unkind with unkind behavior.
The evaluation of intentions is implicitly connected to the assignment of respon-
sibilities for outcomes. The assignment of responsibilities, in turn, is related to
the amount of control that people have over outcomes. It has been shown in our
paper that procedural choices inﬂuence the control that people have over outcomes
and, hence, inﬂuence the attribution of responsibilities and the evaluation of in-
tentions. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)’s theory of sequential reciprocity
captures situations in which agents have full control over outcomes and, hence,
are held fully responsible for all consequences of their actions. In contrast to this,
in our class of procedural games agents can choose between diﬀerent procedures,
which diﬀer in the probabilities that they assign to outcomes. Given this we show,
in line with attribution theory, that the less inﬂuence people have on outcomes
the less responsibility and intentionality is attributed to them.
By deﬁning a class of procedural games we have been able to distinguishing
between procedures which are used to take decisions and the decisions themselves.
Furthermore, assuming reciprocal agents and deﬁning the decision context as the
‘informational background’ which any decision is based upon, we have demon-
strated that procedural concerns are actually an inherent feature of any interaction
of reciprocal agents.
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Appendix
Proof to result (7):
In this proof we show under what conditions the behavior as deﬁned in Result
(7) is the equilibrium behavior. Note, as deﬁned in Deﬁnition (6) we assume that
players’ beliefs are correct. Given this, we analyze under what conditions they
can be sustained in equilibrium. It can easily be seen that if player 2’s second
order belief about player 1’s belief is (c (h42) , c (h
5
2) , c (h
6
2) , d (h
7
2)), then player 2’s
believed equitable payoﬀ is πe12 =
1
2
(1) + 1
2
(0) = 1
2
. Hence, player 2’s perceived
kindness if player 1 chooses c (h01) is
λ212
(
h42
)
= 1− 1
2
=
1
2
,
where 1 is player 2’s expected monetary payoﬀ and 1
2
his equitable payoﬀ given
his second order belief.
Secondly, if player 1 plays r (h01) player 2’s perceived kindness of player 1’s
procedural choice is
λ212
(
h52
)
= λ212
(
h62
)
= α2 (1) + (1− α2) (−1)− 1
2
= 2α2 − 3
2
, (4)
and, thirdly, if player 1 plays d (h01), it is
λ212
(
h72
)
= 0− 1
2
= −1
2
.
From equation (4) it can directly be seen that player 2 perceives player 1’s proce-
dural choice r (h01) as kind or unkind depending on α2. If α2 >
3
4
then player 1’s
choice of r (h01) is perceived as kind. Therefore,
Remark 9 If α2 is such that
1 > α2 >
3
4
,
then player 2 perceives player 1’s procedural choice r (h01) as kind.
Henceforth we assume that player 1’s procedure r (h01) is associated with an
explicit probability distribution α2 >
3
4
.
We said before that player 1’s ﬁrst order belief is (c (h42) , c (h
5
2) , c (h
6
2) , d (h
7
2)).
Furthermore, we said that in equilibrium this belief has to be correct. Hence,
under what condition do we expect player 2 to choose c (h42) following player 1’s
choice of c (h01)? By playing c (h
4
2) player 2 receives the following utility
u2
(
c
(
h42
))
= 1 + Y2 (1)
(
1
2
)
,
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where κ21 (c (h
4
2)) = 1 − 12 ((1) + (−1)) = 1 is player 2’s kindness to player 1 by
playing c (h42). On the other hand, by playing d (h
4
2) player 2’s utility is
u2
(
d
(
h42
))
= 2 + Y2 (−1)
(
1
2
)
,
where κ21 (d (h
4
2)) = −1 − 12 ((1) + (−1)) = −1. Hence player 2 plays c (h42) in
history h42 if
1 + Y2 (1)
(
1
2
)
≥ 2 + Y2 (−1)
(
1
2
)
.
This reduces to
Y2 ≥ 1.
This shows that if player 1 plays c (h01), player 2 plays c (h
4
2) if Y2 ≥ 1.
Remark 10 If player 1 plays c (h01), player 2 plays c (h
4
2) if Y2 ≥ 1.
Going back to player 1’s ﬁrst order belief, under what conditions do we expect
player 2 to choose d (h72) following player 1’s choice of d (h
0
1)?
In history h72 it is easy to see that player 2’s monetary and reciprocity payoﬀ
induce him to chooses d (h72) for all Y2 ≥ 0. Hence, if player 1 plays d (h01), player
2 plays d (h72) if Y2 ≥ 0.
Remark 11 If player 1 plays d (h01), player 2 plays d (h
4
2) if Y2 ≥ 0.
Finally, under what conditions do we expect player 2 to choose c (h52) in h
5
2 and
c (h62) in h
6
2 following player 1’s choice of r (h
0
1)?
Assume that player 1 has chosen r (h01). Doing the analogous calculations as
above for player 2’s behavior in history h52 one can see that player 2 plays c (h
5
2)
in h52 if
1 + Y2 (1)
(
2α2 − 3
2
)
≥ 2 + Y2 (−1)
(
2α2 − 3
2
)
,
where the lhs is u2 (c (h
5
2)) and the rhs is u2 (d (h
5
2)). The above reduces to
Y2 ≥ 1
4α2 − 3 .
Note, as α2 >
3
4
we know that Y2 ≥ 14α2−3 > 1. This shows that any player 2 with
Y2 ≥ 14α2−3 would play c (h42) in history h42 and c (h52) in history h52. Finally, in
history h62 the analogous calculations as in h
5
2 and h
4
2 are
−1 + Y2 (1)
(
2α2 − 3
2
)
≥ 0 + Y2 (−1)
(
2α2 − 3
2
)
,
where the lhs is u2 (c (h
6
2)) and the rhs is u2 (d (h
6
2)). The above also reduces to
Y2 ≥ 1
4α2 − 3 .
Hence, also here it holds that if Y2 ≥ 14α2−3 player 2 plays c (h62) in history h62.
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Remark 12 If player 1 plays r (h01), player 2 plays c (h
5
2) in h
5
2 and c (h
6
2) in h
6
2
if Y2 ≥ 14α2−3 .
Concluding, as we have seen above, if Y2 ≥ 14α2−3 , it holds that player 2’
equilibrium behavior is characterized by c (h42) , c (h
5
2) , c (h
6
2) and d (h
7
2) in histories
h42, h
5
2, h
6
2 and h
7
2 respectively.
Let us now turn to player 1. Player 1’s perceived kindness of player 2’s equi-
librium procedural strategy is
λ121
(
h01
)
= (q + 2q′ − q′α2)− (1− q′α2 − q)
= 2q + 2q′ − 1,
where q and q′ are player 1’s second order beliefs associated with his procedures
c (h01) and r (h
0
1). His kindness to player 2, on the other hand, is
κ12
(
c
(
h01
))
= 1− 1
2
=
1
2
,
by playing c (h01),
κ12
(
r
(
h01
))
= α2 − (1− α)− 1
2
= 2α2 − 3
2
,
by playing r (h01) and
κ12
(
c
(
h01
))
= 0− 1
2
= −1
2
,
by playing d (h01).
Putting the pieces together one can see that player 1 chooses r (h01) in equilib-
rium if for q′ = 1 and q = 0 two conditions hold: i) u1 (r (h01)) ≥ u1 (c (h01)) and
ii) u1 (r (h
0
1)) ≥ u1 (d (h01)). The ﬁrst condition boils down to
(2− α2) + Y1
(
2α2 − 3
2
)
≥ (1) + Y1
(
1
2
)
,
which reduces to
Y1 ≤ 1
2
.
The second condition furthermore boils down to
(2− α2) + Y1
(
2α2 − 3
2
)
≥ (0) + Y1
(
−1
2
)
,
which holds for all Y1 ≥ 0. Hence, given player 2’s behavior, the equilibrium
behavior of player 1 is characterized by r (h01) if 0 < Y1 ≤ 12 .
Remark 13 Given player 2’s equilibrium behavior (c (h42) , c (h
5
2) , c (h
6
2) , d (h
7
2)),
player 1 plays r (h01) if 0 < Y1 ≤ 12 .
In other words, if player 2’s sensitivity to reciprocity is high and player 1’s is
not too strong, the equilibrium behavior for both players is player 1 choosing the
procedure r (h01) and player 2 choosing (c (h
5
2) , c (h
6
2)) in response. This concludes
the proof of Result (7).
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Proof to result (8):
In analogy to the aforementioned proof, we ﬁrst show under what conditions(
ω′2
(
h42
)
, ω2
(
h52
))
and (
ω′3
(
h63
)
, ω2
(
h73
))
simultaneously represent the equilibrium behavior of players 2 and 3. Then, sec-
ondly, we show the conditions for which it is best for player 1 to choose ω′1 (h
0
1),
given the behavior of players 2 and 3.
If (ω′2 (h
4
2) , ω2 (h
5
2)) and (ω
′
3 (h
6
3) , ω2 (h
7
3)) are player 2’s and 3’s procedural
strategies, then the most and least that player 1 can give to player 2 and 3 is
either 1 or −ε. Hence, it can easily be seen that the perceived kindness of player
2 and 3 in either of the four histories h42, h
5
2, h
6
3, h
7
2 is:
λ212
(
h42
)
= λ313
(
h73
)
= −ε− 1
2
(1− ε)
= −1
2
(1 + ε) ,
λ212
(
h52
)
= λ212
(
h63
)
= λ313
(
h52
)
= λ313
(
h63
)
=
1
2
− 1
2
(1− ε)
=
1
2
ε,
and
λ212
(
h73
)
= λ313
(
h42
)
= 1− 1
2
(1− ε)
=
1
2
(1 + ε) ,
where πe12 = π
e1
3 =
1
2
(1− ε). In other words, if player 1 chooses ω1 (h01) player 2
perceives this as unkind and player 3 as kind. On the other hand, if player 1 chooses
ω′′1 (h
0
1), player 2 perceives this as kind and player 3 as unkind. Furthermore, if
player 1 takes his decision by ﬂipping a coin, i.e. ω′1 (h
0
1), then both players do not
perceive this as unkind as ε ≥ 0.
Remark 14 Player 2 perceives player 1’s procedural choice of ω1 (h
0
1) as unkind.
Likewise, player 3 perceives player 1’s procedural choice ω′′1 (h
0
1) as unkind. On the
other hand, both player do not perceive player 1’s choice ω′1 (h
0
1) as unkind.
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Consider now all histories in turn. Looking at history h42 after which player 2
has to choose one can see that player 2 can either show a kindness of
κ12
(
ω2
(
h42
))
= 3− 1
2
(3 + 1)
= 1
by playing ω2 (h
4
2) or he can show a kindness of
κ12
(
ω′2
(
h42
))
= 1− 1
2
(3 + 1)
= −1
by playing ω′2 (h
4
2). Obviously, player 2’s behavior in history h
4
2 in general also
creates some (un)kindness towards player 3. In our case, however, 3’s monetary
payoﬀ is invariant to player 2’s choice in h42. Hence, player 2’s kindness towards
player 3 is 0 in h42. Given this, the utilities from either of player 2’s choices are
u2
(
ω2
(
h42
))
= (0) + Y21 (1)
(
−1
2
(1 + ε)
)
,
and
u2
(
ω′2
(
h42
))
= (−ε) + Y21 (−1)
(
−1
2
(1 + ε)
)
.
Again in equilibrium player 2 chooses the latter if u2 (ω
′
2 (h
4
2)) ≥ u2 (ω2 (h42)). This
can be written as
(−ε) + Y21 (−1)
(
−1
2
(1 + ε)
)
≥ (0) + Y21 (1)
(
−1
2
(1 + ε)
)
,
which reduces to
Y21 ≥ ε
ε + 1
.
This means if Y21 ≥ εε+1 then player 2 takes revenge on player 1 by choosing
ω′2 (h
4
2) in history h
4
2. From the symmetry of the game it necessarily also follows
that everything which holds for player 2 in history h42 also holds for player 3 in
history h73. In other words if
Y31 ≥ ε
ε + 1
,
then player 3 takes revenge on player 1 in history h73 by playing ω
′
3 (h
7
3).
Remark 15 Players 2 and 3 take revenge on player 1 by playing ω′2 (h
4
2) in h
4
2
and ω′3 (h
7
3) in h
7
3 respectively, if Y21, Y31 ≥ εε+1 .
Turning now to histories h52 and h
6
2 one can see that due to the symmetry of the
situation both players, 2 and 3, perceive player 1’s kindness identically. Therefore,
in history h52 player 2’s utilities from choosing either of his procedures is
u2
(
ω2
(
h52
))
= (0) + Y21 (1)
(
1
2
ε
)
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and
u2
(
ω′2
(
h52
))
= (−ε) + Y21 (−1)
(
1
2
ε
)
.
He chooses ω2 (h
5
2) rather than ω
′
2 (h
5
2) if u2 (ω2 (h
5
2)) ≥ u2 (ω′2 (h52)), i.e.
(0) + Y21 (1)
(
1
2
ε
)
≥ (−ε) + Y21 (−1)
(
1
2
ε
)
,
which reduces to
Y21 ≥ −1.
Note, this holds for all Y21 ≥ 0. Again, for equal reasons also player 3 chooses
ω3 (h
6
3) rather than ω
′
2 (h
6
3) in history h
6
3 if Y21 ≥ 0.
Remark 16 If player 2’s and 3’s sensitivity to reciprocity is
Y21 ≥ 0,
and
Y31 ≥ 0,
then they respectively choose ω2 (h
5
2) and ω3 (h
6
3) in histories h
5
2 and h
6
3 following
player 1’s choice of ω′1 (h
0
1).
Concluding, if Y21 ≥ εε+1 and Y31 ≥ εε+1 then players 2 and 3 play (ω′2 (h42) , ω2 (h52))
and (ω′3 (h
6
3) , ω2 (h
7
3)) in their histories h
4
2, h
5
2 and h
6
3, h
7
3 respectively.
Given this under what conditions is it best for player 1 to choose ω′1 (h
0
1)?
Assume for simplicity that player 1’s sensitivity to reciprocity is equal towards
both, player 2 and 3. In other words, assume that Y12 = Y13 = Y . Denote player
1’s second order beliefs about player 2’s and 3’s beliefs p2, p
′
2 and (1− p2 − p′2) as
well as p3, p
′
3 and (1− p3 − p′3). More precisely, let pi and p′i be player 1’s belief
about the probabilities that any player i ∈ {2, 3} attaches to player 1’s procedures
ω1 (h
0
1) and ω
′
1 (h
0
1) respectively. Therefore, player 1’s perceived kindness from
player 2’s and 3’s procedural strategies is
λ121 = p2 (−1) + p′2
(
1
2
(1) +
1
2
(0)
)
+ (1− p2 − p′2) (0)
= p′2
(
1
2
)
− p2,
and
λ131 = p3 (0) + p
′
3
(
1
2
(0) +
1
2
(1)
)
+ (1− p3 − p′3) (−1)
= p′3
(
1
2
)
− (1− p3 − p′3)
Player 1’s kindness, on the other hand, towards player 2 and 3 is given by κ12 (ω1 (h
0
1)) =
κ13 (ω
′′
1 (h
0
1)) = −12 (1 + ε), κ13 (ω1 (h01)) = κ12 (ω′′1 (h01)) = 12 (1 + ε) and κ12 (ω′1 (h01)) =
κ13 (ω
′
1 (h
0
1)) =
1
2
ε.
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Hence, given that players 2 and 3 choose (ω′2 (h
4
2) , ω2 (h
5
2)) and (ω
′
3 (h
6
3) , ω2 (h
7
3))
the utilities from all of player 1’s procedural choices can be written as
u1
(
ω1
(
h01
))
= 1 + Y
(
−1
2
(1 + ε)
)(
p′2
(
1
2
)
− p2
)
+Y
(
1
2
(1 + ε)
)(
p′3
(
1
2
)
− (1− p3 − p′3)
)
by playing ω1 (h
0
1),
u1
(
ω′1
(
h01
))
= 3 + Y
(
1
2
ε
)(
p′2
(
1
2
)
− p2
)
+Y
(
1
2
ε
)(
p′3
(
1
2
)
− (1− p3 − p′3)
)
by playing ω′1 (h
0
1) and
u1
(
ω′′1
(
h01
))
= 1 + Y
(
1
2
(1 + ε)
)(
p′2
(
1
2
)
− p2
)
+Y
(
−1
2
(1 + ε)
)(
p′3
(
1
2
)
− (1− p3 − p′3)
)
by playing ω′′1 (h
0
1).
Obviously, player 1 plays ω′1 (h
0
1) if u1 (ω
′
1 (h
0
1)) ≥ u1 (ω1 (h01)) and u1 (ω′1 (h01)) ≥
u1 (ω
′′
1 (h
0
1)) with p2 = p3 = 0, p
′
2 = p
′
3 = 1 and p
′′
2 = p
′′
3 = 0. The ﬁrst of the two
conditions can be written as
3 + Y
(
1
2
ε
)(
1
2
)
+ Y
(
1
2
ε
)(
1
2
)
≥ 1− Y
(
1
2
(1 + ε)
)(
1
2
)
+ Y
(
1
2
(1 + ε)
)(
1
2
)
,
which holds for all Y > 0. Secondly, it has to hold that
3 + Y
(
1
2
ε
)(
1
2
)
+ Y
(
1
2
ε
)(
1
2
)
≥ 1 + Y
(
1
2
(1 + ε)
)(
1
2
)
− Y
(
1
2
(1 + ε)
)(
1
2
)
,
which is identical to the above. Hence, whenever Y = Y12 = Y13 > 0 it holds that
player 1’s best response to player 2’s and 3’s procedural strategy (ω′2 (h
4
2) , ω2 (h
5
2))
and (ω′3 (h
6
3) , ω2 (h
7
3)) is to play ω
′
1 (h
0
1).
Remark 17 Given player 2’s and 3’s equilibrium play, player 1 chooses procedure
ω′1 (h
0
1), if Y = Y12 = Y13 > 0.
This concludes the proof of Result (8).
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Figure 5: Game Γ5
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Procedural Concerns in Psychological Games∗
Alexander Sebald†
Abstract
One persistent ﬁnding in experimental economics is that people react very
diﬀerently to outcomewise identical situations depending on the procedures
which have led to them. In accordance with this, there exists a broad
consensus among psychologists that not only expected outcomes shape hu-
man behavior, but also the way in which decisions are taken. Economists,
on the other hand, have remained remarkably silent about procedural as-
pects of strategic interactions. This paper provides a game theoretic frame-
work that integrates procedural concerns into economic analysis. Building
on Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)’s framework of dynamic psychological
games, we show how procedural concerns can be conceptualized assuming
that agents are (also) motivated by belief-dependent psychological payoﬀs.
Procedural choices inﬂuence the causal attribution of responsibilities, the
evaluation of intentions and the arousal of emotions. Two applications
highlight the impact and importance of procedural concerns in strategic
interactions.
Keywords: Psychological Game Theory, Procedural Concerns, Reciprocity,
Guilt Aversion
JEL Classification: D01, C70
1 Introduction
One persistent ﬁnding in experimental economics is that people react very diﬀer-
ently to outcomewise identical situations depending on the procedures which have
led to them [e.g. Blount (1995), Falk et al. (2000), Charness (2004), Brandts et al.
(2006), Charness and Levine (2007)]. For example, Charness and Levine (2007)
experimentally analyze workers’ reactions to pay decisions by ﬁrms following dif-
ferent wage-setting procedures.1 They ﬁnd that the process leading to a speciﬁc
∗I am very grateful to Estelle Cantillon, Paolo Casini, Gary Charness, Paola Conconi, Werner
Gu¨th and Georg Kirchsteiger for helpful comments.
†Department of Economics, Maastricht University, PO Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The
Netherlands, and ECARES, Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles. Sebald is also member of ECORE, the
recently created association between CORE and ECARES. E-mail: a.sebald@algec.unimaas.nl
1In their experiment ﬁrms have to choose between either a low ($4) or a high ($8) wage.
Following the ﬁrm’s decision, this wage is either decreased or increased by $2 depending on a
stochastically determined (i.e. ﬂip of a coin) economic condition which can either be good or bad.
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wage aﬀects the workers’ eﬀort choice. Given the same wage, workers choose sig-
niﬁcantly more often low eﬀort when the wage-setting process reveals less-good
intentions by ﬁrms compared to situations in which intentions are perceived as
good. In the same spirit, Brandts et al. (2006) show that selection procedures
matter in a three-player game in which one player has to select one of the other
players to perform a speciﬁc task.2 In their experiment selected players behave
very diﬀerently in their subsequent tasks depending on the type of procedure which
was used to select them. They suggest that people exhibit procedural concerns be-
cause selection procedures aﬀect the beliefs that people hold about each others’
intentions and expectations which subsequently inﬂuence their behaviors.
This paper provides a game theoretic framework that integrates procedural
concerns into economic analysis. Building on Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)’s
dynamic psychological games, we show how procedural concerns can be conceptu-
alized assuming that agents are (also) motivated by belief-dependent psychological
payoﬀs. Our paper consist of three building blocks: a class of procedural games in
which agents choose for procedures rather than for actions as traditionally assumed
in game theory, agents with belief-dependent utilities as deﬁned by Battigalli and
Dufwenberg (2007) and a solution concept, sequential psychological equilibrium.
Using these three building blocks we show how procedural choices inﬂuence the
causal attribution of responsibilities, the evaluation of intentions and the arousal
of emotions.
Among psychologists there exists by now a broad consensus that not only
expected outcomes shape human behavior, but also the way in which decisions are
taken [e.g. Thibaut and Walker (1975), Lind and Tyler (1988), Collie et al. (2002),
Anderson and Otto (2003) and Blader and Tyler (2003)]. Prominent examples of
areas in which procedures have been found to play an eminent role are workplace
relations and the public acceptability of policies and laws. Psychologists have
found evidence that behavioral reactions to promotion decisions, bonus allocations,
dismissals etc. strongly depend on the perceived fairness of selection procedures
[e.g. Lemons and Jones (2001), Konovsky (2000), Bies and Tyler (1993), Lind
et al. (2000) and Roberts and Markel (2001)] and that public compliance with
policies and laws strongly depends on the perceived fairness of their enforcement
procedures [e.g. Tyler (1990), Wenzel (2002), Murphy (2004), De Cremer and van
Knippenberg (2003) and Tyler (2003)].
Psychologists explain the impact of procedures on human interactions with the
help of attribution theory [e.g. Heider (1958), Kelley (1967), Kelley (1973), Ross
and Fletcher (1985)]. Attribution theory assumes that people need to infer causes
and assign responsibilities for why outcomes occur. It is argued that especially
After the revelation of the economic condition, the workers have to choose their eﬀort level: low,
medium or high. The ﬂip of the coin introduces the possibility to compare to diﬀerent intentional
states that represent two diﬀerent ways through which the same wage, i.e. $6, is determined: i)
good intentions: high wage coupled with bad economic condition and ii) less-good intentions:
less costly low wage coupled with good economic condition.
2Two diﬀerent treatments are studied which diﬀer with regard to the selection procedure.
In both treatments the task of the selected player is to choose between two diﬀerent payoﬀ
allocations determining the payoﬀ of all three players.
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when outcomes are unfavorable and perceptions of intentions are strong, there
is a tendency to assign responsibility for outcomes to people. The assignment
of responsibility and blame in turn has been shown to aﬀect the occurrence and
intensity of emotions like disappointment, guilt, anger and aggression [Blount
(1995)]. To exemplify, imagine a workplace situation in which a principal wants
to promote one out of two agents. If he chooses to take the decision on who is to
be promoted intransparently, e.g. behind closed doors, agents are driven to attach
a high degree of responsibility for the outcome to the principal. His choice is
interpreted as intentional, which fosters perceptions of favoritism. If, by contrast,
the principal uses a transparent procedure which credibly shows that the decision
is based on an unbiased criterion, i.e. a criterion which a priori ensures that
both agents have the same chance to be promoted, the principal is not blamed
for the ﬁnal outcome. Hence, if the agents care about intentions their reaction
to the same promotion decision will diﬀer depending on the promotion procedure
used by the principal. Hence, according to the psychological literature procedures
inﬂuence the responsibility that people have for speciﬁc outcomes, they mitigate
the evaluation of intentions and subsequent behaviors.
Notwithstanding the experimental and psychological evidence and the fact
that e.g. workplace relations also play an eminent role in the economic literature,
traditional economic theory has remained remarkably silent about the impact of
procedures on human behavior. Only three recent economic papers have started
to theoretically address the issue of procedural concerns [Bolton et al. (2005),
Trautmann (2006), Krawczyk (2007)]. In contrast to the psychologists’ view,
however, they all extend models of distributional preferences to account for the
impact of procedural choices on strategic interactions. Bolton et al. (2005) and
Krawczyk (2007)’s models are based on the theory of inequity aversion by Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000). Trautmann, on the other hand, builds on Fehr and Schmidt
(1999)’s model of social concerns. All three take a similar approach suggesting
that the experimental evidence on procedural concerns can be accounted for when
agents’ utilities depend on expected outcome diﬀerences ex ante as well as ex post
to any outcome realization.
As indicated in the beginning, Brandts et al. (2006) and Charness and Levine
(2007) follow the psychologists’ view. They argue that intention-based models, e.g.
models of reciprocity and guilt aversion, rather than distributional preferences,
explain the experimental evidence on procedural concerns.
Economic theory has widely neglected emotions and intentions as these issues
are diﬃcult to reconcile with the traditional presumption of stable consequential-
ist preferences. Spurred by experimental ﬁndings, economists have only recently
started to look at the impact of belief-dependent motivations on strategic inter-
actions. Departing from the strictly consequentialist tradition in economics e.g.
Geanakoplos et al. (1989) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) have developed
a framework to analyze the strategic interaction of agents with belief-dependent
motivations: psychological game theory. Roughly speaking, psychological games
are games in which agents are (also) motivated by belief-dependent psychologi-
cal payoﬀs capturing their emotional involvement. Emotions depend on beliefs
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about intentions [Elster (1998)]. Geanakoplos et al. (1989) concentrate on games
in which only agents’ initial beliefs matter, whereas Battigalli and Dufwenberg
(2007) develop a dynamic framework in which agents update their beliefs about
their own and the others’ intentions as games unfold. Many types of emotions
(e.g. regret, disappointment, guilt, reciprocity) have already been formalized in
the context of psychological games. Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006), for example, analyze the strategic inter-
action of agents that act reciprocally. Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2006) look at
the interaction of agents that feel guilt, i.e. that are guilt averse.
Although all of these models are able to explain observed behaviors in ex-
periments in contradiction to classical assumptions about human conduct [e.g.
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Charness and Rabin (2002), Fehr and Gaechter
(2000)], none of them explores the role of procedural choices in the interaction of
emotional agents.3 Therefore, diﬀerent from the existing literature on psychologi-
cal games, in this paper we concentrate on the impact of procedural choices on the
interaction of agents with belief-dependent motivations. First, we show that proce-
dural concerns can theoretically be conceptualized assuming that agents are (also)
incentivized by belief-dependent psychological payoﬀs. As procedural choices af-
fect the beliefs that people hold and agents utilities are belief-dependent, emotional
agents exhibit procedural concerns. Second, we show that the behavioral predic-
tions of the already existing literature on psychological games are sensitive to the
availability of diﬀerent procedures to take the same decision. In the existing lit-
erature on psychological games it is implicitly assumed that people can only use
procedures that make them fully responsible for the outcomes of their actions. In
our procedural games people can choose between diﬀerent procedures to take the
same decision. As will be seen, this leads to diﬀerent equilibrium predictions com-
pared to the existing literature on psychological games. In another paper [Sebald
(2007)] it was already shown how procedural concerns aﬀect the strategic inter-
action of reciprocal agents. Sebald (2007), thus, is an application of the general
framework presented here.
Our work is related to the (experimental) literature on the impact of institu-
tions on human interaction [North (1991), Bowles (1998), Bohnet (2006), Bohnet
(2007)]. In this literature institutions are commonly deﬁned as humanly devised
rules of the game that structure political, economic and social interactions. The ar-
gument is that institutions create and direct incentives, aﬀect preferences, provide
information on processes leading to certain outcomes and allow people to make in-
ferences about others’ motivations [Bohnet (2006)]. Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004)
and Hong and Bohnet (2005), for example, experimentally investigate the eﬀect of
causal attribution in diﬀerent institutional settings. They analyze the ﬁrst-mover
behavior in two closely related but diﬀerent institutional environments, a binary-
choice trust and a binary-choice risky dictator game.4 Participants act diﬀerently
3Following Elster (1998), throughout the paper we will sometimes refer to agents with belief-
dependent psychological payoﬀs as emotional agents.
4In both situations the ﬁrst-mover has to decide between either an outside option or to let a
second-mover decide between two alternative payoﬀ allocations. In the binary-choice trust game
the second-mover is another player. In the binary-choice risky dictator game, on the other hand,
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in the two settings suggesting that people dislike being betrayed by others more
than losing a lottery. This implies that there is an additional psychological factor
inﬂuencing the strategic interaction related to the causal attribution of responsi-
bilities [Bohnet (2006)]. In line with this, our methodological approach sheds light
on the hidden relation connecting the information on procedures entailed in insti-
tutions and the process of causal attribution. Our work suggests that the process
information entailed in institutions creates the possibility for causal attribution
and directs it in such a way that people are only held accountable for what they
are actually responsible.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In the next section we formally de-
ﬁne procedures and characterize a class of procedural games in which agents choose
procedures rather than actions and strategies. In section 3 we study the impact of
procedures on the behavior of emotional agents. More precisely, we characterize
agents with belief-dependent psychological payoﬀs in the context of our class of
procedural games and provide a ﬁrst example of the impact of procedural choices
on their strategic interactions. In section 4 we develop the concept sequential
psychological equilibrium for our procedural games with psychological incentives.
Finally, we discuss two applications that highlight the impact and importance of
procedural concerns in strategic interactions of reciprocal and guilt averse agents.
2 Procedures and Procedural Games
In this section we proceed in two steps. First, we intuitively sketch our method-
ological approach with the help of two examples. In a second step we formally
deﬁne the concept of procedures and fully characterize our class of procedural
games in which agents do not choose actions and strategies, as usually assumed
in game theory, but procedures. This class of multi-stage games is used in the
subsequent sections to capture and analyze the impact of procedural choices on
the strategic interaction of agents with belief-dependent utilities.
As a starting point consider games Γ1 and Γ2 in Figure 1 and 2:
[Figure 1 and 2 here]
The sole diﬀerence between games Γ1 and Γ2 is that in Γ2 player 1 can choose
(M) on top of his pure actions (L) and (R). Player 1’s pure action (M), how-
ever, is nothing else than choosing an explicit randomization device, (0), assigning
probabilities α2 and (1− α2) to his pure actions (L) and (R) respectively. Flipping
a coin constitutes such an explicit randomization device, for example. It assigns
the probability 1
2
to both pure actions (L) and (R). Obviously, ﬂipping a coin is
just one way in which a decision can be taken. In reality, one usually disposes
of many diﬀerent credible ways. Consider, for example, the workplace situation
sketched in the introduction. The principal could take the promotion decisions
the second-mover is reducing the role of the second player to being a dummy. It is found
that ﬁrst-movers act diﬀerently if the responder is the other player compared to the situation in
which acts as the second-mover.
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by organizing a promotion tournament using an objective evaluation criterion.
Given that both agents are identical, i.e. are equally skilled, and this is commonly
known, this would induce a commonly known probability distribution over the set
of pure actions giving both agents an equal chance to be promoted. Note that we
distinguish between explicit, i.e. credible, randomizations which are observed by
all players and implicit randomizations, i.e. behavioral strategies. The choice (M)
of player 1 in game Γ2 is a pure choice for an explicit randomization device and it
diﬀers from player 1 choosing a behavioral strategy in game Γ1 which implicitly
randomizes over his pure actions (L) and (R) without the others observing the
random draw.
But not only choices like (M) can be formalized as choices for explicit ran-
domization devices. Taking the thought about the credible ways to the extreme
shows that also pure actions like (L) and (R) can equally be deﬁned as choices
for explicit randomization mechanisms. Imagine, for example, that player 1 in Γ1
and Γ2 chooses his pure action (L). This is equivalent to saying that player 1
chooses for chance to take the decision between (L) and (R) assigning probability
1 to his pure action (L). Hence, although (L) represents a pure action, it can
nevertheless be reinterpreted in a way in which the decision is indirectly taken
by chance randomizing with a degenerated probability distribution over the set
{(L) , (R)}. This shows that in our two examples, Γ1 and Γ2, any choice for a pure
action, i.e. (L) and (R), and any choice for an explicit randomization mechanism,
i.e.(M), can likewise be reinterpreted as a choice for an explicit randomization
device through which the actual decision is subsequently taken by chance.
Consider, for example, game Γ3 in Figure 3, which is a restatement of game
Γ2 in the spirit of this intuition:
5
[Figure 3 here]
As one can see, in Γ3 we reformulate all strategic choices of game Γ2 into choices
for explicit randomization mechanisms through which decisions are subsequently
taken. In game Γ2 player 1 can decide between (L), (M) and (R). Equivalently, in
game Γ3 he has to decide between the explicit randomization devices ω1,h0, ω
′
1,h0
and ω′′1,h0 in the initial history h
0. First, by choosing ω1,h0 he decides to let chance
take the decision between (L) and (R) assigning probability 1 to (L), i.e. ρ(L) = 1.
Second, by choosing ω′1,h0 he decides to let chance take the decision between (L)
and (R) assigning probability α2 to (L), i.e. ρ(L) = α2, and (1− α2) to (R),
i.e. ρ(R) = (1− α2). Finally, by choosing ω′′1,h0 he decides to let chance take the
decision between (L) and (R) assigning probability 1 to (R), i.e. ρ(R) = 1. In
all these three cases player 1 only determines how chance subsequently takes the
decision, rather then taking the decision himself.
Hence, despite the equivalence between games Γ2 and Γ3, an interpretive dif-
ference exists. Choosing for an explicit randomization mechanism implies that
players do not take decisions themselves. They merely determine how decisions
are taken by chance. In other words, players decide about the procedures which
5Note, actions that are played by player with probability 0 are disregarded in Figure
3.
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Figure 3: Game Γ3
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are used to take decisions. The example in Figure 3, thus, uncovers that strategic
decision making is not only about choosing actions but also about how actions are
chosen. For this reason we call game Γ3 a procedural game.
This brings us to the formal deﬁnition of our class of procedural games. For-
mally, let the set of players be N = {0, 1, ..., N} where 0 denotes the uninterested
player chance. Denote as H the ﬁnite set of histories h, with the empty sequence
h0 ∈ H, and Z the set of end nodes. Histories h ∈ H are sequences that describe
the choices that players have made on the path to history h. We assume that
only one player moves after each non-terminal history. Hence, the set of histo-
ries H\{Z} can be partitioned into sets Hi, with i ∈ N . At each non-terminal
history h ∈ Hi after which player i ∈ N\ {0} has to move he disposes of a ﬁnite
set of feasible actions denoted by Ai (h) and a ﬁnite set of explicit randomization
devices denoted by Ωi (h) through which he can indirectly choose an action from
Ai (h). In fact, as already suggested in example Γ3, in our procedural games play-
ers i ∈ N\ {0} do not choose actions ai,h ∈ Ai (h) directly, but choose explicit
randomization mechanisms, denoted by ωi,h ∈ Ωi (h), through which a decision is
indirectly taken by chance. The choice for a speciﬁc explicit randomization device
ωi,h in history h by player i ∈ N\ {0} determines the explicit probability distri-
bution ρ0,h′ with which chance takes the actual decision in the following history
h′ = (h, ωi,h). Hence, any history h controlled by a player i ∈ N\ {0} is succeeded
by a history h′ controlled by player 0. More formally, if player i = 0 chooses ωi,h in
history h with length x, then player 0 takes a decision a0,h′ in history h
′ = (h, ωi,h)
of length x + 1 explicitly randomizing with the probability distribution ρ0,h′ over
the set A0(h′) = Ai(h).6
To exemplify, the choice for a pure action (e.g. (L) in Γ2) translates in our
procedural game into a choice for an explicit randomization mechanisms ωi,h that
is associated with a degenerated probability distribution ρ0,h′ which assigns prob-
ability 1 to the pure action ai,h in the set of possible actions A0 (h′) = Ai (h).
The choice for an explicit randomization device like e.g. (M) in Γ2), on the other
hand, is a choice for an explicit randomization mechanism, ω′i,h, that is associated
with a non-degenerate probability distribution ρ′0,h′ deﬁned on A0 (h′) = Ai (h).
This means, player chance essentially plays a commonly known, i.e. explicit,
mixed strategy ρ0 = (ρ0,h)h∈H0 which speciﬁes for each history h ∈ H0 that he
controls a behavioral strategy ρ0,h according to which an action a0,h is chosen
from A0 (h). Consequently, one can denote as ρ0 (s0|h) the probability with which
player 0 plays the pure strategy s0 = (a0,h)h∈H0 conditional on history h.
Intuitively, as players only decide on how decisions are taken, they only decide
on the procedures, which are used to take them. This brings us to a formal
deﬁnition of procedures:
Definition 1 A procedure, ωi,h ∈ Ωi (h), for player i ∈ N\ {0} in history h ∈ Hi
6Note that the length of a history corresponds to the number of choices that are contained
in that history.
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is a tuple:7
〈ρ0,h′,A0 (h′)〉 ,
where h′ = (h, ωi,h) and ρ0,h′ is an explicit probability distribution deﬁned on
A0 (h′) = Ai (h).
For a given set of procedures Ωi (h), the associated set of explicit probability
distributions is denoted by Pi (h) = {ρ0,h′ | ωi,h ∈ Ωi (h)}. The minimum number
of procedures that a player i ∈ N\ {0} can decide between in any history h
controlled by him equals the number of pure actions that he has in the traditional
extensive form representation.
We deﬁne a procedural strategy for player i ∈ N\ {0} as a collection that
speciﬁes a procedure for each history h ∈ Hi after which player i moves, ωi =
(ωi,h)h∈Hi, where ωi,h is the procedure that would be selected by player i if h
occurred. It is assumed that all players learn the outcome of a procedure directly
after its realization and perfect recall holds.
Let Ωi = ×h∈HiΩi (h) and Ω = ×N\{0}Ωi. Given a procedural strategy, ωi ∈ Ωi
for each player i ∈ N\ {0} and the commonly known system of probability distri-
butions, P = ∪i∈N\{0}Pi, where Pi = ∪h∈HPi (h), we can compute a probability
distribution over end nodes. By assigning payoﬀs to end nodes, we can derive an
expected payoﬀ function, πi : Z → , for every player i ∈ N\ {0} which depends
on what procedural proﬁle, ω ∈ Ω is played. In what follows, we assume that
payoﬀs are material payoﬀs like money or any other measurable quantity of some
good.
Summarizing:
Definition 2 A procedural game is a tuple:
Γ =
〈
N ,Ω, (πi : Z → )N\{0}
〉
.
This concludes the deﬁnition of procedures and the characterization of our
class of procedural games which is the basis for our subsequent analysis. Starting
from two simple examples, i.e. Γ1 and Γ2, we have formalized the idea that players
choose for procedures rather than actions. In this way we have separated choices
for procedures and actual decisions. In the remainder of the paper we use this
class of procedural games in order to isolate the impact of procedural choices on
the strategic behavior of agents with belief-dependent utilities.
7In example Γ3 procedures are used to choose pure actions. We do not exclude, however, the
possibility that players use procedures to choose between procedures and procedures that choose
between procedures that choose between procedures etc. Procedures, ωi,h ∈ Ωi (h), rather have
to be understood as . The explicit probability distribution associated with a
reduced procedure, ρ0,h′ ∈ Pi (h), basically subsumes the probability distributions of procedures
of all levels into one explicit distribution indirectly deﬁned on Ai (h).
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3 Procedural Games with Psychological Incen-
tives
It is easy to see that if agents are only interested in their own expected mate-
rial payoﬀ, the set of all subgame perfect equilibria of two identical subgames is
the same. Looking again at game Γ3 in Figure 3, for example, this means that
players are expected to react the same in histories h1 and h2. However, as al-
ready mentioned in the introduction, there exists ample evidence contradicting
this traditional behavioral presumption. People very often react diﬀerently in
outcomewise identical situations depending on the procedures which have led to
them. Following the psychologist’s view procedural choices aﬀect peoples’ beliefs
about intentions. Hence, if people are (also) motivated by belief-dependent psy-
chological payoﬀs, they exhibit procedural concerns. To conceptualize this idea,
in this section we deﬁne procedural games in which agents have belief-dependent
psychological incentives. This will allow us to formally capture the impact of
procedural choices on the strategic behavior of emotional agents.
Economists have only recently developed a framework, i.e. psychological game
theory, to formally account for behavioral traits such as emotions and intentions
[e.g. Geanakoplos et al. (1989) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)]. Psycho-
logical games are games in which agents are (also) motivated by belief-dependent
psychological payoﬀs capturing their emotional involvement. Psychological pay-
oﬀs arise from the beliefs that agents have about their opponents’ strategies and
beliefs. Therefore let agents have:
i) beliefs about the strategies of other players,
ii) beliefs about the beliefs of other players,
and
iii) let them update their beliefs as events unfold.
In order to formally capture assumptions i)-iii), we have to deﬁne an epistemic
structure (collectively coherent hierarchies of beliefs) which describes what people
initially belief and how they update their beliefs as play unfolds. This epistemic
structure can be characterized in the context of our procedural games by assuming
that players hold hierarchies of conditional beliefs over the procedural strategies
as well as beliefs of other players i ∈ N\ {0}.
As in Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) we only summarize the theory of hier-
archies of conditional beliefs.8 We describe, ﬁrst, a system of conditional ﬁrst-
order-beliefs and then, secondly, show how this extends to higher orders (i.e.
second-order beliefs etc). In our class of procedural games denote by Ω−i the
set of procedural strategies of the opponents j where j ∈ N\ {0, i}. At the begin-
ning of any game, i.e. in the initial history h0, player i does not know the true
procedural strategies of his opponents. He only learns the true strategy ω−i ∈ Ω−i
8For topological details, proofs and further references see Brandenburger and Dekel (1993)
and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999).
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step-by-step by updating his beliefs as the game unfolds. More formally, player i
assigns probabilities to the events in the Borrel sigma algebra B of Ω−i according to
some probability measure. Let ∆ (Ω−i) be the set of all such probability measures.
Denote C ⊆ B the set of potential conditioning events at which player i can update
his beliefs. In other words, C is the set of potentially observable events. Player i
holds probabilistic beliefs about his opponents’s procedural strategies conditional
on each event F ∈ C. These probabilistic beliefs are captured in a conditional
probability system (cps).
From Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) consider the following deﬁnition:
Definition 3 A conditional probability system (cps) is a function µ (·|·) : B×X →
[0, 1] deﬁned on (X,B, C) such that for all E ∈ B and F ′, F ∈ C:
1. µ (·|·) ∈ ∆(X),
2. µ (F |F ) = 1,
3. E ⊆ F ′ ⊆ F implies µ (E|F ) = µ (E|F ′)µ (F ′|F ),
where X is a set, e.g. Ω−i, whose ‘true’ element x ∈ X is initially unknown and
only learned step-by-step as conditioning events, e.g. F ∈ C, are reached.
Concentrating, ﬁrst, on beliefs of order 1 means X = Ω−i. The ﬁrst two
conditions of deﬁnition 3 ensure that µ (·|F ) is indeed a probability measure (i.e.
µ (·|F ) ∈ ∆(X)) which puts all probability weight on F given that F is observed.
Condition 3 ensures that players update their beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. The
set of all functions µ for which conditions 1-3 hold is denoted by ∆H (X). Hence,
∆H (Ω−i) is the set of all conditional probability systems of order 1 of player i.
Deﬁnition 3 can easily be extended to higher-order-beliefs. In the construction
of the ﬁrst-order cps we start from an initial situation in which player i does
not know the true procedural strategy of his opponents. He has a conditional
ﬁrst-order-belief over it which is updated as play unfolds. Analog to this, in the
construction of a second-order-belief we start from an initial situation in which
player i does not know the true procedural strategy and the true conditional ﬁrst-
order-belief of players −i. Hence, the relevant set X in deﬁnition 3 becomes:
X = Ω−i ×
∏
j =i
∆H (Ω−j) ,
where i, j ∈ N\ {0} and ∆H (Ω−j) is the set of conditional ﬁrst-order cps of player
j. The resulting conditional probability system does not only represent player i’s
belief about the strategy of players −i, but also about their ﬁrst-order-beliefs.
Generalizing this idea, ﬁrst- and higher-order cps are deﬁned recursively as
follows. Let:
X0−i = Ω−i, where i ∈ N\ {0} ,
Xk−i = X
k−1
−i ×
∏
j =i
∆H
(
Xk−1−j
)
, where i ∈ N\ {0} and k = 1, 2, ... .
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Then, a cps µki ∈ ∆H
(
Xk−1−i
)
is called a k-order cps or simply a k-order belief.
For k > 1, µki is a joint cps on the opponents’ strategies and (k − 1)-order cps ’,
i.e.:
µ1i ∈ ∆H
(
X0−i
)
where X0−i = Ω−i,
µ2i ∈ ∆H
(
X1−i
)
where X1−i = Ω−i ×∆H (Ω−j) ,
µ3i ∈ ∆H
(
X2−i
)
where X2−i = Ω−i ×∆H (Ω−j)×∆H
(
Ω−j ×∆H (Ω−i)
)
etc. .
This brings us to the formal deﬁnition of hierarchies of cps ’:9
Definition 4 A hierarchy of cps is a countably inﬁnite sequence of cps’:
µi =
(
µ1i , µ
2
i , ...
) ∈∏
k>0
∆H
(
Xk−1−i
)
.
As one can see, each piece of information appears many times in the belief
hierarchy of player i. This implies that one can calculate marginal beliefs of
higher-order-beliefs. As also Geanakoplos et al. (1989) point out, these marginal
beliefs of higher-order-beliefs should coincide with lower-order-beliefs in the belief
hierarchy for the hierarchy to be meaningful. In other words beliefs should be
coherent. We say a hierarchy of cps ’ is coherent if the cps ’ of distinct orders
assign the same conditional probabilities to lower-order-events. This means,
µki (·|h) = margXk−1−i µ
k+1
i (·|h) (k = 1, 2, ...; h ∈ H),
where margXk−1−i
µk+1i (·|h) is the event of order k − 1 in the cps of order k + 1,
µk+1i (·|h). If this condition holds, player i is said to have a coherent conditional
belief system. It can be shown that a coherent hierarchy of cps’ induces a single cps
νi on the cross product of Ω−i and the sets of hierarchies of cps ’ of i’s opponents
−i. Note, however, coherency regarding the own beliefs does not exclude the
possibility that the cps νi puts a positive probability on the opponents incoherence.
But as players are rational they should not believe that their opponents entertain
incoherent beliefs. Hence, in order to rule this out, say that a coherent hierarchy
µi satisﬁes belief in coherency of order 1 if the induced cps νi is such that each
νi (·|h) with h ∈ H assigns probability one to the opponents’ coherence of order
1. The hierarchy of coherent beliefs µi satisﬁes belief in coherency of order k, if it
satisﬁes belief in coherency of order k − 1, µi is collectively coherent, if it satisﬁes
belief in coherency of order k for each positive integer k.10 We denote the set of
collectively coherent hierarchies of beliefs of player i by Mi. The set of collectively
coherent beliefs of the opponents −i is M−i and M =
∏
j∈N\{0} Mj .
Finally, as the probability distributions associated with the moves of the player
chance, i.e. player 0, are commonly known, nobody faces any uncertainty with
regard to his true type. In other words, players do not learn the true strategy
of player 0 over the course of the game, as it is ex ante commonly known. As
9See also Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007), p. 13.
10See also Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007), p.13.
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will be seen in the Example presented below, this is crucial in the context of our
procedural games. As the mixed strategy, ρ0, of the player chance is commonly
known, causal attribution is linked to procedural choices and not to outcomes.
To come to full circle, belief-dependent utilities are utilities that are not only
deﬁned on monetary outcomes, but also on collectively coherent hierarchies of
beliefs and the commonly known probability distributions associated with the
moves of the player chance:
Definition 5 A belief dependent utility u of player i is a function:
ui : Z × P ×Mi × Πj =i (Ωj ×Mj)→ .
As mentioned in the introduction, strategic interactions with belief-dependent
utilities have so far only been analyzed in traditional dynamic decision contexts,
i.e. traditional extensive form representations, (e.g. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004), Falk and Fischbacher (2006), Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2006)). Deﬁni-
tion 5 represents an adaptation of these earlier approaches to our class of proce-
dural games in which agents choose procedures rather than actions and strategies.
In order to get a ﬁrst impression of the impact of procedural choices on the inter-
action of emotional agents consider the following example:
Example: Assume that players 1 and 2 in game Γ3 are reciprocal. This means
they react kindly (unkindly) if they perceive the other to be kind (unkind). As we
only want to give a ﬁrst glimpse of the importance of procedures, we concentrate
in this example on the perception that player 2 has about the kindness of player 1
in the histories h1 and h2. As said before, histories h1 and h2 are starting points
of identical subgames.
Following Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) the perceived kindness of player
2 in h1 and h2 can be deﬁned as:
λ212 = π2
(
µ12 (·|hx) , µ22 (·|hx) , ρ0
)− πe12 (µ12 (·|hx) , µ22 (·|hx) , ρ0) ,
where x ∈ {1, 2} and
πe12 (·) =
1
2
[
max
{
π2
(
µ12 (·|hx) , µ22 (·|hx) , ρ0
)
, ω1 ∈ Ω1
}
+min
{
π2
(
µ12 (·|hx) , µ22 (·|hx) , ρ0
)
, ω1 ∈ Ω1
} ]
.
The perceived kindness λ212 is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between what player 2
believes player 1 intends to give him, π2 (·) (conditional on history hx and given
player 2’s ﬁrst- and second-order beliefs, µ12 and µ
2
2, and the mixed strategy of
the player chance, ρ0) and an equitable payoﬀ, π
e1
2 . Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) deﬁne the equitable payoﬀ, πe12 , as the average of the minimum and the
maximum that player 2 believes player 1 could give him (again conditional on
history hx and given player 2’s ﬁrst- and second-order beliefs, µ12 and µ
2
2, and the
mixed strategy of the player chance, ρ0).
Assume, for example, that α2 = (1−α2) = 12 and imagine that player 2 believes
that player 1 believes that he plays left in all the histories that he controls, i.e.
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histories h1, h2, h3 and h4. Given this, player 2 has to believe that player 1
intended to give him a material payoﬀ of
π2
(
µ12
(·|h1) , µ22 (·|h1) , ρ0) = 200,
if he ﬁnds himself in history h1 after player 1 has chosen procedure ω1,h0. In
contrast to this, if player 2 ﬁnds himself in history h2 he has to believe that player
1 intended to give him:
π2
(
µ12
(·|h2) , µ22 (·|h2) , ρ0) = 12 (200) + 12 (1800) = 1000,
by choosing procedure ω′1,h0. The equitable payoﬀ, on the other hand, is given by:
πe12 (·) =
1
2
[
200 + 1800
]
,
where 200 is the minimum that player 2 believes player 1 could have given him
in history h0 (by playing ω1,h0) and 1800 is the maximum (by playing ω
′′
1,h0).
Putting the pieces together, player 2’s perceived kindness in history h1 and h2 are
respectively:
λ212(h
1) = 200− 1
2
[
200 + 1800
]
= −800,
λ212(h
2) = 1000− 1
2
[
200 + 1800
]
= 0.
Hence, although histories h1 and h2 are starting points of identical subgames,
they are perceived very diﬀerently by player 2 due to the diﬀerent procedural
choices which have led to them. It is now easy to see that player 2 who is con-
cerned about the intentions of player 1 might react diﬀerently in histories h1 and
h2 depending on the strength of his reciprocal preferences. This gives a ﬁrst idea
of how procedural choices inﬂuence the causal attribution of responsibilities and
the strategic interaction of emotional agents. 
Given our class of procedural games as deﬁned in the previous section and the
belief-dependent utilities (Deﬁnition 5), we are now ready to deﬁne procedural
games with psychological incentives:
Definition 6 A procedural game with psychological incentives is a tuple:
ΓP =
〈
Γ, (ui)N\{0}
〉
where ui : Z ×P ×Mi × Πj =i (Ωj ×Mj) → .
Procedural games with psychological incentives are the framework which we use
to capture the impact of procedural choices on the interaction of psychologically
motivated agents. Before presenting some applications, however, we subsequently
adapt Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)’s sequential equilibrium to our class of
procedural games with psychological incentives.
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4 Sequential Psychological Equilibria in Proce-
dural Games with Psychological Incentives
Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) adapt Kreps and Wilson (1982)’s concept of
sequential equilibrium to their class of dynamic psychological games. They do so
by characterizing consistent assessments that do not only consist of ﬁrst-, but also
of higher-order beliefs and deﬁning sequential equilibria as sequentially rational
consistent assessments.
As in Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007), also our equilibrium concept refers to
mixed strategies, i.e. implicit randomizations over sets of procedures. Note, how-
ever, that, following Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), we interpret player i’s
mixed strategy as a conjecture on the part of his opponents as to what player i will
do. Hence, denote a behavioral procedural strategy of player i as σi = (σi,h)h∈Hi ∈
Σi, where Σi is the set of all mixed strategies of player i. The behavioral choice
σi,h ∈ Σi(h) in h has to be understood as an implicit randomization over the set of
procedures Ωi (h) in history h and interpreted as an array of common conditional
ﬁrst-order-beliefs held by i’s opponents.11 This means that the behavioral procedu-
ral strategy σi is part of an assessment ((σ, ρ0), (µ, ρ0)) = ((σi, ρ0), (µi, ρ0))i∈N\{0}
of behavioral strategies and hierarchies of conditional beliefs.
Three conditions ensure consistency of assessments in the original characteri-
zation by Kreps and Wilson (1982):
1. Beliefs must be derived using Bayes’ rule,
2. Beliefs must reﬂect that players choose their strategies independently,
3. Players with identical information have identical beliefs.
In addition to these conditions, Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) add another
requirement for consistency:
4. Players hold correct beliefs about each others’ beliefs.
Condition 1 holds by the deﬁnition of hierarchies of conditional belief systems
(Deﬁnition 3). In other words, hierarchies of beliefs are deﬁned in such a way that
conditional beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule. In order to formalize conditions
2-4 we ﬁrst need to deﬁne what is meant by stochastic independence. Note, the
observability of past actions allows us to deﬁne stochastic independence of the
conditional belief systems in terms of marginal cps ’. Diﬀerent to the concept
of marginal beliefs used in the previous section, a marginal cps now refers to
player i’s marginal belief on the procedural strategies of a particular player j and
it is denoted as µ1ij ∈ ∆H (Ωj), where ∆H (Ωj) is the set of marginal cps on the
procedural strategies of player j. Given this we can deﬁne stochastic independence
of beliefs as:12
11See Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007), p 16.
12See also Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)’s deﬁnition of stochastic independence, p 17, and
their deﬁnition of sequential equilibrium, p 19.
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Definition 7 A ﬁrst-order cps µ1i ∈ ∆H (Ω−i) satisﬁes stochastic independence, if
there exists a proﬁle of marginal cps’ (µ1ij)j =i ∈
∏
j =i ∆
H (Ωj) such that µ
1
i (ω−i|h) =∏
j =i µ
1
ij(ωj |h) for all h ∈ Hi. We denote the set of stochastically independent
ﬁrst-order cps’ of a player i as ∆HI (Ω−i).
This brings us to our deﬁnition of consistent assessments:
Definition 8 An assessment ((σ, ρ0), (µ, ρ0)) is consistent if:
1. The ﬁrst-order cps of each player satisﬁes stochastic independence as for-
malized in Deﬁnition (7), i.e.:
∀i ∈ N\ {0} , µ1i ∈ ∆HI (Ω−i) .
2. The marginal ﬁrst-order cps of any two players about any third player coin-
cide, i.e.:
∀i ∈ N\ {0} , ∀l ∈ N\ {i, j, 0} , ∀h ∈ H, µ1il(·|h) = µ1jl(·|h).
3. Each players higher order beliefs in µ assign probability 1 to the lower order
beliefs in µ itself:
∀i ∈ N\ {0} , ∀k > 1, ∀h ∈ H, µki (·|h) = µk−1i (·|h)× δµk−1−i ,
where δµk−1−i
is the probability measure which assigns probability 1 to µk−1−i .
Conditions 1 and 2 capture the assumption that beliefs should be the end-product
of a transparent reasoning process of intelligent people [Battigalli and Dufwen-
berg (2007)]. Condition 3, on the other hand, is analog to Geanakoplos et al.
(1989)’s condition requiring that players hold common and correct beliefs about
each others’ beliefs.
After having deﬁned consistent assessments we can formally characterize se-
quential psychological equilibria (henceforth: SPE) by requiring sequential ratio-
nality:
Definition 9 An assessment ((σ, ρ0), (µ, ρ0)) is a sequential psychological equilib-
rium (SPE), if for all i ∈ N\ {0} , h ∈ Hi it holds:
Supp (σi,h) ⊆ argmaxωi,h∈Ω(h)Eµ,ρ0 [ui|h, ωi,h] ,
where Eµ,ρ0 [ui|h, ωi,h] is the expected utility of player i conditional on history h,
procedural choice ωi,h ∈ Ω (h) and given the system of hierarchies of conditional
beliefs µ and the commonly known mixed strategy, ρ0, played by player 0.
Note, the expected utility of any player i ∈ N\ {0} (conditional on history h,
procedural choice ωi,h ∈ Ω (h), given the system of consistent hierarchies of con-
ditional beliefs µ and the commonly known mixed strategy, ρ0) can be deﬁned
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as:
Eµ,ρ0 [ui|h, ωi,h] =
∑
s0∈S0(h)
ρ0 (s0|h)
∑
ω−i∈Ω−i(h)
µ1i (ω−i|h)
∑
ωi∈Ωi(h,ωi,h)
µ1ji (ωi| (h, ωi,h, ω−i,h))ui (ζ (ωi, ω−i, s0) , ρ0, µ, ω−i) ,
where ζ (ωi, ω−i, s0) ∈ Z denotes the terminal history induced by the procedural
strategies ωi and ω−i, and the strategy s0 of player 0. Note, this speciﬁcation is
diﬀerent from the expected utility formula traditionally used. Furthermore, it is
also diﬀerent from the speciﬁcation used by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) as
it encloses the behavioral moves of the player chance.
The following proposition shows that there exists at least one sequential psy-
chological equilibrium in any procedural game with psychological incentives and
continuous utility functions:
Proposition 1 If the utility functions are continuous, there exists at least one
sequential psychological equilibrium assessment.
Proof: Consider a procedural game with psychological incentives in which any
procedure at any history is played with a strictly positive minimal probability
ε. More formally, consider an ε-perturbed game Γε in which players i ∈ N\{0}
dispose of ‘constrained’ choice sets Σεi (h) at each history h ∈ Hi. The ‘constrained’
choice set Σεi (h) of player i in history h is deﬁned as:
Σεi (h) := {τi,h ∈ Σi(h)|τi,h(ωi,h) ≥ ε, ∀ωi,h ∈ Ωi(h)}.
So Σεi (h) consists of only those elements in Σi(h) that put a strictly positive
probability greater or equal to ε on all elements ωi,h ∈ Ωi(h), i.e. Σεi (h) ⊂ Σi(h).
It follows that in any Γε the set of strictly mixed procedural strategies of players
i ∈ N\{0} is Σεi = ×h∈HiΣiε(h) and the set of all strictly positive behavioral
procedural strategy proﬁles is Σε := ×i∈N\{0}Σεi . Note, for each σ ∈ Σε there
exists a unique corresponding proﬁle of hierarchies of cps ’ µ = β(σ) such that
((σ, ρ0), (β(σ), ρ0)) is consistent.
Now, deﬁne for σ ∈ Σε, ε > 0, i ∈ N\{0} and h ∈ Hi the local best-response
of player i in history h as:
BRεi,h(σ) := {τˆi,h ∈ Σεi (h)|ui(σi/τˆi,h, σ−i, ρ0) ≥ ui(σi/τi,h, σ−i, ρ0), ∀τi,h ∈ Σεi (h)},
where σi/τi,h denotes the behavioral procedural strategy for player i that speciﬁes
the strictly positive mixture τi,h at history h ∈ Hi and σi at every other history
controlled by player i. In other words, local best-response-correspondences are
strictly mixed behavioral choices that put at least a minimum probability ε on
each procedure ωi,h ∈ Ωi(h) given i’s choices in all other histories controlled by
him and given the behavioral procedural strategy of the opponents. The domain
of the local best-response-correspondence is Σε. The set Σε = Σε1 × Σε2... × ΣεN
and each Σεi with i ∈ N\{0} is deﬁned as Σεi = ×h∈HΣεi (h). As said above,
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Σεi (h) is the set of all behavioral procedural strategies of player i at history h
that put at least a strictly positive probability ε on each procedure ωi,h ∈ Ωi(h).
It is non-empty (because Ωi(h) is non-empty), compact and convex. Hence,
also Σε is non-empty, compact and convex (because the ﬁnite Cartesian prod-
uct of nonempty, convex and compact sets is itself nonempty, convex and com-
pact). Furthermore, BRεi,h(σ) is upper-semi-continuous. Note, the local best-
response-correspondence BRεi,h(σ) is upper-semi-continuous, if for any sequence
(σi/τˆ
m
i,h, σ
m
−i) → (σi/τˆi,h, σ−i) such that σi/τˆmi,h ∈ BRεi,h(σi/τˆmi,h, σm−i) for all m ∈
{1, 2, ...}, we have σi/τˆi,h ∈ BRεi,h(σi/τˆi,h, σ−i). To see that this is indeed the case,
note that for all m, the u(σi/τˆ
m
i,h, σ
m
−i) ≥ u(σi/τˆ ′i,h, σm−i) for all σi/τˆ ′i,h ∈ Σεi . Hence,
by the continuity of the utility function, we have u(σi/τˆi,h, σ−i) ≥ u(σi/τˆ ′i,h, σ−i).
Given the local best-response correspondence BRεi,h(σ), the best-response cor-
respondence BRε(σ) is deﬁned as:
BRε = (τˆi,h)h∈Hi∧i∈N{0} .
This implies that also BRε : Σε → Σε is upper semi continues, compact and
convex and, hence, has a ﬁxed point σˆε. As already pointed out by Geanakoplos
et al. (1989), the proﬁle σˆε constitutes an equilibrium of the constrained game Γε.
Now, let εk be a sequence converging to 0 and σˆk the corresponding sequence
of equilibrium assessments with σˆk being an equilibrium of Γε
k
. By the compact-
ness of Σ, σˆk has an accumulation point σ∗ and by the upper-semi-continuity of
the local best-response-correspondents, BRεh(σ), σ
∗
i,h assigns positive probability
only to those actions that are best responses to (σ∗, β(σ∗), ρ0) at h. Therefore
((σ∗, ρ0), (β(σ∗), ρ0)) is a sequential equilibrium assessment. This concludes the
proof. 
Concluding, in this section we have formally deﬁned sequential psychological
equilibria in the context of our class of procedural games with psychological pay-
oﬀs. Furthermore we have shown that every procedural game with psychological
incentives with continues utility functions has at least one SPE. Using our solution
concept we demonstrate in the following section the impact of procedural choices
on the interaction of psychologically motivated agents by means of two examples.
5 Applications
In the ﬁrst application we analyze a principal-agent relation in which agents be-
have reciprocally towards their principal. This application shows the impact that
diﬀerent promotion procedures have on the interaction of psychologically moti-
vated agents. In the second application we analyze the ‘So long, Sucker’ game
which has also been discussed by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). Diﬀerent
to them, however, we do not assume reciprocal behavior but guilt aversion. A full
description of the strategic interaction with all possible sequential psychological
equilibria is beyond the scope of this paper. We therefore limit the analysis to
the characterization of only one equilibrium per application to demonstrate the
impact and importance of procedural choices in the interaction of agents with
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belief-dependent utilities. Results and intuitions are presented in this section,
lengthy mathematical proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
With the help of these two applications it is demonstrated i) how procedu-
ral choices inﬂuence the interaction of agents with belief-dependent psychological
payoﬀs and ii) that the equilibrium predictions of the already existing literature
using psychological games are sensitive to the availability of diﬀerent procedures
to take the same decision.
5.1 A Principal-Agent Relation
Imagine a principal, p, with two agents, e1 and e2, that is oﬀered a project, b. He
ﬁgures that in order to realize b he needs a project manager, pm, that is supported
in the ﬁnal phase of the project by an assistant, a, within the realm of his normal
work. He knows that if both invest high eﬀort, h, the project is a success, s, and
he gets a payoﬀ of π (h, h) > 0. If one of them invests low eﬀort, l, however, the
project will fail, f , and he will get a payoﬀ of π (h, l) = π (l, l) < π (h, h). Let
both agents, e1 and e2, be equally skilled to perform either as project manager or
assistant, implying that both have the same eﬀort costs equal to υ in case of high
eﬀort and 0 otherwise. Note that for simplicity we abstract in this principal-agent
example from the usual question regarding the optimal incentive scheme. We take
wages as given (e.g. due to a collective labor agreement) in order to single out
the impact that the selection procedure has on the eﬀort choices of the reciprocal
agents. It is assumed that, in case of success, the principal pays w (pm|s) > w(a) to
the project manager and w (a) < 1
2
((w (pm|s)− υ) + (w (a)− υ)) to the assistant.
On the other hand, in case of failure both get w (pm|f) = w (a). Let eﬀorts be
observable, which implies that the assistant is aware of the project managers’s
eﬀort choice when choosing his own eﬀort level, as he only collaborates in the ﬁnal
phase of the project. Furthermore, assume that the proﬁts, π(·) minus the wage
costs in case of a failure are 0 for the principal and positive if the project is a
success.
Remark 1 From the payment structure to the agents one can already see that,
if eﬀort is costly, the assistant has no monetary incentive to perform high eﬀort
since his wage will be w (a) independent of the outcome of the project, b.
The similarity of the two agents complicates the principal’s decision on who
is to become the project manager and who the assistant. Let the principal have
two types of procedures that he can use to take his decision. He can either decide
behind closed doors, bcd, or he can use a small selection tournament, st. This means
his set of procedural strategies is Ωp = {st, bcd(e1), bcd(e2)}. For simplicity let
the selection tournament be costless and credible to the agents. It is just about
concentration, c, or no concentration, nc. Let it be commonly known that, if both
concentrate or both do not concentrate during the short selection tournament,
both are equally likely to become the project manager. If one concentrates and
the other one does not, then the agent who concentrates gets the job.13
13This means that if both perform equally during the the principal ﬂips a coin in
front of them.
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From the outset it is clear that the principal’s proﬁt is maximized if both his
agents invest high eﬀort and he shares part of the proﬁt with the project manager.
Against the background of Remark (1) it is easy to see, however, that if agents are
only concerned about their own monetary payoﬀ, it is impossible for the principal
to elicit high eﬀort from both agents after his selection decision.
Result 1 If both agents are only concerned about their own monetary payoﬀ, it
is impossible for the principal to elicit high eﬀort, h, from agents e1 and e2 inde-
pendent of the selection procedure. As a consequence, the ‘selection tournament’
can never be strictly preferred to a decision ‘behind closed doors’.
Proof: As said in Remark (1), the assistant never has a monetary incentive to
perform high eﬀort (as it is costly) independent of the selection procedure. Obvi-
ously this is also known to the project manager who conjectures that no matter
what he does the project will fail and he will get w(pm|f) = w(a) independent of
the selection procedure which the principal has used to take his decision. Hence,
his optimal choice is also to always perform low eﬀort, l. Given this the principal
is indiﬀerent between his two diﬀerent types of selection procedures. 
Consider now a situation in which agents e1 and e2 behave reciprocally towards
the principal p. As pointed out before, this means they reciprocate kind with kind
and unkind with unkind behavior. This type of behavior can be captured by
assuming that each agent i ∈ {e1, e2} maximizes the following utility function:
ui = πi + Yip · (κip · λipi) ,
where Yip > 0 is a positive constant that captures agents i’s sensitivity to reci-
procity, κip is agent i’s belief about his kindness towards the principal, λipi is the
agent i’s perceived kindness of the principal towards himself and πi is agent i’s own
expected monetary payoﬀ. Note, this conceptualization of reciprocity is analog to
the deﬁnition by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).
In the Example in section 3 we have already deﬁned perceived kindness. For
completeness, however, let us restate it here in the context of our principal-agent
relation. Agent i’s perceived kindness of the principal, λipi, in history h
x is deﬁned
as:
λipi = πi
(
µ1i (·|hx) , µ2i (·|hx) , ρ0
)− πepi (µ1i (·|hx) , µ2i (·|hx) , ρ0) .
As before, πi(·) describes what agent i believes the principal intends to give him
and π
ep
i (·) is the equitable payoﬀ which characterizes agent i’s belief about the
average that the principal could have given him. More formally:
π
ep
i (·) =
1
2
[
max
{
πi
(
µ1i (·|hx) , µ2i (·|hx) , ρ0
)
, ωp ∈ {st, bcd(e1), bcd(e2)}
}
+min
{
πi
(
µ1i (·|hx) , µ2i (·|hx) , ρ0
)
, ωp ∈ {st, bcd(e1), bcd(e2)}
} ]
.
Similarly agent i’s kindness towards the principal in history hx can be described
as:
κip = πp
(
µ1i (·|hx) , ωi, ρ0
)− πeip (µ1i (·|hx) , ωi, ρ0) ,
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where,
πeip (·) =
1
2
[
max
{
πi
(
µ1i (·|hx) , ωi, ρ0
)
, ωi ∈ {l, h}
}
+min
{
πi
(
µ1i (·|hx) , ωi, ρ0
)
, ωi ∈ {l, h}
} ]
.
In line with the above, the expected material payoﬀ πp (·) describes what agent
i believes the principal will get, given his beliefs, the commonly known ‘mixed
strategy’ of player chance and his own choice ωi ∈ {l, h}. Furthermore, πeip (·) is
agent i’s belief about the the average that he can give to the principal p.
In contrast to Result 1, the question arises whether the proﬁt maximizing
principal is also indiﬀerent between his selection procedures, given that the agents
behave reciprocally towards him. Note that the principal-agent relation is sym-
metric. This allows us to state the following result in terms of project manager and
assistant rather than the behavior of agents e1 and e2 in their diﬀerent possible
roles.
Result 2 If the project manager’s sensitivity to reciprocity is:
Ypmp ≥ (w(pm|f)− w(pm|s)) + υ1
2
[
1
2
[w (pm|s)− w(a)]− υ] [∆πp +∆w(pm)] ,
and the assistant’s sensitivity to reciprocity is:
Ya ≥ υ1
2
[
1
2
[w (pm|s)− w(a)]− υ] [∆πp +∆w(pm)] ,
where ∆πp = πp (h, h) − πp (h, l) and ∆w(pm) = w(pm|f) − w(pm|s), then the
sequential psychological equilibrium is given by:
1. The project manager i) chooses low eﬀort following a decision of the principal
taken behind closed doors, ii) chooses concentration and iii) high eﬀort, if
the principal uses a selection tournament to take his decision.
2. The assistant i) chooses low eﬀort following a decision of the principal taken
behind closed doors, ii) chooses concentration, iii) low eﬀort following low
eﬀort by the project manager and the selection tournament and iv) high
eﬀort, if the principal uses a selection tournament to take his decision and
the project manager has chosen high eﬀort as well.
3. The principal uses the selection tournament.
Proof: See appendix
The intuition behind this result is the following: The assistant feels unkindly
treated, if the principal has taken the decision behind closed doors.14 As eﬀort is
costly, he thus chooses low eﬀort independent of the eﬀort choice of the project
14This is also in analogy to the ‘promotion’ example brieﬂy sketched in the introduction.
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manager. In comparison to that, the assistant does feel kindly treated if the
principal has used a selection tournament to choose the project manager. Thus, if
he is sensitive enough to reciprocity, i.e. condition Ya in Result (2) holds, then he
chooses high eﬀort given that the project manager has chosen high eﬀort following
st. But if, on the other hand, the project manager has chosen low eﬀort following
the selection tournament, the assistant knows that it is useless to invest high
eﬀort and, hence, he optimally chooses l. The project manager obviously knows
all this. Hence, if he was selected behind closed doors, he chooses low eﬀort because
he knows that the assistant will. If he was selected via a selection tournament,
however, and he knows that the assistant is suﬃciently sensitive to reciprocity he
will choose high eﬀort to reciprocate the kind behavior of the principal. Given this
the principal will choose the selection tournament, as in this way he maximizes his
own proﬁt. This highlights the importance of procedural choices in the interaction
of psychologically motivated agents.
In addition, one can also confront Result (2) with the results obtained in the
setting of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) who do not allow for diﬀerent types
of procedures. In order to do so, consider the same situation as described above,
but without the principal’s possibility to perform a selection tournament. In other
words, the principal can only decide behind closed doors.
Result 3 For all Yap ≥ 0 and Ypmp ≥ 0 the SPE is given by:
1. The assistant always chooses low eﬀort either out of pure cost (if Yap = 0)
or cost and kindness considerations (if Yap > 0).
2. The project manager knows this and, consequently, also chooses low eﬀort
independent of Ypmp.
3. The principal is indiﬀerent between choosing agent e1 or e2 as project man-
ager. Hence, any choice of the principal is part of an equilibrium.
Proof: The assistant will always perceive the principal’s decision as unkind.
Hence he is never inclined to choose high eﬀort out of kindness considerations.
This is even reinforced by the fact that high eﬀort is costly. Consequently the
assistant ’s optimal strategy is to choose l in every history in which he is active.
As said above, the project manager knows this and ﬁgures that what ever he does
the project will fail. Hence, his optimal choice is also to invest low eﬀort. Given
this the principal is indiﬀerent between bcd(e1) and bcd(e2). 
As one can see, if alternative procedures to take the same decision are ne-
glected diﬀerent equilibrium predictions result. This is not a mere artifact in this
particular example but holds true also in other settings as will also be seen in the
next application. Hence, the behavioral predictions that have been made in the
hitherto existing literature on psychological games [e.g. Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006)] are sensitive to the availability of
diﬀerent procedures to take the same decision.
Concluding, we have seen in this principal-agent example how procedural con-
cerns inherently arise if agents are also psychologically motivated. Furthermore,
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taking diﬀerent procedures to take the same decision explicitly into account leads
to behavioral predictions that diﬀer from the results with mere consequentialist
preferences, as traditionally assumed in economic theory, and they also diﬀer from
the results obtained in settings allowing for belief-dependent utilities but neglect-
ing procedural choices. In the next application we will demonstrate the impact of
procedural choices when agents are guilt averse [e.g. Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006), Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2006)].
5.2 The ‘So long, Sucker’ Game with Guilt Aversion
Consider the game in Figure 4:15
[Figure 4 here]
This ‘So long, Sucker’ game is a three-player game in which a player 1 seems
to be trapped since he has to be unkind to one of the other players 2 and 3. This
setting has already been analyzed by Nalebuﬀ and Shubik (1988) and Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2004) to explain why agents might choose to punish others (in
this case player 1), i.e. reciprocate for any perceived unkindness, even if it is costly
for themselves.
Diﬀerent to Nalebuﬀ and Shubik (1988) as well as Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) assume that agent 1 is guilt averse. More precisely, assume that player 1
feels guilty, if the other two players get the impression that he did not treat them
equally. This can be conceptualized as follows: At any endnode z ∈ Z player j’s
inference (j ∈ {2, 3}) with regard to what player 1 intended to give him by playing
the procedural strategy ωi is:
Eµ1j ,µ2j ,p0 [πj |H (z) , ω1] .
Obviously, player j also has a belief in z about what player 1 intended to give to
the other player q, where q = j ∧ q = 1:
Eµ1j ,µ2j ,p0 [πq|H (z) , ω1] .
This means player j can infer player 1’s intended diﬀerence, i.e. player 1’s fa-
voritism, between j and the other player q:
Eµ1j ,µ2j ,p0 [πj |H (z) , ω1]− Eµ1j ,µ2j ,p0 [πq|H (z) , ω1] .
In line with the above-sketched intuition concerning player 1’s guilt feeling and
similar to Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2006), we say that player 1 is aﬀected by
‘guilt from blame’, if players 2 and 3 get a perception of favoritism. His preferences
can hence be written as:
u1
(
z, µ1−1, µ
2
−1
)
= π1 −
∑
j
Y1j
(
|Eµ1j ,µ2j ,p0 [πj |H (z) , ω1]−Eµ1j ,µ2j ,p0 [πq|H (z) , ω1] |
)
,
15Note that actions that are played by player with probability 0 are disregarded in
Figure 4.
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Figure 4: ‘So long, Sucker’ Game
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where Y1j is a positive constant capturing player 1’s sensitivity to guilt and µ
1
−1
and µ2−1 are the other players ﬁrst- and second-order beliefs. Note, in each history
player 1 maximizes his utility ui conditional on his belief up to the third-order
because he takes his belief about the other players’ second-order-belief, µ2−1, into
account.16 For simplicity, assume that players 2 and 3 perceive player 1’s fa-
voritism, but this does not have any eﬀect on their utility.17 In other words,
players 2 and 3 are only concerned about their own material welfare.
As a benchmark let us ﬁrst state how player 1 behaves if all players are only
concerned about his own monetary payoﬀ:
Result 4 For all ε ≥ 0, if all players are only interested in their own material
payoﬀ, then player 1 is indiﬀerent with regard to his procedural choice.
Proof: By backward induction, players 2 and 3 respectively choose {ω2,h1, ω2,h2}
and {ω3,h3, ω3,h4} in the histories that they control. This implies player 1 knows
that he gets 3 for sure independent of his own choice. Hence, he is indiﬀerent
between ω1,h0, ω
′
1,h0 and ω
′′
1,h0. 
The situation changes assuming that player 1 is guilt averse as deﬁned above.
Given our set up with guilt aversion, it is possible to state the following result:
Result 5 If Y12 > 0 and Y13 > 0, then the only SPE is given by:
1. Player 1 chooses ω′1,h0 in history h
0.
2. Players 2 and 3 choose respectively {ω2,h1, ω2,h2} and {ω3,h3, ω3,h4} in the
histories that they control.
Proof: In line with player 2’s and 3’s preferences, let player 1’s ﬁrst-order-
belief and player 1’s belief about the second-order-belief of players 2 and 3 be
{ω2,h1, ω2,h2} and {ω3,h3, ω3,h4}. This implies that player 1’s belief about players
2’s and 3’s perception of his intended favoritism is:
i) (0− 1) = −1 (player 2) and (1− 0) = 1 (player 3), if he chooses ω1,h0,
ii) 1
2
(0− 1) + 1
2
(1− 0) = 0 (for both players), if he chooses ω′1,h0 and
iii) (1− 0) = 1 (player 2) and (0− 1) = −1 (player 3), if he chooses ω′′1,h0.
This means, his guilt feeling is minimized by playing ω′1,h0. Furthermore, his
own expected material payoﬀ given his ﬁrst-order-beliefs is 3 independent of his
procedural choice. Therefore, it is easy to see that the rational player 1 that
is guilt averse optimally chooses the procedure ω′1,h0 to take his decision between
players 2 and 3. In addition, players 2 and 3 choose {ω2,h1, ω2,h2} and {ω3,h3, ω3,h4}
16For comparison see Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2006)’s deﬁnition of ‘guilt from blame’.
17Note that one could in addition assume that players 2 and 3 are disappointed due to the
perceived favoritism. This would, however, only complicate the analysis without changing the
results.
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in line with player 1’s beliefs because of their material concerns. This concludes
the proof. 
Note, also in this example it holds that procedures mitigate the own as well as
the others’ psychological payoﬀs.
Remark 2 As in the previous example, ignoring player 1’s possibility to choose a
randomization procedure to take his decision, i.e. ω′1,h0, would lead to a diﬀerent
behavioral prediction. He would be indiﬀerent between choosing ω1,h0 and ω
′′
1,h0.
Hence, also here it holds that neglecting diﬀerent procedures to take the same
decision, as it is done in the hitherto existing literature on psychological games,
leads to diﬀerent equilibrium predictions. This highlights again, how procedural
concerns can be conceptualized as an inherent part of the interaction of agents
with belief-dependent utilities.
All in all, in this section we have used the concept of sequential psychological
equilibrium developed in the previous section to formally demonstrate the impact
of procedural choices on the strategic interaction of emotional agents. We have
seen how procedural choices inﬂuence their interactions and how the inclusion of
diﬀerent procedures to take the same decision aﬀects the behavioral predictions
of the existing literature on psychological games.
6 Conclusion
Any decision in human interactions is inherently associated with a procedure which
characterizes the way in which the decision is taken. This means it is impossible
to take a decision without deciding ﬁrst on how to take it. It is widely accepted in
other scientiﬁc disciplines and it has been shown experimentally that people react
diﬀerently in outcomewise identical situations depending on the procedures which
have led to them. People are concerned about the way in which decisions are taken.
Nevertheless traditional economic theory has neglected the impact of procedural
choices on human interaction. It has ignored the inﬂuence of procedures on human
interactions as traditional economic theory is based on consequentialist preferences
which are diﬃcult to reconcile with the existing evidence on procedural concerns.
Only in recent years psychological game theory has contested the consequen-
tialist view in economic theory by assuming that agents also sense psychological
payoﬀs which, broadly speaking, depend on agents’ beliefs about the other’s strate-
gies and beliefs. It has been shown in our paper how procedural concerns can be
conceptualized in a game theoretic setting assuming that agents are (also) in-
centivized by belief-dependent psychological payoﬀs. According to our approach
procedural choices inﬂuence the beliefs that people hold with regard to others. In
this way they mitigate the causal attribution of responsibilities and the evaluation
of intentions.
With the help of two applications we have furthermore demonstrated i) how
procedural concerns inﬂuence the strategic interaction of agents with belief-dependent
utilities and ii) that the equilibrium predictions in the already existing literature
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on psychological games are sensitive to the availability of diﬀerent procedures to
take the same decision. The hitherto existing literature on psychological games
solely concentrates on situations in which agents are held fully responsible for all
consequences of their actions. In contrast to this, in our class of procedural games
agents can choose between diﬀerent procedures. They can inﬂuence the process
of causal attribution and the evaluation of intentions. Consequently, diﬀerent
equilibrium predictions arise.
Concluding, procedural concerns can play an important role in areas of eminent
concern to economists. Hence, they should not be neglected.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Result 2
Note, as the principal-agent relation is symmetric we will concentrate on the be-
havior of project manager and assistant rather than the behavior of agents e1 and
e2 in the diﬀerent possible roles. Let us start by looking at the behavior of the
assistant following the decision by the principal to take the decision behind closed
doors. Remember, when he has to decide about his eﬀort level, he knows about
the project manager ’s eﬀort level, the principal’s procedural choice etc, i.e. he is
perfectly informed about the history of the game he is in.
To start with, assume that in any history that the assistant can ﬁnd himself
following bcd he believes that the principal believes, i.e. the assistant ’s second-
order-belief, that:
1. the assistant chooses low eﬀort, given that the principal has taken the deci-
sion behind closed doors,
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2. the project manager and the assistant will choose concentration and high
eﬀort, given that the principal has taken the decision by means of a selection
tournament.
This means, if it is the assistant ’s turn and the principal has taken his decision
behind closed doors, then the assistant believes that the principal intends to give
him:
πa(·) = w (a) . (1)
Given this and the assistant ’s second order belief his perceived kindness of the
principal following bcd is:
λapa = w (a)− 1
2
(
w(a) +
1
2
((w(a)− υ) + (w(pm|s)− υ))
)
< 0, (2)
where 1
2
(
w(a) + 1
2
((w(a)− υ) + (w(pm|s)− υ))) is the assistant ’s belief about
the average that the principal could have given him and 1
2
((w(a)− υ) + (w(pm|s)− υ))
is the assistant ’s expected payoﬀ given that the principal had chosen the selection
tournament. Furthermore, the assistant ’s kindness is either:
κap(l) = (πp (l, l)− w)− 1
2
((πp (l, h)− w) + (πp (l, l)− w)) = 0, (3)
if he chooses low eﬀort or
κap(h) = (πp (l, h)− w)− 1
2
((πp (l, h)− w) + (πp (l, l)− w)) = 0, (4)
if he chooses high eﬀort, conditional on the low eﬀort by the project manager.
Conditional on the high eﬀort by the project manager his kindness towards the
principal is either:
κap(l) = (πp (h, l)− w)− 1
2
((πp (h, h)− w) + (πp (h, l)− w)) > 0, (5)
if he chooses low eﬀort or
κap(h) = (πp (h, h)− w)− 1
2
((πp (h, h)− w) + (πp (h, l)− w)) < 0, (6)
if he chooses high eﬀort. To summarize the perceptions and the optimal behavior
of the assistant :
1. If the principal chooses to take the decision behind closed doors and given
the assistant ’s aforementioned second-order beliefs, the perceived kindness
of the assistant is negative independent of what the project manager does.
2. The assistant ’s kindness towards the principal can: i) be 0 independent of his
own choice, if the pm chooses low eﬀort as well, or, ii) positive and negative
given that the project manager has chosen high eﬀort.
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3. Hence, ﬁrst, as eﬀort is costly, he optimally chooses low eﬀort, given low
eﬀort by the project manager. Secondly, as eﬀort is costly and perceived
kindness is negative, he also optimally chooses low eﬀort given high eﬀort
by the project manager. Note, the assistant ’s optimal behavior is in line
with his second order beliefs.
In contrast to this, the assistant ’s perceived kindness of the principal following
the selection tournament is:
λapa =
1
2
(w (a)− υ) + 1
2
(w(pm|s)− υ)
− 1
2
(
w(a) +
1
2
((w(a)− υ) + (w(pm|s)− υ))
)
> 0, (7)
where 1
2
(w (a)− υ) + 1
2
(w(pm|s)− υ) is the assistant ’s belief about what the
principal intended to give him by choosing the selection tournament. Note, it can
easily be seen that the assistant ’s kindness towards the principal in the histories in
which he is active is the same as under bcd, i.e. equations (3),(4),(5) and (6). From
equation (7) we already see that the assistant perceives the selection tournament
as kind. Given this the question arises whether and under what conditions this
would make him choose high eﬀort. Rationality requires that he chooses high
eﬀort if his utility from choosing high eﬀort is bigger or equal to his utility from
choosing low eﬀort, i.e.:
ua(h) ≥ ua(l), (8)
which means
(w(a)− υ) + Yap (κap(h)λapa) ≥ w(a) + Yap (κap(l)λapa) . (9)
As κap(l) and κap(h) are 0 in histories following st and low eﬀort by the pm, it can
easily be seen that equation (9) never holds as υ > 0. Hence, the assistant always
chooses low eﬀort under the selection procedure given that the project manager
pm has chosen low eﬀort as well. In case the project manager has chosen high
eﬀort, however, the situation changes. Equation (9) can be rewritten as:
Yap ≥ υ
λapa (κap(h)− κap(l)) . (10)
Plugging in for λapa and κap(·) gives:
Yap ≥ υ1
2
[
1
2
[w (pm|s)− w(a)]− υ] [πp (h, h)− πp (h, l) + w(pm|f)− w(pm|s)]
> 0. (11)
This shows, if condition (11) holds, then the assistant optimally chooses high eﬀort
following the selection tournament and high eﬀort by the project manager.
To summarize again, given that the principal uses the selection tournament to
take his decision the assistant chooses concentration and:
1. low eﬀort if the project manager has chosen low eﬀort.
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2. high eﬀort if the project manager has chosen high eﬀort and condition (11)
holds.
3. low eﬀort if the project manager has chosen high eﬀort and condition (11)
does not hold.
This brings us to the optimal behavior of the project manager. Consider ﬁrst the
project manager ’s optimal behavior following the principal’s choices to take the
decision behind closed doors. From the above we know that the project manager
and the principal know that the assistant always chooses low eﬀort under bcd.
Given this, the project manager ’s perceived kindness of the principal’s procedural
choice bcd is:
λpmppm = w(pm|f)− 1
2
(
w(pm|f) + 1
2
[(w (a)− υ) + (w(pm|s)− υ)]
)
. (12)
As w(pm|f) = w(a), equation (12) reduces to:
λpmppm = w(a)− 1
2
(
w(a) +
1
2
[(w (a)− υ) + (w(pm|s)− υ)]
)
< 0, (13)
which is identical to equation (2). Hence, as the assistant ’s optimal behavior is
known to the project manager and the project manager also knows that the prin-
cipal knows, the project manager ’ perceived kindness of the principal is identical
to the assistant’s perception following bcd. The same holds true for the project
manager ’s kindness. Given the optimal behavior of the assistant, the project man-
ager ’s kindness towards the principal reduces to:
κpmp(l) = (πp (l, l)− w)− 1
2
((πp (h, l)− w) + (πp (l, l)− w)) = 0, (14)
if he chooses low eﬀort or
κpmp(h) = (πp (h, l)− w)− 1
2
((πp (h, l)− w) + (πp (l, l)− w)) = 0, (15)
if his eﬀort choice is high. Concluding, as eﬀort is costly also the optimal behavior
of the project manager is low eﬀort following the principal’s procedural choice
of bcd. What about the selection tournament? Remember, the assistant chooses
concentration and l given that the pm chooses l and h if the pm chooses h and
condition (11) holds. Hence, the project manager ’s perceived kindness following
the selection tournament is:
λpmppm =
1
2
[(w (a)− υ) + (w(pm|s)− υ)]
− 1
2
(
w(a) +
1
2
[(w (a)− υ) + (w(pm|s)− υ)]
)
> 0. (16)
As can easily be seen, the project manager and the assistant feel equally treated.
Hence, the perceptions about the principals kindness are identical (equations (16)
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and (7)). The project manager kindness towards the principal, on the other hand,
following is:
κpmp(l) = (πp (l, l)− w)− 1
2
((πp (h, h)− w) + (πp (l, l)− w)) < 0, (17)
if he chooses low eﬀort and
κpmp(h) = (πp (h, h)− w)− 1
2
((πp (h, h)− w) + (πp (l, l)− w)) > 0, (18)
if his eﬀort choice is high. From this follows that the project manager chooses
concentration and high eﬀort following the selection tournament, if:
upm(h) ≥ upm(l), (19)
which can also be written as
(w(pm|s)− υ) + Ypmp (κpmp(h)λpmppm) ≥ w(pm|f) + Ypmp (κpmp(l)λpmppm) . (20)
This reduces to:
Ypmp ≥ (w(pm|f)− w(pm|s)) + υ
λpmppm (κpmp(h)− κpmp(l)) . (21)
Plugging in for the perceived kindness, λpmppm, and kindness, κpmp gives:
Ypmp ≥ (w(pm|f)− w(pm|s)) + υ1
2
[
1
2
[w (pm|s)− w(a)]− υ] [πp (h, h)− πp (h, l) + w(pm|f)− w(pm|s)] .
One can easily see that:
Yap ≥ Ypmp, (22)
as (w(pm|f) − w(pm|s)) < 0. Hence, the project manager optimally chooses
concentration and high eﬀort following the selection tournament already at lower
levels of sensitivity to reciprocity compared to the assistant. This is due to the
fact that he gets a ﬁnancial reward for bringing high eﬀort compared to the assis-
tant who only supports him within the realm of his normal work and gets w(a)
independent of the success or failure of the project. Summarizing:
1. if the principal chooses to take the decision behind closed doors, both players
optimally choose low eﬀort in line with their beliefs and, in addition,
2. if conditions (11) and (22) hold, both choose concentration and high eﬀort
following the selection tournament.
Assume that both conditions (11) and (22) hold. Given this it is easy to see that
the proﬁt maximizing principal always chooses the selection tournament to take
his decision, as this gives him a proﬁt of πp(h, h). This concludes the proof. 
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Abstract
We analyze the impact of aggressive reactions to ego-threatening feedback
on principal-agent relationships. More speciﬁcally, we show how peoples’
desire to protect their self-esteem can explain the existence of contractual
relationships in environments with unobservable eﬀort and subjective mea-
sures of performance. We concentrate on situations in which neither eﬀort
nor output can be measured objectively as these constitute exactly the set-
tings in which disagreements about eﬀort and performance arise.
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1 Introduction
Self-esteem is one of the oldest and widely studied concepts in social psychology
going back to the 1890s. It refers to peoples’ self-evaluation or, in other words,
the belief they hold about their self-worth. The unbroken attention that self-
esteem attracts stems from the fact that people everywhere care about it, try to
enhance, maintain and protect it [e.g. Greenwald (1980)]. Anything that gives a
boost in self-esteem is almost universally welcome. People feel good when their
self-perception is high and rising, and people feel bad when it is low or dropping.
Hardly anyone enjoys events that constitute a blow or a loss to their self-esteem
[Baumeister (2005)].
In recent years also economists have started to acknowledge the importance
of self-esteem in decision making and strategic interactions [e.g. Ko¨szegi (2006),
Be´nabou & Tirole (2002), Compte & Postlewaite (2004), Ellingsen & Johannes-
son (2007)]. It is argued that people strive for positive self-perceptions because
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it entails a consumption, signaling and motivational value. Ko¨szegi (2006), for
example, endows individuals with ‘ego-utility’ and demonstrates the eﬀects on
choice between more or less ambitious tasks. In particular, this model explains
the phenomenon of overconﬁdence by individuals who update believes according
to Bayes’ rule. Be´nabou & Tirole (2002) and Compte & Postlewaite (2004), on
the other hand, center on self-conﬁdence as motivational value. It is argued that
conﬁdence in one’s ability and eﬃcacy can help individuals to e.g. undertake more
ambitious goals. When people have imperfect knowledge about their own ability
and/or when eﬀort and ability are complements, then a higher self-conﬁdence
enhances peoples’ motivation to act [Be´nabou & Tirole (2002): 873].
Psychologists, however, have not only identiﬁed the implicit impact of self-
esteem on information processing and motivation, but also stress the individual’s
eagerness to actively maintain and protect their positive self-perceptions [Green-
wald (1980), Bushman & Baumeister (1998), Baumeister (2005)]. First, people
protect their self-esteem by systematically taking credit for successes and denying
blame for failures. Second, people have a tendency to uncritically accept positive
feedback and eagerly search for ﬂaws/faults in other’s criticisms [e.g. Baumeis-
ter (2005), Greenwald (1980)]. Third and most importantly, psychologists have
found that aggression and conﬂicts tend to result from positive self-images that
are challenged or threatened [e.g. Baird (1977), Raskin et al. (1991), Bushman
& Baumeister (1998)]. It is argued that hostile aggression is an expression of
the self’s rejection of ego-threatening evaluations received from other people [e.g.
Baumeister et al. (1996)]. People with high self-esteem usually hold conﬁdent and
highly favorable ideas about themselves, i.e. they exhibit ego-involvement, and re-
act belligerently to ego-threatening feedback from others [Baird (1977), Shrauger
& Lund (1975) and Korman (1969)]. These behavioral reactions have been found
to be stronger the higher the perceived bias and the lower the perceived quality
of the feedback source [e.g. Steelmann and Rutkowski (2004)].
In this paper we analyze the impact of aggressive reactions to ego-threatening
feedback on principal-agent relationships. More speciﬁcally, we show how peo-
ple’s desire to protect their self-esteem can explain the existence of contractual
relationships in environments with unobservable eﬀort and subjective measures
of performance. We concentrate on situations in which neither eﬀort nor out-
put can be measured objectively as these constitute exactly the settings in which
disagreements about eﬀort and performance arise.
In reality, it is very often impossible to objectively measure workers’ and espe-
cially managers’ individual contributions to the success of projects or ﬁrm values.
Therefore it is widely prevalent to (also) take into account subjective evaluations
in performance pay. Already in 1981 the Bureau of National Aﬀairs reports, for
example, that pay for performance systems involving subjective measures are more
common than those involving only objective performance signals. Furthermore,
Milkovich and Wigdor (1991) and Levine (2003) cite more recent evidence on the
wide usage of subjective performance appraisal systems in performance pay in e.g.
investment banks, law ﬁrms and consultancies.
Against this background, consider the following example. Suppose a principal
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wants to motivate an agent to spend eﬀort on a complex good or service. Neither
the agent’s eﬀort nor the outcome of the project (the quality of the good or service)
is observable. The only information the principal and the agent receive are private,
i.e. subjective, signals about the eﬀort of the agent. These signals are imperfectly
correlated with each other and to the actual eﬀort level. To motivate the agent
to spend positive eﬀort, a contract has to specify payments which increase in
the subjective signal of the principal (an increase in the reported signal of the
agent would just motivate him to misrepresent his information). However, due
to the imperfect signal technology the principal can credibly report that he has
received a signal of low eﬀort regardless of his actual private information. As
payments increase in the subjective signal of the principal, he is always better oﬀ
by misrepresenting his information and pay the agent the minimum wage. This
will be anticipated by the agent and subgame-perfect equilibrium eﬀorts are zero,
i.e. no principal agent relationship can be established.
In a recent paper [MacLeod (2003)], it has been assumed that the principal
can credibly promise to make payments to a third party (contingent on the sig-
nal conﬁguration). In the simplest case of two diﬀerent performance signals, the
agent is indiﬀerent between telling the truth and lying (i.e. he tells the truth by
default) and the principal promises to pay a third party if he pays the agent ac-
cording to a bad signal and the agent reports a good signal in the optimal contract.
The payments to the third party are thereby ﬁxed in such a way that the prin-
cipal’s truth-telling constraint is satisﬁed. The complete ﬂexibility of third-party
payments thereby ensures that a relationship (i.e. a positive eﬀort level) can be
established regardless of the parameters of the model (e.g. the correlation between
the principal’s and the agent’s signal, the size of the project etc.). Of course this
result crucially depends on the credibility of payments to the third party. In par-
ticular, while the principal cannot credibly promise the agent to report his signal
truthfully, it is assumed that he can make such a promise to the third party. This
reminds a little bit of the mediator function of maﬁa clans in business relations -
even though one cannot promise to be honest with a client, no-one will lie to the
godfather. To explain the widespread use of subjective information in particular
in labor market relations far away from enforcement through the Corleone fam-
ily, MacLeod (2003) refers to the third party payments as anticipations of future
conﬂict in an un-modelled dynamic game.
In this paper, we illuminate the un-modelled conﬂict in Macleod (2003) and
show that principal-agent relationships can be established on the basis of sub-
jective performance evaluations, if agents try to defend their self-esteem through
the creation of trouble or aggressive actions. In line with the aforementioned
psychological evidence, we assume that agents perceive a negative psychological
payoﬀ from ego-threatening performance evaluations through the principal (i.e.
the agent suﬀers from a bad performance evaluation by the principal, if he does
not share this opinion based on his own subjective signal), and that he can reduce
this negative psychological payoﬀ through trouble/aggression. If the agent creates
trouble, the principal will face costs of conﬂict.1 The costs of conﬂict play the very
1This mechanism could be interpreted as negative reciprocity. Unlike the existing models of
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same role as MacLeod (2003)’s third-party payments - they enforce truth-telling
by the principal. In our setting, however, they depend on the agent’s sensitivity
to ego-threats, the quality of the information technology etc. and therefore do not
exhibit the same ﬂexibility as third-party payments in MacLeod (2003) that can
be optimally chosen. Our model identiﬁes conditions on conﬂict levels, project
returns, quality of information, and sensitivity to ego-threats which promote or
rule-out the implementation of positive eﬀort levels.
Our model is closely related but conceptually diﬀerent from Ellingsen & Johan-
nesson (2007)’s model of self-esteem. In contrast to us, they model a situation in
which agents sense a psychological payoﬀ from being esteemed by others. Agents
in their setting take pride in what opponents think about them. More formally,
agents derive utility from their belief about the others’ perceptions about their
type. In contrast to this, in our setting agents’ sense a threat to their self-esteem,
if their own positive self-perception is not conﬁrmed by the feedback of others.
In the baseline model, we assume that the principal designs a contract, but
has no inﬂuence on the quality of the information technology. We show that
the interval of credible bonus payments in case of a positive evaluation by the
principal enlarges in the agent’s sensitivity to ego-threats, the level of conﬂict
faced by the principal, and the correlation of subjective signals. In particular,
higher bonuses become credible if the level of conﬂict increases. However, we
demonstrate that the bonus which makes it incentive compatible for the agent
to choose a certain eﬀort level does not have to be credible. In particular, the
incentive compatible bonus increases in the agent’s sensitivity to ego-threats and
the probability of conﬂict (i.e. the principal does not only compensate the agent
for (marginal) eﬀort costs but also for (marginal) psychological cost). To guarantee
the existence of a positive implementable eﬀort level, the information technology
has to be suﬃciently unbiased (i.e. the relative probability of conﬂicting signals
has to be low), and the ratio of psychological costs for the agent and conﬂict costs
for the principal has to be suﬃciently small (i.e. the aggressive action has to be
‘eﬀective’). If there exists a positive implementable eﬀort level, we demonstrate
that a principal agent relationship is established if project returns are suﬃciently
large. However, the principal-agent relationship establishes a ﬁrst best solution if
and only if signals are perfectly correlated. Hence, the additional agency costs due
to a positive probability of ego-threats and the endogenously determined interval
of credible bonuses introduce important frictions which unambiguously reduce
welfare.
In an extension of this model, we allow the principal to also (costlessly) choose
the quality of his signal. We formalize the ﬁndings of Steelmann and Rutkowski
(2004) and assume that psychological costs of the agent are decreasing in the qual-
ity of the signal but do not vanish in the limit of a perfect performance signal of
the principal. As an immediate consequence, the bias of the information technol-
ogy, the psychological costs for the agent, and expected conﬂict with the principal
reciprocity [Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk & Fischbacher (2006)],
however, what is considered to be fair or unfair in our model does not depend on beliefs about
strategies and their associated outcomes, but rather on the perceived fairness/correctness of
(reported) signal constellations.
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decrease in the quality of the principal’s signal. While a lower bias and lower
psychological costs ceteris paribus promote the implementability of a positive ef-
fort level (see above), lower expected costs of conﬂict diminish the set of credible
bonuses. These countervailing eﬀects yield the following results. For suﬃciently
small costs of conﬂict for the principal, there is no signal quality and no contract
which could implement a positive eﬀort and yield positive proﬁts for the principal.
If costs of conﬂict are suﬃciently large, a positive eﬀort level will be implemented,
but the principal does not choose a perfect signal quality (even though this is
assumed to be costless), neither does he implement a ﬁrst best solution. For in-
termediate levels of conﬂict the principal will implement a ﬁrst best solution if
and only if signals are perfectly correlated. Otherwise he may choose a perfect
signal but never achieves a ﬁrst best solution. The non-feasibility of the ﬁrst best
solution is again driven by the additional (psychological) agency costs.
In sum, our model demonstrates that principal-agent relationships may well be
feasible due to the agent’s eagerness to protect their self-esteem through aggressive
acts. However, this psychological mechanism is not suﬃciently ﬂexible in order to
allow for an implementation of a ﬁrst best solution(which would be achievable in
our setting if signals were observable). Moreover, a break-down of the relationship
(the sole implementability of an eﬀort of zero) cannot be ruled out even if the
principal can costlessly choose the quality of his own signal.
In section 2 we present the model, the timing of the game and the ﬁrst best
solution. In section 3 we deﬁne the optimal contract, comparative statics and a
welfare analysis under the assumption that the quality of the principal’s subjective
performance signal is exogenously given. In section 4 we enrich the analysis by
assuming that the principal can choose among diﬀerent evaluation procedures that
diﬀer in quality. With section 5 we conclude.
2 The model
In this section we present the building blocks of our model and derive the ﬁrst-best
outcome.
Production Technology Consider a principal who decides upon undertaking
a project which generates a value of φ > 0 if successful. The project requires eﬀort
of an agent. Assume that if the agent spends eﬀort p ∈ [0, 1], the project will be
successful (create value φ) with probability p. The project is a complex good or
service and its success is not veriﬁable, i.e. contracts contingent on the generation
of φ are not feasible.
Information Technology Neither principal nor agent can observe whether the
project is successful or not. Both rather receive a private signal about the agent’s
performance. The principal receives sP ∈ SP , where SP = {U,A}, i.e. perfor-
mance is regarded as either acceptable (A) or unacceptable (U). Analogously, the
agent receives sA ∈ SA with SA = {U,A}. The signals sP and sA are non-veriﬁable
private pieces of information of the principal and the agent, respectively.
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The signals are informative with respect to the success of the project in the
following sense. If the project is not successful (which happens with probability
(1− p)), principal and agent receive the signal sP = sA = U . Now denote by γkl
the probability that sP = k and sA = l given that the project is a success. Then,
the ex-ante probability for the signal pair sP = U and sA = A, for instance, will
be pγUA. Following [MacLeod (2003), p.227], we introduce the perceived bias of
the relationship by
α =
γUA
γAA
where α = 0 indicates that the principal always agrees with the agent upon a good
signal, while α =∞ would imply that agreement never occurs. I.e., the perceived
bias is a likelihood ratio which represents the agent’s belief about the principal
perceiving his performance as acceptable conditional on his own perception of an
acceptable performance.
Assumption 1 We assume that the principal’s and agent’s signals are positively
correlated which each other, i.e. γAAγUU−γUAγAU > 0. In particular, this implies
that α < ∞.
The Game The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The principal oﬀers a contract to the agent and the agent decides upon
acceptance.2 Upfront payments are arranged.
2. The agent decides upon eﬀort p.
3. The project generates value φ with probability p.
4. The principal receives sP and the agent receives sA. The principal and the
agent report (not necessarily truthfully) on sP and sA. Denote the reports
by tP and tA, respectively. tP and tA are veriﬁable.
5. Payments contingent on tP and tA are arranged.
6. Contingent on sA and received payments, the agent decides upon retaliation
(i.e., spends eﬀort q).
Agent For an eﬀort of p the agent incurs costs v(p) with v(p) : [0, 1] → R+ in
C2, v′(0) = 0, v′′(p) > 0 and limp→1 v (p) =∞.
First Best Eﬀort Level Would the principal have access to the agent’s pro-
duction technology, his eﬀort choice would solve v′(p) = φ. For further reference,
we will denote the ﬁrst best eﬀort level by pFB. Our assumptions on v(p) ensure
that pFB ∈ (0, 1).
2In section 4, the principal can also inﬂuence the perceived bias of the relationship - for
instance, by choosing the quality of his own signal.
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Psychological Payoﬀs The agent is risk-neutral and senses a psychological
payoﬀ that depends on his own private signal about performance, sA, and the
reported signal of the principal, tP . More speciﬁcally, the agent’s utility function
reads:
U = c− v(p)− Y (sA, tP , α)(1− q)− w(q) (1)
Thereby, c denotes the wage payment and Y (sA, tP , α) represents the agent’s psy-
chological costs for a given conﬁguration of (reported) signals and the perceived
bias of the relationship, α. With respect to Y (sA, tP , α) we proceed with the
following speciﬁcation.
Assumption 2 (i) Y (sA = U, tP , α) = 0 for all tP and α.
(ii) Y (sA, tP = A, α) = 0 for all sA and α.
(iii) Y (A,U, α) ∈ C1, Y (A,U, 0) > 0, and ∂Y (A,U,α)
∂α
> 0.
Part (i) and (ii) formalize the concept of an ego-threat. Individuals with low
self-esteem (here, represented by sA = U) do not exhibit ego involvement and show
no reaction to feedback (be it conﬁrming or threatening) [see Baumeister, Smasrt
& Boden (1996)]. If the individual is sensitive to ego-involvement (sA = A), it
uncritically accepts positive (or conﬁrming) feedback [see Baumeister (2005)] -
formalized with zero psychological payoﬀs in this case - but suﬀers from negative
(or threatening) assessments [see e.g. Bushman and Baumeister (1998)] - which
amounts to non-zero psychological costs in our model. Finally, Part (iii) follows
the ﬁndings of e.g. Steelmann and Rutkowski (2004) in assuming that psycholog-
ical costs increase in the perceived bias of the relationship (or the quality of the
information technology).
q is the level of conﬂict (or retaliation) created by the agent with w(q) ∈ C2,
w(0) = 0, w′(0) = 0, w′′ > 0 and w′(1) < ∞.
For further reference, we summarize some results concerning the agent’s opti-
mal conﬂict level.
Lemma 1 Let c > 0, p ∈ (0, 1), and Y (sA, tP , α) satisfy Assumption 2.
(i) Suppose sA = U and/or tP = A. Then, Y (sA, tP , α) = 0 and the agent
chooses q = 0.
(ii) Suppose Y (sA, tP , α) ≥ w′(1). Then, the agent chooses q = 1.
(iii) Suppose 0 < Y (sA, tP , α) < w
′(1). Then, the agent chooses
q = arg (Y (sA, tP , α) = w
′(q)) > 0.
In this case dq
dY
> 0 holds for the optimal q.
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Proof. Follows from Eqn. 1 and Assumption 2.
With Assumption 2 and Lemma 1, the agent retaliates (i.e., q > 0) if and only
if sA = A (ego-involvement) and sP = U (ego-threat). If psychological costs are
larger than maximal marginal costs of conﬂict (Part (ii)), the agent exerts maximal
level of conﬂict q = 1. If psychological costs are below that level, q ∈ (0, 1) holds.
For further reference we abbreviate Y (A,U, α) ≡ Y .3 Moreover, q∗ will henceforth
denote the conﬂict level for the conﬁguration tP = U and sA = A - as q = 0 for
all other conﬁguration, no confusion should arise.
Principal The principal’s expected proﬁt is given by:
Π = pφ− E {c} − E {q}ψ, (2)
where pφ is the expected beneﬁt which the agent generates, E {c} are the expected
wage cost of employing the agent, and E {q}ψ are the expected costs of conﬂict due
to the reciprocal behavior of the agent. As our assumptions on w(q) ensure that
q ∈ [0, 1], we can interpret q as the probability with which the agent creates costs
of ψ > 0 for the principal. First best proﬁts are given by ΠFB = pFBφ− v(pFB).
Contracts A contract Γ speciﬁes payments contingent on veriﬁable events, i.e.
Γ = {ckl | k ∈ SP , l ∈ SA}. The agent accepts a contract if he expects a (weakly)
positive utility from it (individual rationality) and chooses p as to maximize his
utility (incentive compatibility). In this case, we say that Γ implements p. Princi-
pal and agent report their signal truthfully if and only if they weakly beneﬁt from
doing so.
3 Cost Minimizing Contracts
In this section we characterize cost minimizing contracts which implement a cer-
tain eﬀort level p (i.e., satisfy individual rationality and incentive compatibility
constraints) and discuss their feasibility in the presence of truth-telling constraints
for the principal and the agent.
Reduced Form Contracts For a given contract Γ and signals sP and sA, the
principal and agent decide upon their report. Let σP : SP → ∆(SP ) and σA :
SA → ∆(SA) be the principal’s and agent’s reporting strategies (i.e., mappings
from the set of signals SP and SA to the set of probability distributions over SP and
SA, respectively). Suppose that (σ
∗
P , σ
∗
A) is the pair of optimal reporting strategies
for contract Γ. Then, the revelation principle implies that there exists a contract
Γˆ which implements the same eﬀort at the same costs and induces truthful reports
by principal and agent. We will, henceforth, restrict our analysis to this type of
(revelation) contracts. The following results further simplify the analysis.
3In section 4, α is endogenized and we will refer to Y (A,U, α) as Y (α).
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Lemma 2 Suppose there exists a contract Γ which implements p > 0. Then, there
always exists a contract Γˆ which implements p at weakly lower costs such that
(i) ckl = ckm ≡ ck for all l,m ∈ SA and k ∈ SP . In particular, the principal and
the agent tell the truth.
(ii) cA > cU .
Proof. See Appendix
For convenience, we will from now on write cA = f + b and cU = f and a
contract reads Γ = (b, f). By Lemma 2(ii), b > 0. 4
Then, the principal’s and agent’s truth-telling decisions constitute the following
simple normal-form game (with the principal being the row- and the agent being
the column player, the action-space is given by SA and SP , respectively).
A U
A pφ− f − b, f + b pφ− f − b, f + b
U pφ− f − q∗ψ, f pφ− f , f
Truth-Telling Notice that as the agent’s monetary compensation is indepen-
dent of his own report, he is indiﬀerent between reporting either of his signals for
any given report of the principal. We assume that he tells the truth in case of
indiﬀerence such that the agent’s truth-telling constraint is trivially fulﬁlled (see
Lemma 2(i)).
Suppose sP = A. Then, the principal tells the truth, whenever his payoﬀ from
doing so (which reads pφ− f − b) is larger than his payoﬀ from reporting tP = U
(which reads pφ−f−Pr(sA = A | sP = A)q∗ψ). This means the principal reports
tP = A if
b ≤ γAA
(γAA + γAU)
q∗ψ ≡ bmax. (3)
On the other hand, suppose sP = U . Then, the principal tells the truth, whenever
his payoﬀ from doing so (which reads pφ− f −Pr(sA = A | sP = U)q∗ψ) is larger
than his payoﬀ from reporting tP = A (which reads pφ − f − b). In other words,
the principal reports tP = U if
b ≥ γUA
(γUA + γUU)
q∗ψ ≡ bmin. (4)
For further reference we collect the following properties of bmax and bmin.
Lemma 3 Comparative Statics of bmax and bmin
(i) bmax > 0.
4f can be interpreted as an up-front payment which implies a payment of zero if the principal
reports tP = U and a payment of b (a bonus) if he reports tP = A. Henceforth, we assume that
f is chosen in such a way that the contract is individually rational.
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(ii) bmax > bmin.
(iii) ∆b ≡ bmax−bmin is monotone increasing in q∗, ψ, and the correlation between
sP and sA.
(iv) bmin and bmax are monotone increasing in q∗, ψ. bmin is monotone increasing
in γUA and b
max is monotone increasing in γAA.
Proof. (i) and (ii) follow from the positive correlation of signals, i.e., γAAγUU >
γAUγUA.
(iii) Follows from ∆b = γAAγUU−γAUγUA
(γAA+γAU )+(γUA+γUU )
q∗ψ.
(iv) Follows from Eqns. 3 and 4.
Part (i) and (ii) of Lemma 3 imply that [bmin, bmax] is always a non-empty
interval, i.e., the principal can credibly oﬀer a bonus b ∈ [bmin, bmax]. From Lemma
3(iii) and (iv) it follows that the distance between bmax and bmin (the maximal and
minimal credible bonuses) gets larger and the respective interval is shifted towards
larger bonuses as q∗ or ψ increases. Hence, the larger the potential conﬂict level,
the higher are the bonuses that can be implemented. In fact, for every bonus b
there is a conﬂict level ψ such that b is credible. The distance between bmin and
bmax also becomes larger as the correlation between the principal’s and the agent’s
signal increases.
Incentive Compatibility For a given contract Γ = (f, b), the agent chooses
eﬀort p so as to maximize his utility (see Eqn. 1) while anticipating the generation
of ex-post conﬂict at level q∗ as depicted in Lemma 1. Hence, he maximizes
U(p) = p(γAA + γAU)b + f − v(p)− pγUA(Y (1− q∗) + w(q∗))
which induces the ﬁrst order condition5
b(p) =
v′(p) + γUA(Y (1− q∗) + w(q∗))
γAA + γAU
. (5)
Note that d
2U(p)
dp2
= v′′(p) > 0 such that the agent’s optimization problem is well-
behaved. For further reference we collect the following properties of b(p).
Lemma 4 Comparative Statics of b(p)
(i) Suppose p > 0. Then, b(p) > 0.
(ii) limp→0 b(p) > 0 if γUA > 0.
(iii) db(p)
dp
> 0.
(iv) db(p)
dY
> 0.
5We denote a bonus which implements an eﬀort level of p by b(p).
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(v) db(p)
dγUA
> 0.
Proof. Follows from Eqn. 5.
Eqn (5) shows that the bonus has to overcome marginal eﬀort costs and
marginal psychological costs. If the principal wants to induce a positive eﬀort
level, he has to oﬀer a positive bonus (Part (i)). However, the required bonus does
not vanish in the limit of small eﬀorts, because marginal psychological costs do
not vanish for p = 0. Parts (iii)-(v) of Lemma 4 indicate that the necessary bonus
increases in target eﬀort p, psychological costs Y , and the conditional probability
of conﬂict (γUA).
Individual Rationality The agent accepts a contract Γ = (f, b) whenever his
expected utility from it is weakly positive, i.e.
p(γAA + γAU)b + f − v(p)− pγUA(Y (1− q∗) + w(q∗)) ≥ 0.
To maximize her proﬁts, the principal sets for a given bonus b the upfront payment
to
f(b) = −p(γAA + γAU)b + v(p) + pγUA(Y (1− q∗) + w(q∗)).
The upfront-payment can well be negative (franchise fee) as the agent is not pro-
tected by limited liability. Note in particular that f(b) can always be ﬁxed such
that the agent does not receive any rents from the relationship.
Implementable Eﬀorts We call a certain eﬀort level p > 0 implementable if
b(p) ∈ [bmin, bmax] and state the following result.
Lemma 5 There exists an implementable eﬀort level p > 0 if and only if bmax >
b(0), i.e., q∗ψ > α(Y (1− q∗) + w(q∗)).
Proof. ”⇒”. Suppose p > 0 is implementable. Then, b(p) ∈ [bmin, bmax]. Accord-
ing to Lemma 4(iii), db(p)
dp
> 0 such that b(0) < bmax.
”⇐”. Suppose bmax > b(0). Then, by continuity of b(p) in p, Lemma 3(iii),
and Lemma 4(iii), there exists a p > 0 with b(p) ∈ [bmin, bmax] such that p > 0 is
implementable.
Lemma 5 shows that there exists an implementable eﬀort level p > 0 whenever
the perceived bias α is suﬃciently low or the ratio of costs of conﬂict for the
principal to psychological costs for the agent is suﬃciently large.6 In particular,
no conﬂict (i.e., ψ = 0) or no psychological costs (Y = 0) and therefore no
retaliation q∗ = 0 imply non-implementability of an eﬀort level p > 0. The
existence of implementable eﬀort levels is promoted by a small perceived bias of
the relationship and by high costs of conﬂict for the principal and low but non-zero
costs for the agent.
6Note that a perfect correlation of signals ( α = 0) or a suﬃciently high level of conﬂict
ψ guarantees the existence of an implementable positive eﬀort level.
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Eﬀort Costs To implement an (implementable) eﬀort p > 0 the principal’s costs
are C(p) = f + p(γAA + γAU)b(p) = v(p) + pγUA((1 − q∗)Y + w(q∗)). Note that
C(p) is convex and that C(0) = 0. Moreover, we adopt the convention that an
eﬀort p > 0 which is not implementable requires inﬁnite costs.
Optimal Eﬀort The principal’s proﬁt now reads
Π(p) = pφ− pγUAq∗ψ − C(p)
which is concave for all implementable p > 0 and zero for p = 0. We denote the
maximum of Π(p) on [0, 1] by p∗. p∗ will be referred to as the optimal eﬀort level
chosen by the principal.
Proposition 1 Optimal Eﬀort Level
(i) Suppose b(0) ≥ bmax. Then, p∗ = 0.
(ii) Suppose b(0) < bmax. Then, there exists φ > 0 such that p∗ = 0 for φ ≤ φ
and p∗ > 0 for φ > φ.
Proof. Part (i). This follows directly from Lemma 5.
Part (ii). With b(0) < bmax it follows from Lemma 5 that there exists an im-
plementable eﬀort level p > 0, i.e., C(p) < ∞. Observe that Π(p) is a linear
increasing function of φ for a given implementable eﬀort p > 0. Hence, there
exists φ such that Π(p) = 0. Now take the implementable eﬀort p > 0 which leads
to the lowest such φ. As Π(p) < 0 for φ = 0 and p > 0, it follows that φ > 0.
By construction, there is no positive implementable eﬀort level for any φ ≤ φ
which leads to positive proﬁts. Hence, p∗ = 0 in this case. As Π(p) is monotone
increasing in φ, p∗ > 0 if φ > φ.
According to Proposition 1, there will be no principal-agent relationship (i.e.,
p∗ > 0) whenever no eﬀort is implementable or returns to the project are too
small. Recall that the ﬁrst best solution always requires a positive eﬀort level
(pFB > 0) which implies a welfare loss due to the subjectivity of information. In
case of Part (i), the perceived bias of the relationship is too large or the ratio
of costs of conﬂict for the principal and the agent is too small to overcome the
truth-telling problem of the principal (see the discussion of Lemma 5). In Part
(ii), implementable eﬀort levels exist but agency costs are too high to generate
positive proﬁts for the principal.
In the reminder of this section, we will further analyze the case of existing
implementable eﬀort levels (i.e., a suﬃciently low perceived bias α or a suﬃciently
large ratio of conﬂict costs for principal and agent) which also generate positive
proﬁts for the principal (i.e., suﬃciently high returns φ). In particular, we are
interested in the comparative statics of p∗ with respect to the parameters of our
model.
To this end we neglect for the moment the truth-telling constraints of the
principal, i.e., the principal’s proﬁt is given by Π(p) with C(p) = v(p)+pγUA((1−
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q∗)Y + w(q∗)) for all p > 0. This proﬁt function is concave and we denote the
unique maximum by p˜. Furthermore, denote by pmin the (unique) eﬀort level for
which b(p) = bmin and by pmax the (unique) eﬀort level for which b(p) = bmax.7
Then, the following cases can be distinguished.
Lemma 6 Suppose p∗ > 0.
(i) Binding Lower Truth-Telling Constraint: If 0 < p˜ < pmin, then the principal
implements p∗ = pmin by paying bmin [Figure 1].
(ii) Binding Upper Truth-Telling Constraint: If p˜ > pmax, then the principal
implements p∗ = pmax by paying bmax [Figure 2].
(iii) Non-Binding Truth-Telling Constraint: If p˜ ∈ [pmin, pmax], then the principal
implements p∗ = p˜ by paying [Figure 3]:
b(p˜) =
v′(p˜) + γUA(Y (1− q∗) + w(q∗))
γAA + γAU
.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 1
[Figures 1-3 here]
With Lemma 6, the comparative statics of p∗ follows from the respective results
for pmin, pmax, and p˜ which are implicitly determined by Lemma 3 and Lemma 4.
Consider ﬁrst the impact of conﬂict costs ψ. Recall that b(p) is independent
of ψ while bmin and bmax are monotone increasing. But as b(p) increases in p, it
follows that pmin and pmax are increasing in ψ. Moreover, the increase of pmax is
steeper than the increase of pmin. Hence, higher costs of conﬂict for the principal
shift the interval of implementable eﬀorts towards larger eﬀorts and increases the
distance between pmin and pmax.
Another clear cut result can be derived for the impact of γAA. b
max increases
in γAA, b
min is independent of γAA, and b(p) decreases. Hence, the larger γAA the
larger pmin and pmax. Moreover, the increase of pmax is steeper such that a larger
probability of consensus about acceptable eﬀorts (measured by γAA) also shifts the
interval of implementable eﬀorts towards larger eﬀorts and increases the distance
between pmin and pmax.
The impact of Y and γUA is more subtle. On the one hand, b(p) is increasing
in Y and γUA such that larger bonuses are needed for the implementation of a
given eﬀort level. As bmax is independent of γUA, this implies that p
max decreases
in γUA. However, b
min is increasing in γUA such that ceteris paribus the bonus
has to be larger in order to be credible. Depending on e.g., the level of ψ, one or
the other eﬀect dominates and pmin is increasing or decreasing in the conditional
probability of conﬂict γUA. It is, however, clear that an increase in γUA reduces
the distance between pmin and pmax. The comparative statics with respect to Y
7Uniqueness follows directly from the monotonicity of b(p) in p and the respective indepen-
dence of bmin and bmax.
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is similar because bmin and bmax both increase in Y (because q∗ increases) and so
does b(p). Again, it depends on the other parameters (e.g., the level of ψ) which
of these eﬀects dominates.
The comparative statics of p˜ is more straightforward and can be summarized
as follows.
Lemma 7 Comparative Statics of p˜
(i) dp˜
dφ
> 0, (ii) dp˜
dψ
< 0, (iii) dp˜
dY
< 0 and (iv) dp˜
dγUA
< 0.
Proof. Consider
Π(p) = pφ− pγUAq∗ψ − C(p)
with C(p) = v(p) + pγUA((1− q∗)Y + w(q∗)). We use the ﬁrst order condition
dΠ
dp
= φ− γUAq∗ψ − v′(p)− γUA(Y (1− q∗) + w(q∗) = 0. (6)
as an implicit function of p˜. We get
dp˜
dφ
= − 1−v′′(p˜) > 0,
dp˜
dψ
= −−γUAq
∗
−v′′(p˜) < 0,
dp˜
dγUA
= −−q
∗ψ − (Y (1− q∗) + w(q∗))
−v′′(p˜) < 0,
dp˜
dY
= −−γUAψ
dq∗
dY
− γUA(1− q∗)
−v′′(p˜) < 0.
Lemma 7 demonstrates that comparative statics of the optimal eﬀort level
is straightforward if the truth-telling constraints do not bind. In this case, the
optimal eﬀort level is certainly increasing in project returns φ, and decreasing in
conﬂict costs ψ. The probability of conﬂict γUA and the psychological costs of
the agent also reduce proﬁts because they increase expected costs of conﬂict and
agency costs.
Welfare Analysis Finally, we want to comment on the welfare eﬀects of self-
esteem and conﬂict in our model. Recall that the agent is always left with rents of
zero such that a welfare analysis amounts to a discussion of the principal’s proﬁts.
We have already shown that the assumptions of our model ensure that pFB > 0
and ΠFB > 0. Until now, we have identiﬁed two diﬀerent sources for welfare-
losses. First, implementable eﬀorts do not have to exist (see Lemma 5) - in which
case p∗ = 0 and Π(p∗) = 0. This may happen because the bias of the relationship
is too large or the ratio of conﬂict costs of the principal to psychological costs
of the agent is too small. Second, even though implementable eﬀort levels exist,
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agency costs are substantial and may make it preferable for the principal not to
hire the agent at all (see Proposition 1(ii)) - this is in particular the case for too
small project returns. As the following result demonstrates, welfare losses are
not restricted to the cases of p∗ = 0 but are a common feature of all parameter
conﬁgurations of our model.
Proposition 2 Suppose pFB is implementable
8
(i) p∗ = pFB if and only if γUA = 0. Then, ΠFB = Π(p∗).
(ii) Suppose that γUA > 0. Then, pFB > p
∗ and ΠFB > Π(p∗).
Proof. Observe that Π(p) = pφ − pγUAq∗ψ − C(p) equals πFB if γUA = 0.
According to Lemma 7(iv), dp˜
dγUA
< 0. This implies Part (i) and pFB > p
∗ whenever
γUA > 0. ΠFB > Π(p
∗) follows from the strict optimality of pFB.
A ﬁrst best outcome can only be achieved with perfectly correlated signals
(Part(i)). If the signals are imperfectly correlated, expected costs of conﬂict and
agency costs (i.e., the compensation of the agent’s psychological costs) lead to
optimal eﬀort levels (and proﬁts) strictly below the ﬁrst best (Part(ii)).
4 The Evaluation Process
Until now, we have investigated optimal contract design for a given information
technology. In reality, however, the quality of the evaluation process is to a large
extent endogenously determined. The principal can, for example, decide how much
time he spends on supervising the agent in the accomplishment of his project. He
could (i) sit next to the agent during the whole project, or (ii) close the door to
his oﬃce and only look at the result. Intuitively, the quality of the signal might be
much better under the ﬁrst evaluation procedure.9 As a benchmark, Proposition
2 indicates that the principal should choose a perfectly correlated signal if pFB
can be implemented with a credible bonus. In general, however, the feasibility of
a perfectly correlated signal and the implementability of pFB cannot be taken for
granted (for implementability see Lemma 3). This will be the starting point of
the following investigation.
In this section, we assume that the principal not only ﬁxes the terms of con-
tract (i.e., the bonus b and ﬁxed payments f), but can also modify the information
technology. To be speciﬁc, we follow MacLeod (2003) in parameterizing the con-
ditional probabilities γsP ,sA with the probability that the principal receives the
8Observe that there is always a conﬂict level ψ which guarantees this (see the discussion of
Lemma 3).
9Note that we explicitly avoid terms like and here (as e.g. used in Falk &
Kosfeld (2006) and Ellingsen & Johannesson (2007). The choice of the quality of the evaluation
procedure has an inﬂuence on how well the principal can observe an acceptable eﬀort given that
the project is a success. Therefore, the higher the quality of the principal’s evaluation process,
the higher the probability that the agent is rewarded in case of success. A higher quality is,
hence, not regarded as negative by the agent.
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signal sP = A denoted by g, the probability with which the agent has the same
evaluation as the principal denoted by ρ and the probability with which the agent
receives sA = A given that his signal is independent from the evaluation of the
principal denoted by x [see also MacLeod (2003): 228]. Hence, g measures the
quality of the principal’s signal, ρ indicates the correlation between the agent’s
and the principal’s signal - or the probability of an independent judgment - and x
quantiﬁes the quality of the agent’s signal if he forms an independent judgment.
As an illustration for this parameterization consider an evaluation process for
end-of-the-year bonuses for managers. The board ﬁxes a checklist with elements
of managerial performance which are assumed to be correlated with ﬁrm success.
The stronger the relation between the points on the checklist and actual ﬁrm suc-
cess, the better the boards (the principal’s) signal (i.e. the larger g). For a given
checklist, there is the probability ρ that the agent comes to the same judgment
(about ﬁrm success) following the list. Finally, independent of the checklist, the
agent has an independent judgment of his impact on ﬁrm success and the extent
to which he deserves the bonus. While the latter cannot be inﬂuenced by the
principal, it seems reasonable to assume that the design of the checklist can inﬂu-
ence g (and perhaps ρ which will be discussed at the end of this section). In what
follows, we assume that ρ < 1 and x > 0, and that the principal can costlessly
choose g.
Perceived Bias of the Relationship Using g, ρ, and x, we get
γAA = g (ρ + (1− ρ) x) and γUA = (1− g) (1− ρ)x.
Thus, the perceived bias of the relationship α = γUA
γAA
is given by
α =
(1− g)
g
(1− ρ) x
(ρ + (1− ρ) x) . (7)
Eqn. (7) demonstrates that the principal can choose any α between 0 and ∞
with an appropriate choice of g. This implies that he can inﬂuence the agent’s
psychological costs Y (α) and, hence, the optimal conﬂict level q∗(α) as follows.
Lemma 8 Comparative Statics w.r.t. g
(i) dα
dg
< 0, limg→0α = ∞ and limg→1α = 0.
(ii) dY (α)
dg
< 0 and limg→1Y (α) > 0.
(iii) dq
∗(α)
dg
≤ 0 and limg→1q∗(α) > 0.
(iv) ∂C(p)
∂g
≤ 0.
Proof. (i) follows directly from Eqn. (7). (ii) follows directly from (i) together
with the fact that dY (α)
dα
> 0 and Y (α) < 0 for α = 0. (iii) follows directly from
(ii) together with the fact that dq
∗
dY
≥ 0 and teh properties of w(q). (iv) follows
from the deﬁnition of C(p), Part (ii) and dγUA
dg
< 0.
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The lower the quality of the principal’s signal, the higher the perceived bias of
the relationship (Part(i)) and the larger the agent’s psychological costs (Part(ii)).
More intuitively, the lower the quality of the evaluation procedure that the princi-
pal uses to assess the agent’s performance, the angrier the agent gets and the more
he is willing to harm the principal whom he regards responsible for the choice of
g.
Implementable Eﬀorts As discussed in the previous section, an eﬀort p > 0
is implementable for a given information technology if and only if the incentive
compatible bonus b(p) is between the maximal and minimal bonus bmax and bmin
which can credibly guarantee truthtelling by the principal. The following Lemma
displays the comparative statics of
bmin =
(1− ρ)x
(1− ρx)q
∗ψ,
bmax = (ρ + (1− ρ)x)q∗ψ, and
b(p) =
1
g
(v′(p) + (1− g)(1− ρ)x(Y (1− q∗) + w(q∗))).
with respect to g.
Lemma 9 (i) db
min
dg
≤ 0 and limg→0 bmin < ∞.
(ii) db
max
dg
≤ 0 and limg→0 bmax < ∞.
(iii) db(p)
dg
< 0 and limg→0 b(p) =∞.
Proof. (i) and (ii) follow directly from dq
∗
dg
≤ 0 and q∗ ≤ 1. (iii) is an immediate
consequence of dY
dg
< 0 and the deﬁnition of b(p).
Lemma 8 and 9 determine the possible scenarios for implementability of an
eﬀort level p > 0 as depicted in Figure 4.
Lemma 10 We can distinguish the following cases:
(i) Case 1. b(p) > bmax for all g.
Then, p > 0 can not be implemented.
(ii) Case 2. b(p) ≤ bmax for some g < 1 but b(p) > bmax for g = 1.
Then, p > 0 is implemented with the maximal g for which b(p) = bmax.
(iii) Case 3. b(p) ≤ bmax for some g < 1 but b(p) < bmin for g = 1.
Then, p > 0 is implemented with the maximal g for which b(p) = bmin.
(iv) Case 4. b(p) ∈ [bmin, bmax] for g = 1.
Then, p > 0 is implemented with b(p) at g = 1.
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Proof. Follows from Lemma 8 and 9.
[Figures 4 and 5 here]
Figure 4 shows Case 2. in which b(p) ≤ bmax for some g < 1. The optimal
bonus and signal quality is denoted bmax and g. Figure 5, on the other hand,
shows Case 3. in which b(p) ≤ bmax for some g < 1 but b(p) < bmin for g = 1.
In this case the optimal bonus and signal quality is respectively denoted as bmin
and g.10 Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate that an eﬀort level p ∈ [pmin, pmax] is
implementable (with an individually rational and incentive compatible contract
and an appropriate signal quality g) if for any g ∈ [0, 1] there exists a b(p) such
that b(p) ≤ bmax. The principal implements p most eﬃciently, i.e. at lowest cost,
by choosing the highest possible g (recall that ∂C(p)
∂g
< 0).
The following example shows that all cases can occur in our model.
Example 1 Let w(q) = 1
2
q2, v(p) = 1
2
p2, Y = (0.1 + α). Then, q∗ = (0.1 + α) if
(0.1 + α) ≤ 1 and q∗ = 1 otherwise. Moreover, pFB = φ.
Fix, ρ = 1/2, x = 1/2, and φ = 1/2.
• Let ψ = 1. Then, b(p) > bmax for all g (Case 1).
• Let ψ = 4. Then, b(p) ≤ bmax for some g < 1 and b(p) > bmax for g = 1
(Case 2).
• Let ψ = 100. Then, b(p) ≤ bmax for some g < 1 and b(p) < bmin for g = 1
(Case 3).
• Let ψ = 10. Then, b(p) ∈ [bmin, bmax] for g = 1 (Case 4).
As suggested by the example, Case 1. (Case 3.) will be the relevant description
of implementability if the level of conﬂict ψ is suﬃciently small (large) as the
following result indicates.
Lemma 11 Suppose p > 0. Then, Case 1 holds whenever ψ is suﬃciently small
and Case 3 holds, whenever ψ is suﬃciently large.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 3, Lemma 9(iii), and the fact that b(p) does
not depend on ψ.
Lemma 11 implies that the principal will not choose g = 1 to implement a
certain eﬀort level whenever ψ is too large. This explains the endogenous choice
of an imperfect information technology by the principal even if the quality of the
signal is costless.11
10We only focus on and in the graphical representation for simplicity. Note that
and can likewise be analyzed in the same setting.
11To see that an eﬀort level which is not implementable with g = 1 can indeed be optimal
consider the case of very large conﬂict levels ψ. Then, bmin > b(p) at g = 1 for all eﬀort levels
p > 0. If φ is suﬃciently large (for instance larger than the level of conﬂict), a positive eﬀort
level will nonetheless be optimal.
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Welfare Implications The previous paragraph demonstrated that if the princi-
pal can decide upon the quality of his own signal, the set of implementable eﬀorts
will be larger as compared to the situation in which the information technology
was exogenously given. However, a certain eﬀort level does not have to be imple-
mentable (Case 1), or is not implementable at g = 1 (Cases 2 and 3). This holds
in particular for pFB which leads to the following result.
Proposition 3 Let ρ < 1 and suppose Case 1, 2 or 3 describes implementability
of pFB.
12 Then, p∗ < pFB and Π(p∗) < ΠFB.
Proof. Consider Case 1. As pFB is not implementable, p
∗ < pFB (possibly p∗ = 0)
will be implemented and Π(p∗) < ΠFB follows from the unique optimality of pFB.
Consider Case 2 and 3. Then pFB can not be implemented with g = 1. Hence,
marginal costs of eﬀort implementation C ′(pFB) > v′(pFB) which implies p∗ < pFB
and thereby Π(p∗) < ΠFB.
According to Proposition 3, the ﬁrst best solution will not necessarily be im-
plemented by the principal even if he can choose any signal quality at zero costs.
As indicated by Lemma 11 this will be the case for instance whenever conﬂict level
ψ is above a certain threshold.
How do these results translate if the principal can choose correlation ρ? First
of all, an information technology with perfectly correlated signals (i.e., ρ = 1)
becomes feasible. For ρ = 1, bmin = 0, bmax = q∗ψ, and b(p) = v
′(p)
g
. Suppose for
the moment that g is ﬁxed. In this case, the principal will implement pFB whenever
b(pFB) ≤ bmax. Otherwise (and this will be the case if ψ is suﬃciently small) he
will - analogously to Proposition 3 - implement a lower eﬀort level (p∗ < pFB)
which indicates a welfare loss. This argument does not change if the principal can
choose both g and ρ, because bmax = q∗ψ can still be smaller than b(p) = v′(pFB)
which is e.g., the case whenever ψ < φ. I.e., if the return of the project is bigger
than the level of conﬂict, the principal will not implement a ﬁrst best eﬀort level
- even if he can decide upon the quality of his own signal and the correlation of
signals.
5 Concluding Remarks
The analysis of our model revealed that self-esteem and the individual’s eagerness
to protect it may facilitate principal-agent relationships even if performance sig-
nals are subjective and no third-party can enforce truth-telling. However, only if
signals are perfectly correlated, a ﬁrst best can be achieved - even if the princi-
pal can costlessly choose the quality of his own signal. For imperfectly correlated
signals, positive eﬀort levels will be implemented by the principal if proﬁts and
costs of conﬂict are suﬃciently large. As an incentive compatible contract has
to compensate the agent for eﬀort costs and expected psychological costs, the
implemented eﬀort level will be below the ﬁrst best eﬀort.
12Example 1 and Lemma 11 show that this holds true for an appropriate choice of ψ.
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This qualiﬁes to some extent the results in MacLeod (2003) which claim the
existence of implementable eﬀort levels regardless of the details of the relationship.
The positive result of MacLeod (2003) is crucially depending on the credibility and
ﬂexibility of the third-party payments. While in his model, every payment to a
third-party was a credible promise, the speciﬁc nature of conﬂict in our setting
imposes tighter constraints on the set of feasible contracts. Moreover, following
the interpretation of third-party payments as endogenous costs of conﬂict [see
MacLeod (2003), p.229], our analysis demonstrates that the feasibility of welfare-
optimal solutions in MacLeod (2003) crucially hinges on the fact that conﬂicts do
not impose any costs on the agent. If - as in our model - conﬂicts entail some costs
for the agent, the need to compensate for these costs raises agency costs above
the ﬁrst best level and prevents welfare optimal solutions even if the truth-telling
problem is not an obstacle.
In the extended version of the model we assume that the principal has control
over the choice of his evaluation procedure. More precisely, we assume that the
principal does not only have to choose the optimal compensation scheme, but
can also choose among diﬀerent evaluation procedures that diﬀer in the quality
of their subjective performance signal. In particular, the agent’s psychological
costs increase in the bias of the information technology. This resembles a case
of procedural concerns as conceptualized by Sebald (2007) in a general class of
models with belief-dependent utility. Interestingly, our model shows that it may
be optimal for the principal to choose a procedure which is not minimizing the
agent’s psychological costs - even if it is costless to do so - but rather facilitates
the credible implementation of a positive eﬀort level.
Our assumptions on psychological costs are rather ad-hoc. We simply for-
malized the results from the literature in social psychology in a straightforward
functional form. We opted for this approach as the main purpose of this paper is
the discussion of promoting and inhibiting factors for principal-agent relationships
in which neither eﬀort nor output can be measured objectively.
Furthermore, we have chosen to model the agent as risk-neutral and with
unlimited liability. While this obviously promoted expositional ease, it focuses on
the special case of a principal-agent relationship which never leaves a rent to the
agent. In case of risk-averse or limitedly liable agents, a non-trivial dependence of
the agent’s rents on his sensitivity to ego-threats and the quality of the information
technology is to be expected and deﬁnitely worth an investigation. Our results
with respect to break-downs of the relationship are, however, not expected to
depend on these assumptions.
Finally, it is known since long [see Malcomson (1984)] that the problem of
non-enforceable contracts in the presence of subjective performance measures is
easily solved if the principal has to deal with a team of agents and can pay them
according to a ranking with pre-committed payments for each rank. If agents
do not suﬀer from psychological costs in these kind of tournaments, a ﬁrst best
can be achieved and performance pay as characterized in this paper is always in-
ferior. However, it is an empirical question whether tournaments actually lead
to lower psychological costs. If self-esteem is threatened ﬁercely by the explicit
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announcement that someone-else is better, incentive compatible payments in the
tournament have to compensate the corresponding expected psychological costs.
This may well lead to an inferiority of such a scheme and promote performance
pay as discussed in our paper, where self-esteem is not threatened by a relative
performance measure but by an absolute evaluation. In this respect, new labora-
tory experiments could shed some light on the optimal design of payment schemes
in the case of subjective performance evaluation.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2: To save on notation, we denote Y (tP = k, sA = l, α)(1−
q∗) + w(q∗) ≡ Ykl throughout this proof.
Part (i). Without loss of generality, suppose that Γ is a revelation contract,
i.e., the principal and the agent tell the truth under contract Γ. As Γ implements
p > 0, the incentive compatibility constraint
Σk∈SP ,l∈SA(Ykl + ckl)
dPr{sP = k, sA = l}
dp
= v′(p)
is satisﬁed. Consider a contract Γˆ which ﬁxes payments of cˆk =
∑
l∈SA cklPr{sP =
k, sA = l} if the principal receives signal sP = k, i.e., payments are independent
of sA. These payments also satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (see
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above).13 Moreover, the agent always tells the truth due to indiﬀerence. Finally,
the principal’s truth-telling constraint is also satisﬁed under Γˆ. To see this observe
that the principal reports k given that he has received k under contract Γ if
Pr{sA = A|sP = k}(coA − ckA) + Pr{sA = U |sP = k}(coU − ckU) (8)
≥ Pr{sA = A|sP = k}((q∗ψ)kA − (q∗ψ)oA)
+Pr{sA = U |sP = k}((q∗ψ)kU − (q∗ψ)oU)
for all o ∈ SP (where (q∗ψ)tA,tP denotes the anticipated conﬂict costs for a reported
conﬁguration (tA, tP )). This set of inequalities holds because Γ implements truth-
telling by assumption. Γˆ implements truth-telling if
cˆo − cˆk ≥ Pr{sA = A|sP = k}((q∗ψ)kA − (q∗ψ)oA) (9)
+Pr{sA = U |sP = k}((q∗ψ)kU − (q∗ψ)oU).
holds for all o, k ∈ SP . Inserting cˆk and cˆo yields
Pr{sA = A|sP = k}(coA − ckA) + Pr{sA = U |sP = k}(coU − ckU)
≥ Pr{sA = A|sP = k}((q∗ψ)kA
−(q∗ψ)oA) + Pr{sA = U |sP = k}((q∗ψ)kU − (q∗ψ)oU).
which coincides with System 8 and therefore shows that for Γˆ the principal’s
truthtelling constraint is satisﬁed as well. Hence, any revelation contract Γ can
be substituted by a revelation contract Γˆ with ckl independent of l which also
implements p > 0 and leaves the principal weakly better oﬀ.
Part (ii). Suppose by contradiction that Γ implements p > 0 with cA = g and
cU = g +  with  ≥ 0. Then, the incentive compatibility constraint of the agent
can be written as
 =
v′(p)− γUAYUA
(γUA + γUU − 1) . (10)
Observe that the numerator of the rhs is positive for every p > 0 and vanishes
for p = 0 while the denominator is negative. Hence, the rhs is negative and the
incentive compatibility constraint is not satisﬁed for any p > 0 and  > 0. For
 = 0, the incentive compatibility constraint is solved by p = 0. A contradiction.

13Individual rationality is trivially fulﬁlled as expected payments for the agent are the same
under Γ and Γˆ.
151
152
Short Curriculum Vitae
Alexander Sebald was born on October 28, 1976 in Bergisch Gladbach, Germany.
In 1996 Alexander ﬁnished high school (Gymnasium) and started his national
service in the German Navy. From 1997 till 2002 he studied International Eco-
nomic Studies at Maastricht University. During that time Alexander also spend
a year (2000 - 2001) in Milan, Italy, participating in an Erasmus exchange at the
Universita Commerciale Luigi Bocconi and working as an intern at McKinsey &
Company. After his graduation from Maastricht University in 2002 and a long voy-
age to India, China and South East Asia, Alexander started as a PhD-student at
the Department of Economics of Maastricht University in 2003. Without leaving
Maastricht, Alexander followed his supervisor Georg Kirchsteiger to the European
Center for Advanced Research in Economic and Statistics at the Universite´ Libre
de Bruxelles in 2004.
His research interests are: Behavioral Economics, Psychological Game Theory,
Experimental Economics and Contract Theory.
153
